Just Say No: Authority, Disobedience, and Individuation in Some of Sam Peckinpah’s Minor Films by Felten, Ron
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
May 2017
Just Say No: Authority, Disobedience, and
Individuation in Some of Sam Peckinpah’s Minor
Films
Ron Felten
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Film and Media Studies Commons, Philosophy Commons, and the Sociology
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Felten, Ron, "Just Say No: Authority, Disobedience, and Individuation in Some of Sam Peckinpah’s Minor Films" (2017). Theses and
Dissertations. 1466.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1466
JUST SAY NO: AUTHORITY, DISOBEDIENCE, AND INDIVIDUATION 
IN SOME OF SAM PECKINPAH’S MINOR FILMS 
by 
Ronald J. Felten, Jr. 
A Dissertation Submitted in 
Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in English 
at 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
May 2017 
ABSTRACT 
JUST SAY NO: AUTHORITY, DISOBEDIENCE, AND INDIVIDUATION 
IN SOME OF SAM PECKINPAH’S MINOR FILMS 
by 
Ronald J. Felten, Jr. 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017 
Under the Supervision of Professor Tasha Oren 
Sam Peckinpah is best known for his films The Wild Bunch (1969) and Pat Garrett and Billy the 
Kid (1973), and quite a bit of the existing scholarly work on Peckinpah focuses on these two 
films; what’s more, much of the work that does exist on his other films tends to be subjective and 
celebratory. The aim of this project is to critically and soberly examine Peckinpah’s relatively 
minor works and from particular perspectives. Specifically, this dissertation focuses on one of 
the major thematic threads that runs through all of the director’s films, both major and minor: 
how ordinary people individuate themselves through their opposition to power and capital. For 
Peckinpah, power takes many forms. God (and religion, generally) is an integral character in The 
Ballad of Cable Hogue (1970), for example, and violent mobs, the police, and corrupt 
businessmen and politicians serve as antagonists in some of the other films examined here. 
Peckinpah’s protagonists all battle these forces, to varying degrees of success, and in turn attempt 
to affirm their own identities through this rejection. In addition to the film scholars used in this 
project, Erich Fromm, Carl Jung, and David Harvey are a few of the thinkers employed in my 
analysis of these films, primarily Peckinpah’s road movies and non-Westerns. 
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 Introduction 
Sam Peckinpah is best remembered for his Westerns, and much of the existing criticism 
on his work focuses on these films in particular. Further, the scholarship that takes up these 
movies too often discusses them in an oddly celebratory manner. One of the primary aims of this 
project, then, is to take a more critical approach to Peckinpah’s oeuvre. Specifically, my goal is 
to examine these films, and especially the relatively minor and not so frequently discussed ones, 
objectively and soberly. While Peckinpah was an innovative and often compelling filmmaker, he 
was far from perfect and his filmography is uneven, to say the least. 
Again, I am most interested in those Peckinpah films that have not received a lot of 
attention. For that reason, you will not find much discussion here of ​The Wild Bunch ​ and ​Pat 
Garrett and Billy the Kid ​; instead, I will analyze movies like ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​, ​Straw 
Dogs ​, ​The Getaway​, and ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​, films that are not widely 
discussed or even particularly highly regarded. While it is true that many of Peckinpah’s “minor” 
films are not quite masterpieces, they still have a lot to offer; at the very least, they help us 
recognize and understand some of Peckinpah’s major thematic concerns, and chief among them 
is the relationship between power--in the forms of both money and authority--and the process of 
individuation for the “everyman.”  Even more specifically, I’ll argue here that Peckinpah’s 1
primary obsession was with how people come to define themselves through their rejection of the 
1 ​As Jim Kitses writes in “Sam Peckinpah: The Savage Eye” from ​Horizons West​: “Peckinpah is fond of describing 
the thematic continuity of his work in terms of a preoccupation with losers […], misfits and drifters. Certainly, the 
work of few directors is so peopled with characters who are emotionally, spiritually, or physically crippled. 
However, more precisely, Peckinpah’s characters suffer from not knowing who they are: above all, it is the quest for 
personal identity that provides the dramatic action of his films, a quest seen both in terms of a meaningful 
confrontation or dialogue with the past, and a tortured struggle to achieve mastery over self-annihilating and savage 
impulses” (141). 
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 powerful and corrupt figures who seek to control them.  It is a sort of negative affirmation that 2
can be traced back to, at least, Erich Fromm, Carl Jung, and Sigmund Freud, and I’ll discuss their 
ideas vis-a-vis Peckinpah’s work in considerable detail. Further, Peckinpah’s ostensibly 
libertarian but ultimately humanistic philosophy will be considered with regard to the time 
period during which he produced his films; that is, how did the politics of his time affect his 
ideas about individual liberties vis-a-vis the dictates of the larger society and state, and how do 
Peckinpah’s film differ from those of his peers?  In other words, I will explore the question of 3
how his films are both products of and responses to his time, e.g. the Vietnam War, Watergate, 
political assassinations, road movies, and so on. Finally, I will also consider the representation 
and function of violence in Peckinpah’s films. While I take issue with some of the director’s 
claims regarding why he employed violence the way he did, particularly with regard to his 
invocation of Aristotle’s theories about catharsis, I also think Peckinpah’s use of violence was 
purposeful and ultimately effective in terms of serving his themes. The violence in his films is 
not, in other words, gratuitous, as some have charged. 
Though I’m reluctant to use a cliche here, this project has been a labor of love for me and 
has its roots in my preliminary exam, which focused on the representations in film and literature 
2 ​What most often troubles Peckinpah’s protagonists is the stifling limitations and impositions of an increasingly 
capitalistic and industrial society. For this type of society to function, its members or participants must shed their 
instinctive drives, their primalism; they must willingly sacrifice, to some extent, their autonomy so this society can 
operate in an orderly manner. Property rights must be respected, for example, and we must more or less respect the 
ostensibly unfair distribution of wealth—bank owners and railroad executives, in Peckinpah’s films, begin 
accumulating massive wealth while other, less privileged, less innovative, and less predatory citizens lead 
hand-to-mouth existences. Peckinpah’s protagonists find themselves in between these two poles: they have a desire 
to accumulate capital for themselves but what is seemingly equally important to them is a certain kind of justice and 
freedom. 
3 ​Sartre, in ​Existentialism is a Humanism ​, writes: “[W]e do not believe in the idea of progress. Progress implies 
improvement, but man is always the same, confronting a situation that is forever changing, while choice always 
remains a choice in any situation” (47). He also writes: “Nowhere is it written that good exists” (28-9). In other 
words, all things are possible; what society deems “good” might change and no a priori values or truths exist. 
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 of existentialism in the suburbs and shopping malls. Specifically, I was most interested in these 
spaces as somehow representative of a new Eden, full of promise and wonder.  After further 4
consideration and research, I eventually decided to go back even further to examine this same 
idea in filmic depictions of the the American West. More specifically still, I decided to focus on 
the films of Sam Peckinpah, who as much as any other filmmaker, was consumed by the idea of 
escaping society’s confines in order to begin again. 
The first chapter here came about as a result of me reading Carl Jung’s ​Answer to Job 
and, around the same time and as a total coincidence, watching Peckinpah’s ​The Ballad of Cable 
Hogue​. I found that the former text helped me to develop a unique insight into the latter text, and 
this methodology inspired me to go further. I remember a few years back hearing a graduate 
conference presentation during which the speaker championed the practice of pairing ostensibly 
unrelated or even random texts in an effort to develop new insights like this, and I’ve been a fan 
of this methodology ever since. That said, Jung’s book and Peckinpah’s film are obviously far 
from being unrelated, and some of the textual pairings in this project are even more deliberate; 
for example, I use Aristotle’s ​Poetics ​ in the second chapter on ​Straw Dogs ​ because Peckinpah 
himself often cited this work as a major inspiration and influence, especially with regard to the 
concept of catharsis. Additionally, I use Erich Fromm’s work throughout the project because his 
ideas on individuation seem, more so than any others, most germane with regard to Peckinpah’s 
primary thematic concern: how one defines him- or herself through the rejection of and rebellion 
4 ​Leo Marx, writing in ​The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America​, suggests: “The 
pastoral ideal has been used to define the meaning of America ever since the age of discovery, and it has not yet lost 
its hold upon the native imagination” (3). He continues: “The ruling motive of the good shepherd, leading figure of 
the classic, Virgilian mode, was to withdraw from the great world and begin a new life in a fresh, green landscape. 
And now here was a virgin continent!” (3). If this doesn’t describe the typical Peckinpah protagonist, I don’t know 
what does. 
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 against dominating political and business/capitalistic forces (Peckinpah saw power and capital as 
the primary corrupting forces and the things that most powerfully stood in the way to one’s 
realization of a desire for happiness, freedom, and individuation). While these concepts apply to 
the third chapter on Peckinpah’s road movies as well, I also bring in some specific scholarship 
on the genre there in an effort to better understand Peckinpah’s place in it and the extent to which 
his rebellion against generic conventions either helped establish his contributions as remarkable 
or, somewhat ironically, what I dub conservative. Finally, the last chapter in this project focuses 
on Peckinpah’s presentation of aestheticized violence; specifically, I analyze how he crafts and 
presents violence and why he depicts it in this way. In other words, who were his influences with 
regard to aestheticized violence, what purposes did his employment of this violence serve, and 
who are the Peckinpah heirs and proteges on this point? Much of this chapter focuses on the 
question of why screen violence is and is not attractive, and I consider the ways in which 
Peckinpah adhered to and violated the apparent rules regarding “attractive” screen violence in his 
last few films. 
To be clear, my aim here is not to defend Peckinpah. Indeed, he made some mediocre 
films; however, there is no denying that many of his movies have a certain charm or appeal, even 
when they are sometimes uncomfortable to watch. That is another thing that interests me: aside 
from the films that were plagued by battles with producers and ultimately suffered from recuts, 
why would he make films that are, on a visceral level, more than occasionally hard to watch? 
Why aestheticize the rape scene in ​Straw Dogs ​ the way he did, for example? How does this 
aestheticization serve a larger thematic purpose or argument? Those are some of the primary 
questions I set out to investigate and understand through the undertaking of this project. In 
4 
 addition, my purpose is to also balance out some of the celebratory, subjective criticism that 
exists on Peckinpah. Though, of course, there are some outstanding Peckinpah scholars out there 
(e.g. Stephen Prince, Jim Kitses, Paul Seydor, etc.), but--and this is a question to which I still 
don’t have an answer--they are the exceptions; it is difficult to understand why so much 
Peckinpah scholarship is unashamedly celebratory (e.g. Cordell Strug). So that was another goal: 
to approach and write about Peckinpah’s films from the perspective of a relatively objective 
viewer, as someone who did not have passionate feelings about him one way or the other 
heading into this project. 
There were several texts that proved to be invaluable to me throughout this journey. I’d 
like to discuss some of them briefly: 
First, there’s Carl Jung’s ​Answer to Job ​. Jung’s provocative analysis of The Bible’s Job 
story is what first lit the spark, so to speak, beneath this project. While ​The Ballad of Cable 
Hogue​ is, like many Westerns, clearly a celebration of self-reliance, it is also, as I explain in the 
first chapter, a sort of nihilistic lament; that is, the film seems to argue that while we will be tried 
and tested, whatever victories we earn will be temporary or even illusory. Time marches 
forward, that is, and it has no concern for the individual. Any god that might exist, Peckinpah 
argues, is equally indifferent. Jung’s analysis of the Job story, while he was writing well before 
Peckinpah’s film was produced, opens up this film to interpretive possibilities that are exciting 
and compelling, even if they are troubling. 
The second book that I found myself coming back to again and again throughout my 
work on this project is ​Sam Peckinpah: Interviews ​, which was edited by Kevin J. Hayes. This 
text collects several interviews (including the infamous ​Playboy​ interview from 1972 with 
5 
 William Murray) conducted with Peckinpah over the years and was invaluable in terms of 
helping me understand some of the director’s motives, interests, and techniques, i.e. these 
interviews helped me see what Peckinpah was attempting to do in his films and this allowed me 
to understand the extent to which he was or was not “successful.” While I recognize there are 
problems with auteur theory, I personally find it fascinating to hear in a filmmaker’s own words 
why he or she did what (s)he did and how. That said, I use these interviews merely as 
springboards, places from which I begin further investigation and analysis; in other words, I do 
not uncritically accept Peckinpah’s claims as truth. 
Coupled with the interviews book, Aristotle’s ​On Poetics ​ was also a great resource. 
Peckinpah often cited Aristotle’s theory of catharsis in justification of his use of aestheticized 
violence, and reading Aristotle’s own words, along with the other drama theorists’ I discuss in 
the second chapter, helped me evaluate the effectiveness of Peckinpah’s use of violence in his 
films, particularly ​Straw Dogs ​. Ultimately, I think the filmmaker misunderstood Aristotle’s 
argument, though that does not necessarily invalidate his films or the techniques he employed in 
their creation; instead, these movies are compelling despite the often misguided philosophy 
behind them. 
Erich Fromm’s ​On Disobedience​ was, like Jung’s ​Answer to Job ​, a foundational text for 
me, and it led me to several of Fromm’s other books that are incorporated here. Unlike most of 
my colleagues, I never quite outgrew my existentialism phase, and I’ve always been very 
interested in how both identity and meaning are formed or developed (to this day, I still enjoy 
reading Sartre). Fromm, in this text, argues that we come to be who we are by both asserting our 
beliefs and values and also, and just as important, by rejecting ideas, etc. to which we are 
6 
 opposed--really, these are two sides of the same coin.  And, while this idea might not seem 5
particularly novel to us today, it was still incredibly useful in terms of helping me identify 
Peckinpah’s primary thematic concern: how people react when faced with an oppressive, 
existential threat that is also representative of money and power. Some of Peckinpah’s 
protagonists “succeed” while others “fail” in their battles, but Fromm helped me to recognize 
just how pervasive this idea is in the director’s work and, further, just how traditional 
Peckinpah’s values are (in contrast with his contemporaries) with regard to the morals, goals, and 
fates of his protagonists. 
Michael Bliss’ collection ​Peckinpah Today: New Essays on the Films of Sam Peckinpah 
was also very useful but in a slightly different way. This text, comprised of recent scholarship on 
Peckinpah, gave me a sense of where things stand now with regard to our collective perspective 
on and feelings about the director. In other words, the essays in this book helped me understand 
what is being written about and how; further, it helped me make decisions about which films I 
should focus on, because they receive relatively little attention, and the tone my work should 
strike. 
Similarly, Paul Seydor’s excellent book, ​Peckinpah: The Western Films: A 
Reconsideration ​, was a huge inspiration. Seydor’s prose is a pleasure to read and his analysis of 
Peckinpah’s films greatly inspired my own; while I developed my own insights and arguments, 
Seydor helped show me how to do this. 
My fourth chapter, which focuses on mediated and aestheticized violence, owes a great 
debt to a few texts. First, Christopher Sharrett’s ​Mythologies of Violence in Postmodern Media 
5 ​As Fromm writes, “'Original sin,' far from corrupting man, set him free; it was the beginning of history. Man had 
to leave the Garden of Eden in order to learn to rely on his own powers and to become fully human” (2). 
7 
 provided some great context. While I did not end up directly using many sources from this 
collection, the essays contained therein were incredibly valuable in the way that Seydor’s book 
was: I learned a lot by reading this text about how violence is used in film and for what purpose. 
I also benefitted greatly from one essay in this collection in particular: Tony Williams’ “Woo’s 
Most Dangerous Game: ​Hard Target​ and Neoconservative Violence.” Many people would think 
immediately of Quentin Tarantino when asked to name a contemporary director who makes 
violent films, but William’s essay convinced me that John Woo is probably Peckinpah’s most 
direct descendant in terms of theme and style. Similarly, Guy Deboard’s ​Society of the Spectacle 
and James Kendrick’s ​Film Violence ​ were indispensable with regard to helping me think about 
the aestheticization of violence in cinema. 
Finally, Jeffrey H. Goldstein’s collection ​Why We Watch: The Attractions of Violent 
Entertainment​ was critically important with regard to my attempts to understand exactly why 
viewers are intrigued by violent films. Even more, though, the essays in this volume shed light 
on the importance of aestheticization; that is, if screen violence is to be appealing, it must be 
crafted in such a way that it is, even if we only recognize this on an unconscious level, obviously 
“fake.” Music, film speed, and editing or cutting create a sort of aesthetic distance that permits 
the viewer to process the violence without being revolted by it (though, admittedly, there is a fine 
line between being disturbed and being revolted by screen violence) and, at the same time, this 
aestheticization can make screen violence more effective in terms of facilitating the 
communication of ideas and themes. Specifically, J. Hoberman’s “‘A Test for the Individual 
Viewer’: ​Bonnie and Clyde ​’s Violent Reception,” Goldstein’s introduction, and Clark 
8 
 McCauley’s “When Screen Violence Is Not Attractive” together formed the foundation for the 
fourth chapter of this project. 
Ultimately, this dissertation’s primary purpose is to add to the body of criticism that 
exists on Peckinpah’s films. And, specifically, I aim here to celebrate less and analyze more; that 
is, I do not feel the need to defend Peckinpah or to argue on his behalf. On the contrary, I would 
be the first to argue that his body of work is uneven and flawed. Regardless, I think this project is 
successful in terms of developing new insights from fresh perspectives. What is most interesting 
to me, ultimately, is that while Peckinpah was incredibly conservative in many ways (e.g. he 
almost always celebrated the virtues of marriage and family life and opposed the dominating 
influence of capital vis-a-vis individual liberty), he was at times undeniably innovative when it 
came to technique; his use of slow-motion, multi-camera filming, cutting, and so on, while not 
entirely new, was developed to the point that Peckinpah’s films stand on their own as products of 
a very particular time and representative of a specific viewpoint. His films are, unquestionably, 
responses to the violence of the late 1960s and ‘70s, for example, and they are effective critiques 
of state violence, political corruption, and arguably capitalism as an economic system. The 
aestheticized violence he employs in these films (especially those from the middle years of his 
career), far from being merely exploitative, serves these critiques in interesting and often 
innovative ways; further, it allowed him to represent and examine the complex relationship 
between power/capital and the individual’s desire to live freely, outside of this authority’s 
control and, in some cases, economic enslavement. Peckinpah’s borderline libertarian answer to 
this problem was for individuals to a) remain true to their values while b) attacking, sometimes 
violently, the oppressive power structure in an effort to take back from that system and its 
9 
 representatives as much capital as possible, using it to essentially buy one’s freedom outside of 
the larger society. These ideas reveal just how indebted to the Western genre Peckinpah was; 
even when he was working outside of it, such as with his series of road movies, he still 
championed three of the Western’s key elements: 1) Society is inherently oppressive and 
restrictive, 2) morals must be lived, and 3) violence, in moderation, is a necessary evil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 Divine Darkness in ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​: Sam Peckinpah's Jungian Response to the 
Book of Job 
From Erich Fromm’s “Disobedience as a Psychological 
and Moral Problem”: 
“[H]uman history began with an act of disobedience, and it 
is not unlikely that it will be terminated by an act of 
obedience” (1). 
From Erich Fromm’s “Let Man Prevail”: 
“[M]an can stand on his feet only if, as Marx said, 'he owes 
his existence to himself, if he affirms his individuality as a 
total man in each of his relations to the world, seeing, 
hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, willing, 
loving—in short, if he affirms and expresses all organs of 
his individuality'” (59-60). 
 
Preface ​: 
While it is important to not overstate this, much of the existing scholarship on Sam 
Peckinpah’s films is of a celebratory nature, which is to say that many critics focus largely on 
what, in their eyes, makes Peckinpah a great filmmaker. This type of approach certainly has 
value, but it is also necessarily limited. The purpose of this project, therefore, is twofold: first, to 
take a more critical, i.e. intentionally objective, look at Peckinpah’s work (specifically with 
regard to his themes, arguments, and techniques) and, second, to examine some of his relatively 
11 
 minor, lesser explored films. One cannot fully understand an artist without carefully considering 
each of his/her works, warts and all, and my goal here is not to uncritically celebrate Peckinpah, 
as he was an undoubtedly uneven filmmaker; rather, I want to attempt to understand not only his 
philosophical positions but to track their articulation in the films of his that haven’t received as 
much attention as others (of course, one cannot undertake an endeavor of this nature without 
discussing more acclaimed films like ​The Wild Bunch ​ and ​Pat Garrett and Billy the Kid ​, so I am 
not intentionally ignoring any of his works). 
This first chapter in particular focuses on one of Peckinpah’s most anachronistic films, 
The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​, which is part comedy, part Western, and part musical. Following 
1969’s ​The Wild Bunch ​, ​Hogue​ was an obvious departure in many ways; aside from the genre 
mashup, this film presents a tender and romantic -- if also sentimental and nostalgic -- vision, 
one at odds with many of Peckinpah’s other works that express what some have described as a 
nihilistic philosophy. That said, this film also shares similarities with the other works in the 
director’s oeuvre, namely an aggressive and passionate critique of authority and power 
(represented here by God) and its corrupt and abusive nature vis-a-vis the “common man” and, 
conversely, a celebration of individuality and disobedience. (Another common thread is 
Peckinpah’s continued use of Bible stories to highlight injustice and critique both conventional 
Christianity and the pioneers’ invocation of it to justify greed, theft, racism, murder, etc., i.e. 
Manifest Destiny.) While this theme was, to varying degrees, articulated in each of Peckinpah’s 
works and in more than a few other Westerns, and its uneven articulation is really the central 
focus of this project, it is most explicit in ​Hogue​, making this a logical jumping-off point for this 
project; here Peckinpah in some ways suggests that the corrupt bankers and politicians of his 
12 
 other films are merely following God’s example, or their self-serving interpretation of it.  (A 6
note here, too, about the aforementioned genre-crossing this film does: Peckinpah’s obsession 
with capital, power, and corruption seems to me to be so central to him as an artist that it, in part, 
explains why he worked in so many different genres, i.e. his desperation to articulate this critique 
motivated him to repackage it in as many ways as he could, and an examination of Peckinpah’s 
exploration of various genres is another thread that runs through this project. The musical 
numbers in this film, for example, soften the critique’s edge, perhaps making it more palatable 
for the average viewer, especially when compared to films like ​The Wild Bunch ​ or ​Bring Me the 
Head of Alfredo Garcia ​.) 
 
 
 
 
6 In addition to Cable Hogue, the protagonist of this film, the supporting characters in ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue 
serve to underscore Peckinpah's interest in scrutinizing questions of biblical moral justice. The Reverend Joshua 
Duncan Sloane (David Warner) is a nomadic womanizing preacher, for example, and serves as a foil to the simple, 
pragmatic Hogue. Hildy (Stella Stevens) is a prostitute who, as we have seen in other Westerns, is banished from 
town and becomes Hogue's love interest. As Michael Bliss notes in ​Justified Lives: Morality & Narrative in the 
Films of Sam Peckinpah​, “Hildy most clearly recalls Mary Magdalene, the saintly whore” (128). Together, the 
characters of Hogue, Josh, and Hildy represent a personification of the attributes Jung assigns to God in ​Answer to 
Job​: Hogue is vengeful but kind, Josh is conniving and sex-obsessed yet ultimately pious, and Hildy is materialistic 
but warm-hearted. Each of these characters, like Jung’s God, is an antinomy and a paradox; however, unlike the God 
of the Job story, they are sympathetic and admirable; their fallibility and humility serve to present a kind of 
humanistic, pragmatic morality that is arguably more just in nature than God’s. In other words, as in the story of Job, 
the God of Cable Hogue’s world is at best merely a present yet mostly disinterested (except where matters of His 
respect and power are concerned) spectator and, at worst, He is a sadistic megalomaniac. In turn, His moral 
commandments are rendered irrelevant and Hogue must create his own moral code, one that has him acting as the 
benevolent lord of his own patch of the desert, Cable Springs. Here we have an inverse of the notion put forth in 
Genesis that man was created in God’s image: in Cable Springs, God is created in man's image, as man creates his 
own god, which in turn requires man to create his own morality whereby men must be more good than not, 
despite—or perhaps because of—the lack of inherent cosmic order or justice. Further, like man, the god created here 
is imperfect. As Bernard F. Dukore writes in ​Sam Peckinpah's Feature Films ​, citing Job 1:21 (“The Lord gave, and 
the Lord hath taken away”), “​The Ballad of Cable Hogue​ seems to emphasize the arbitrariness of God” (32). 
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 Introduction ​: 
The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ (1970) is a significant Sam Peckinpah film relative to the 
director's body of work as a whole for several reasons, not least of which is that ​Hogue​ straddles 
several generic lines: sandwiched between two of Peckinpah’s most memorable and 
controversial films, ​The Wild Bunch ​ (1969) and ​Straw Dogs ​ (1971), which have been called 
nihilistic and fascistic, ​Hogue​ is mostly subdued and sweet, ostensibly sharing more in common 
with the Jane Fonda vehicle ​Cat Ballou ​ (dir. Elliot Silverstein, 1965) with its fast-motion 
slapstick comedy and cornball musical numbers than the carnage and ennui with which 
Peckinpah is commonly associated. 
Hogue​ is also the film wherein Peckinpah most explicitly deals with what one might call 
“moral questions.” The parallels between ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ and the Bible's Job story 
have been explored by many critics, but these comparisons tend to break down, specifically 
because scholars can’t effectively explain Hogue’s death (Hogue is played by Jason Robards) at 
the end of the film without either rationalizing Hogue’s demise from a position of Christian 
apologetics or by abandoning the Biblical narrative -- and specifically the Job story -- altogether, 
i.e. contrary to Job’s rewards for his loyalty, Hogue is run over and killed by an automobile just 
as he is about to run off with his prostitute girlfriend, Hildy (Stella Stevens). This motif of new 
technologies representing the end of an era is fairly common in Westerns, and particularly with 
Peckinpah, but it upsets attempts to read the character of Hogue as simply Job-in-the-West. 
Carl Jung’s book, ​Answer to Job ​ (1952), however, serves as a lens through which we 
might view ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​, and it allows for an interesting interpretation of both the 
Biblical story and, in turn, the film with which we’re presently concerned: instead of serving as a 
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 straight Job-like character, Hogue is arguably more similar to the the paradoxical God of the Old 
Testament or even the sacrificed Jesus; what's more, using Jung as inspiration, I contend that 
Hogue is revealed to be more moral and just than his supposed creator, who is depicted in both 
the Job story and Peckinpah’s film as an antinomy (that is, good and evil, both prosecutor and 
judge) and not as wholly benevolent. At the very least, Peckinpah’s film functions as a critique 
of God’s behavior vis-a-vis Job and, interestingly, as a subtle critique of Job himself. 
 
Overview of Job ​: 
The general plot of the Job story is well known: God tests Job’s faith by allowing Satan 
to subject Job to incredible losses -- his livestock are stolen, his children are killed, and he’s 
afflicted with agonizing sores -- as Satan argues that Job is only pious because God has protected 
him. Despite these trials and the advice of his wife, who in 2:9 demands that Job “Curse God and 
die,” the hero remains faithful and is eventually rewarded by God, who “made him prosperous 
again and gave him twice as much as he had before” (Job 42:10). According to the story, Job was 
also blessed with 10 new children, who were more beautiful than his first, and finally died at the 
age of 140, “old and full of years” (Job 42:16-17). 
These are just the basic plot points, but what’s important here is that, generally, the story 
of Job is interpreted by many Christians in such a way as to suggest that God will reward those 
who remain faithful and obedient to Him in the face of adversity. Questions and various 
interpretations arise when one looks beyond these basics, of course, such as why God feels the 
need to prove Himself to Satan, for example, or why Job in particular is singled out. With regard 
to the latter question, philosopher René Girard discusses in his book ​Job, the Victim of His 
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 People​ (1985/7), what he views as the glaring contradictions between Job’s prologue and the rest 
of the text, namely that Job is presented in this prologue as “blameless and upright,” as 
God-fearing and a shunner of evil, yet in his monologues later in the story Job dwells on the 
cause of his suffering, which Girard argues is not divine in origin but “merely human” (3). Citing 
Job’s monologue in Chapter 19, Girard writes: “Job clearly articulates the cause of his suffering 
-- the fact that he is ostracized and persecuted by the people around him. He has done no harm, 
yet everyone turns away from him and is dead set against him. He is the scapegoat of his 
community” (4). Perhaps Satan saw Job as vulnerable for this reason and that’s why he was 
selected as the subject for this divine experiment/bet. Regardless, Girard’s point is that the 
prologue to this story is obviously at odds with details revealed in the story itself. 
Others haven’t been as obsessed with the ostensibly minor details of the Job narrative 
other than to employ them in support of one overall interpretive argument or another. Indeed, 
some critics and Christians don’t make any attempt whatsoever to reconcile the apparent 
contradictions within the Job story, as Girard tries to do; on the contrary, they use the existence 
of these inconsistencies to argue favorably in support of God’s irrationality, i.e. to suggest that 
God’s logic isn’t bound to or defined by human standards and so, of course, some of His words 
and deeds won’t and can’t make sense to us, as mere humans. George Steiner, writing in 
Grammars of Creation​, for instance, argues: 
Job’s suffering is, on the level of theodicy, unanswerable. God, therefore, relies 
on something quite different from anything that can be exhaustively rendered in 
rational concepts, namely on the sheer absolute wondrousness that transcends 
thought, on the mysterium presented in its pure, non-rational form. What 
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 overwhelms [Job] is the “downright stupendousness, the wellnigh demonic and 
wholly incomprehensible character of the eternal creative power.” We are meant 
to be convinced “by the intrinsic value of the incomprehensible—a value 
inexpressively positive and ‘fascinating.’” (48-9) 
Interpretations of this sort fuel the apologetics movement and, to be blunt, strike me as hokum, 
the kind of mental gymnastics required to explain and rationalize something that by the 
apologists’ own admission can be neither adequately explained nor rationalized. 
My purpose here isn’t to present a case in favor of or against the Christian God, the 
legitimacy of the Bible, or anything of the sort; instead, the aforementioned interpretive 
responses to Job serve to illustrate that this story -- like any good art, really -- is ripe for 
dissection and analysis. The fact that Peckinpah’s critics tend mostly to rely on but one 
interpretive possibility -- and a rather lazy and uninteresting one at that -- when discussing the 
Job story vis-a-vis ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ leaves something to be desired. But how else 
might one interpret The Book of Job? Carl Jung’s controversial book, ​Answer to Job ​, supplies 
one answer to this question and is particularly useful in terms of giving us an opportunity to add 
something new to the existing and somewhat stale conversation on ​Hogue​’s relationship to Job. 
Before discussing Jung’s text, however, perhaps it would be best to further contextualize 
the argument I’ll attempt to make by first discussing Peckinpah’s film. 
 
Overview of Peckinpah’s ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​: 
Set in the pre-industrialized American West, ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ is a relatively 
simple story. It will suffice for me to provide the basic plot points here: 
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 1) Hogue is cheated by his friends, Taggart and Bowen, and abandoned in the desert 
without food or water. Like Job, Hogue presumably hasn’t done anything to deserve such 
treatment; he and his friends have simply fallen on hard times and Hogue’s friends, seeing him 
as the weakest link and too “yellow” to strike back at them, take the group’s water supply and 
leave Hogue to fend for himself. Hogue swears revenge. 
2) After days of wandering the desert and repeatedly begging God for mercy, Hogue 
rather accidentally, and just as he’s resigning himself to death via starvation and dehydration, 
discovers what turns out to be a productive water spring. Hogue doesn’t for a second entertain 
the idea that this could be divine intervention (though some critics argue it was); instead, he 
emphatically declares to God or to no one in particular, “Told ya I was gonna live. This is Cable 
Hogue talkin’. Hogue. Me.” 
3) Hogue soon learns that his new discovery sits along a stage coach route and that he 
could profit greatly if he were to develop the spring into a rest stop. While the project is in its 
infancy, Hogue shoots and kills a passer-by who drinks from the hole-in-the-ground without 
paying Hogue, though at this point Hogue has no legal right to the claim. In Hogue’s defense, 
however, the “customer” drew his weapon first. 
4) Soon after, a wandering preacher, Joshua, approaches the oasis. He says to Hogue, 
noticing the makeshift gravestone: “I see tragedy has already struck this cactus Eden.” “No, that's 
no tragedy,” Hogue replies. “Shot the son of a bitch. With his own rifle. He tried to kill me. He 
was my first customer. You're my second.” Josh asks for some free water (i.e., mercy), but 
Hogue pulls his gun and won’t offer charity even though it was through charity -- and disaster -- 
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 that he was able to develop his spring in the first place. Joshua offers to save Hogue’s soul, but 
Hogue would rather have the money. 
5) Through a series of events, such as the display of photos of naked female parishioners, 
we and Hogue learn that Joshua is a sex-crazed womanizer, though he certainly knows the Bible; 
his religion, though, is of a less conservative or traditional nature and is, shall we say, more 
pragmatic, i.e. Joshua sees himself as free to pick and choose the commandments to which he 
adheres. 
6) Joshua convinces Hogue to go into the nearest town, Deaddog, and file an official 
claim for the property. Hogue has to haggle with bankers and real estate men but eventually 
takes care of business. The banker is initially reluctant to grant Hogue a loan for development, 
but when Hogue says he has a preacher (Joshua) who can vouch for him, the banker says, 
“That’s the first man I’d doubt.” Hogue laughs and replies, “Well, I’ll be damned. Looks like I 
came to the right place after all.” The banker and Hogue bond over their contempt for religion 
and agree to terms for the loan. 
7) While in town, Hogue first sees and falls for Hildy, a prostitute. The two begin to 
make love, but a religious tent meeting outside of Hildy’s window distracts Hogue. The preacher 
warns that “the devil seeks to destroy you with machines,” foreshadowing the film’s conclusion 
and Hogue’s fate, and Hogue remembers that Joshua is back at the spring. Hogue, worried that 
Josh might sell him out, abruptly leaves Hildy (without paying for her services) and returns to his 
property. 
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 8) Hogue and Joshua work together to build up Cable Springs. Hogue still has revenge on 
his mind, but Joshua warns Hogue: “Vengeance is mine, sayeth the Lord.” Hogue replies, “Well 
that’s fair enough with me just as long as He don’t take too long and I can watch.” 
9) Hildy, Hogue’s prostitute, is exiled from Deaddog because of her improprieties and 
flees to Cable Springs, where she and Hogue begin their relationship in earnest. Hildy asks 
Hogue if it bothers him that she’s a prostitute, but he reassures her: “What the hell are you? A 
human being. Try the best you can. We all got our own ways of living.” 
10) Like Joshua, Hildy warns Hogue against seeking revenge on Taggart and Bowen, his 
former friends and current enemies. “It ain't worth it, Hogue,” she says. “Revenge always turns 
sour. You ought to just forget them.” 
11) Eventually, both Hildy and Joshua depart (separately) from Cable Springs. Hogue 
continues operating his business until one day when Taggart and Bowen just happen to arrive on 
a coach. They’re obviously surprised to see Hogue alive, let alone thriving, and Hogue 
graciously tells the men that he owes his success to them. The men leave, ostensibly on good 
terms, after learning that Hogue keeps his money at the springs because he doesn’t trust banks. 
12) Taggart and Bowen later return, armed, in order to rob Hogue, who doesn't appear to 
be around. The men search for his stash until Hogue reappears and, at gunpoint, forces them into 
a pit. After some shooting, Hogue dumps a number of rattlesnakes into the pit, prompting the 
men to crawl out and face Hogue. Hogue orders the men to strip down to their underwear and to 
walk out into the desert without food or water, effectively employing an eye-for-an-eye style of 
Old Testament justice. Taggart refuses and goes for his gun, but Hogue shoots and kills him. As 
Bowen begs for mercy, a car approaches and then continues on beyond Cable Springs. Hogue 
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 realizes his business will soon be obsolete, as the car doesn’t need to stop as the coaches did, but 
says, “That’s gonna be the next fella’s worry.” Hogue orders Bowen to bury Taggart and, as 
that’s happening, Hogue reminisces about Hildy. He decides to chase after and join her in San 
Francisco and, through an act of gracious forgiveness, declares that Bowen will now be in charge 
of the springs. 
13) Another car approaches the springs, but this one stops and we soon see Hildy inside. 
As she and Hogue embrace, kiss, and decide to immediately go to New Orleans together, Hildy’s 
driver gets Bowen to help put water into the car’s radiator. Bowen learns that cars run on 
gasoline and, as a new business owner, gets the idea to start selling this fuel in addition to water. 
As Hogue begins loading his belongings into Hildy’s car, he accidentally bumps and disengages 
the auto’s brake. As the “horseless carriage” begins to roll down the incline toward Bowen, 
Hogue rushes to push Bowen out of the way but, in the process, falls and is run over. Hogue 
realizes he’s badly hurt but curiously remains jovial. 
14) Joshua also coincidentally returns to Cable Springs at this time and immediately 
understands that Hogue is dying. Hogue asks Joshua to deliver his eulogy now, before he 
actually dies. Joshua’s words represent Hogue fairly, noting that men are “made out of bad as 
well as good, all of them.” Significantly, Joshua also notes that Hogue was “in some ways” 
God’s “dim reflection,” adding in his address directly to God, “right or wrong, I feel he is worth 
consideration.” 
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 Overview of Jung’s ​Answer to Job​: 
As I stated in my introduction, the existing criticism on Peckinpah’s film tends to suffer 
in two ways: 1) it rationalizes Hogue’s death in a manner that is seemingly inspired by Christian 
apologetics, i.e. these critics argue that Hogue deserved his fate because he was ungrateful, or 2) 
it abandons the Job narrative in order to explain Hogue’s death, looking at the film as a sort of 
Frankenstein, comprised of different Biblical stories and characters, i.e. some critics argue that 
Hogue represents in the latter part of the film a sort of sacrificial Jesus character. Now, of course, 
even the skeptical Carl Jung interprets God’s decision to send Jesus to earth as a response to 
God’s recognition of His own shortcomings as they were revealed in the Job story, so the Job 
and Jesus narratives aren’t necessarily as distinct as they might appear and, in turn, my criticism 
of the existing scholarship surrounding ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ isn’t as focused on this point 
as it is on the former; that is, I’d like to discuss Peckinpah’s film and those critics who defended 
God’s actions in it through a discussion of Jung’s book, ​Answer to Job ​. 
As Joshua says in his eulogy at the end of the film, Hogue was neither a wholly good nor 
wholly bad man. Yet even this ostensibly fair statement is a bit harsh: though Hogue could be a 
tad greedy and was at times somewhat insensitive, he was undeniably likable and was absolutely 
more good than bad. Further, even though he did kill a few men, these murders were all in 
self-defense, after his victims drew their weapons first. His death, too, as I’ve explained, comes 
as he’s saving Bowen’s life, a man who earlier in the film had left Hogue to die in the desert 
without food or water. The protagonist’s death is tragic precisely because it’s irrational and it 
raises the obvious question of why Hogue, as a character, had to die. In other words, what 
function did his death serve with regard to the narrative? 
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 In Steven Lloyd’s recently published article, “The Ballad of Divine Retribution,” he 
argues that Hogue deserved his fate for two reasons: 1) “because Cable never thought to be 
properly grateful to his deliverer (confusing a miracle [the discovery of the spring] with his 
personal self-reliance)” and 2) “insisted on usurping the justice that his faith should have left to 
the Lord,” with regard to Hogue’s quest for revenge on Taggart and Bowen (64). While Lloyd 
acknowledges that ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ is “an inversion of Job,” he still sees the God 
character in the film as benevolent (48). However, this reading strikes me as obviously flawed. 
Each of the characters in Peckinpah’s film sees Hogue as a decent man -- not without his flaws, 
sure, but generally good and certainly not deserving of divine punishment or, as Lloyd says, 
retribution. Yet if, as Lloyd argues, Hogue’s God is benevolent, how do we rationalize Hogue’s 
death, especially as it occurs at a moment of forgiveness, selflessness, and sacrifice? In other 
words, did he deserve his fate and was his punishment just? To the rational mind, Hogue’s death 
can only be understood as an accident: it’s Hogue, after all, who -- albeit accidentally -- 
dislodged the car’s parking brake. Paul Seydor’s suggestion that Peckinpah’s employment of an 
“aesthetics of deliberate artifice” invites viewers to think of the film as an explicit statement 
rather than a work of realism further inspires my thinking regarding Hogue’s fate and leads me to 
wonder if what Joshua meant in his eulogy was that God was simply wrong to punish Hogue, 
that His action was unjust (252). 
To return for a moment to Joshua’s eulogy, the preacher says to God: “In some ways 
[Cable Hogue] was your dim reflection, Lord; and right or wrong, I feel he is worth 
consideration.” Does Joshua mean that he, the speaker, might be “right or wrong” with regard to 
his judgment of Hogue or does he mean that Hogue, who as we’ve established, “wasn't really a 
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 good man, [but] […] wasn't a bad man,” as a dim reflection of God, deserves God’s 
understanding and acceptance? In other words, Joshua might be suggesting that like Hogue, God 
makes mistakes and is both good and evil, and that one of these mistakes was claiming Hogue’s 
life in an unjust manner. 
Carl Jung is, to put it mildly, not kind in his analysis (in ​Answer to Job ​) of the God from 
the Job story. Like Joshua, Jung sees God’s behavior as questionable at best. And, like Joshua, 
Jung sees God, particularly as He appears in the Job story, as an antinomy or as a “divine 
darkness.” He writes: 
[God] himself admitted that he was eaten up with rage and jealousy and that this 
knowledge was painful to him. Insight existed along with obtuseness, 
loving-kindness along with cruelty, creative power along with destructiveness. 
Everything was there, and none of these qualities was an obstacle to the other. 
Such a condition is only conceivable either when no reflecting consciousness is 
present at all, or when the capacity for reflection is very feeble and a more or less 
adventitious phenomenon. A condition of this sort can only be described as 
amoral. (3) 
Jung also writes with regard to the Job story: 
[Job] cannot deny that he is up against a God who does not care a rap for any 
moral opinion and does not recognize any form of ethics as binding. This is 
perhaps the greatest thing about Job, that, faced with this difficulty, he does not 
doubt the unity of God. He clearly sees that God is at odds with himself -- so 
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 totally at odds that he, Job, is quite certain of finding in God a helper and an 
‘advocate’ against God. (7) 
What Jung’s assessment allows us to do is read ​The Ballad of Cable of Hogue ​ as either a critique 
of the apologist’s defense of God, i.e. God’s actions against Hogue were unjust and reveal God 
to be imperfect, and/or as a critique of the Job character, i.e. ​Hogue​ allows us to imagine how 
Job’s story might have played out had Job not been so rigidly and uncritically devout. Hogue’s 
greatest sin, after all, is (as Lloyd says) not being “properly grateful.” Would a just God require 
this minor sinner’s death in order to appease Himself? If so, Hogue would realize as did Job, 
according to Jung, that “Yahweh is not human but, in certain respects, less than human” (21). 
This question of God requiring sacrifices in order to appease Himself also and obviously 
recalls Jesus’ crucifixion. As Jung writes, “Yahweh’s intention to become man, which resulted 
from his collision with Job, is fulfilled in Christ’s life and suffering [Jung sees Christ as the 
personalities of Job and Yahweh combined into one]” (47). But this suffering and Jesus’ ultimate 
death are also somewhat paradoxical and seemingly unnecessary: why would God need to create 
and sacrifice a son when He, God, is the one being appeased? As Jung asks: 
What kind of father is it who would rather his son were slaughtered than forgive 
his ill-advised creatures who have been corrupted by Satan? What is supposed to 
be demonstrated by this gruesome and archaic sacrifice of the son? God’s love, 
perhaps? Or his implacability? We know from chapter 22 of Genesis [Abraham 
and Isaac] and from Exodus 22:29 that Yahweh has a tendency to employ such 
means as the killing of the son and the first-born in order to test his people’s faith 
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 or to assert his will, despite the fact that his omniscience and omnipotence have 
no need whatever of such savage procedures.” (56) 
Jung’s analysis reveals the sacrifice of Christ -- and, we might argue, the death of Hogue, if we 
want to view him in the latter part of the film as a Christ-like character -- as totally unnecessary, 
assuming of course that God is a “loving Father.” And if Hogue isn’t meant to represent Christ, 
and if his death is interpreted as punishment for his lack of appreciativeness, we must view 
Peckinpah’s God as nothing but petty and wrathful. For how offended can an omniscient and 
omnipotent God be if His lowly creation forgets or even outrightly refuses to give Him thanks? 
As Jung notes, “The sheep can stir up mud in the wolf’s drinking water, but can do him no other 
harm. So also the creature can disappoint the creator, but it is scarcely credible that he can do 
him a painful wrong. This lies only in the power of the creator with respect to the powerless 
creature” (56). 
Of course, the death/sacrifice of Christ might also be read as a kind of apology: God 
takes the form of man and, in turn, suffers a horrible death, one that He (due to His omniscience) 
had to see coming -- the crucifixion can be interpreted partly as a suicide, a sort of 
sadomasochistic self-punishment as a way for God to apologize to His creation for His behavior 
vis-a-vis Job and others. While this interpretation is debatable, it doesn’t make much sense with 
regard to Peckinpah’s film, as Joshua, a man of God, is left criticizing the Creator at the end of 
the film. Peckinpah’s limited crane shots, as Lloyd has noted, arguably represent God’s 
perspective; the final shot in the film is such a crane shot, depicting a desolate Cable Springs, 
with a lone coyote prowling the grounds, and strikes a rather lamenting tone, suggesting God, 
looking on, is remorseful over having punished Hogue. (This eye-of-God crane shot is an 
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 effective way to communicate God’s lament to the film’s viewers, as it puts us in His shoes, so to 
speak, and also suggests to us that, like Hogue, we are all gods of a sort.) God’s self-awareness, 
then, comes at the very end of the narrative, not earlier as it did in the Job-Jesus saga. 
In my view, the most sensible explanation or interpretation of both the Job story and, in 
turn, ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ is inspired by Jung. In other words, Job assumes that he simply 
doesn’t understand God’s will; his mistake is that he doesn’t seriously consider the possibility 
that God may not be wholly benevolent or even reasonable and/or that He doesn’t always choose 
to refer to His omniscience. After all, God’s “bet” with Satan in the Job story has less to do with 
Job than with God’s own pride, and His insecurity allows Him to be manipulated by Satan. 
Throughout the majority of the story, God does nothing; Satan is the catalyst and author of the 
action. Job is rewarded for enduring, essentially, but his own superficiality, i.e. his satisfaction 
with material rewards, makes him appear as unsympathetic. Apologetics aside, I can’t imagine 
an interpretation of this story that would convincingly argue that any of the characters are 
particularly noble. Conversely, Cable Hogue, while neither wholly good nor wholly bad, is 
certainly sympathetic, much more so than Job, and his fate is pretty clearly unjust (that is, if we 
are looking for a causal explanation). Perhaps Hogue realized what Job did not: that because God 
is not benevolent or perfectly rational -- as a Jungian antinomy, He can’t be wholly any one thing 
-- Hogue must essentially forget God. Or, as Jung writes: “A more differentiated consciousness 
must, sooner or later, find it difficult to love, as a kind father, a God whom on account of his 
unpredictable fits of wrath, his unreliability, injustice, and cruelty, it has every reason to fear” 
(57). In turn, Hogue’s morality, like Joshua’s, is of a pragmatic nature, e.g. his sexual 
relationship with a prostitute and his justification for murder in cases of self-defense; he’s never 
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 cruel and is mostly “good,” which is more than Jung can say for the God of the Job story and the 
Old Testament generally. It’s Hogue, after all, who is capable of forgiveness (sparing Bowen and 
appointing him owner/manager of Cable Springs), not God, as is made clear through Hogue’s 
death. In short, though Hogue too is an antimony, he is generally more kind and just than his 
god. 
 
Conclusion ​: 
Although ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ is clearly inspired by the Job story -- Paul Seydor, 
writing in ​Peckinpah: The Western Films: A Reconsideration ​, has called the film “a rather free 
rendition” of it and notes that Job was Peckinpah’s father’s favorite book of the Bible -- virtually 
every piece of criticism on the film interprets God’s actions with regard to the film’s protagonist 
as benevolent or, at the very least, just (223). In “The Ballad of Divine Retribution,” for 
example, critic Steven Lloyd argues that God only strikes down Hogue when the latter disobeys 
particular commandments, chief among them is the order to not to seek revenge (Leviticus 
19:18). Curiously calling ​Hogue​ both “an inversion of Job” and “one of the screen’s most 
determined conceptions ever of God’s generosity to humanity,” Lloyd apparently fails to 
consider that the God present in ​Hogue​, like the God of the Job story, acts as an insecure tyrant 
(48, 50). In ​Answer to Job ​, Carl Jung suggests that the Job story in particular reveals God to be 
an antinomy: He is all things, good and evil, both prosecutor and judge. In the presence of such a 
paradoxical and temperamental deity, neither Job nor Hogue have any chance of experiencing 
true justice. Read from this perspective, Peckinpah’s ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ is open to an 
interpretive possibility not yet explored in the existing criticism on the film: neither God nor Job 
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 are wholly sympathetic characters (or, at the very least, neither is “perfect”) and, likewise, Cable 
Hogue serves as an equally complex and morally conflicted surrogate for God, as Joshua 
suggests in his eulogy. It’s in Genesis 1:27 we are told: “So God created man in his own image, 
in the image of God he created him.” As Jung suggests, the “image” here can’t refer to human 
morphology, as “Yahweh himself had guarded against this error by expressly forbidding the 
making of images” (15). Rather, the similarities between God and man can be found in the 
aforementioned antinomy. Cable Hogue’s first name, for instance, serves as a pretty obvious 
portmanteau comprised of Cain and Abel, as Jim Kitses, writing in ​Horizons West​, has noted 
(225). This suggests not only a dualism of spirit or nature but a moral paradox mirroring the God 
of the Job story. Hogue’s eventual demise, then, might be read as a critique of the amoral, unjust, 
and, perhaps most significant, ​unsympathetic​ God of the Book of Job and not, as some Peckinpah 
scholars have argued, as divine justice. What is more, the film raises a question to which 
Peckinpah returns in most of his films: “What will happen to man, and especially to his own 
followers, when the sheep have lost their shepherd” (Jung 69)? In other words, who will protect 
everyone from God (who, as I noted earlier, represents Peckinpah’s real target: powerful and 
corrupt men) once Hogue, as their shepherd, is killed? That is, who will save us once the 
powers-that-be eliminate our heroes? To underscore this question, Peckinpah shows us an 
ominously prowling coyote, arguably a symbol of God, on the screen after Hogue’s death. Who, 
he seems to be asking, will be next to stand up to the powerful and, in turn, perhaps be their next 
victim? 
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 Aristotelian Alienation and Tragedy: The Dramatic Function of Aestheticized Rape and 
Violence in Sam Peckinpah's ​Straw Dogs 
 
Preface: 
This chapter, like the others in this project, examines the relationship between what might 
be called power or authority and individuation in Peckinpah’s relatively minor works. More 
specifically, this chapter, which features a discussion of ​Straw Dogs ​, explores the protagonists’ 
reaction to a sort of brutal, savage power. This particular brand of authority is relatively unique 
in Peckinpah’s oeuvre, as he usually represented “power” with figures of considerable capital 
and political sway ( ​Hogue​ is also exceptional in that while it does feature representations of 
capitalism and industrialization, arguably the real power in that film is Hogue’s god); here, 
though, Peckinpah gives us authority-as-threat in the form of physical strength and violent mobs. 
Somewhat ironically, the protagonists, who represent the monied, educated elite, are the 
ostensible victims in this film. ​Straw Dogs ​ explores how the relatively civilized and cultured 
might respond when faced with a more base, existential threat, and in the end Peckinpah 
seemingly concludes that none of us is above violence, as much as we might like to define 
ourselves by our rejection of it. 
This chapter also refers to Aristotelian ideas regarding drama and tragedy in an effort to 
make sense of some of Peckinpah’s narrative strategies. Though Aristotle is an ancient figure, 
and of course many have theorized on the topic since (I do consider Northrop Frye and others in 
this chapter), his ideas are foundational and remain relevant and influential. I consult him also 
because Peckinpah seemed most familiar with this philosopher’s ideas on the subject, and it 
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 seems to me to make sense to refer to those ideas here as a means to evaluate the relative 
effectiveness of Peckinpah’s dramatic choices. Further, many critics have cited Aristotle’s 
concept of catharsis when analyzing Peckinpah, and Aristotle also seemed to find it appropriate 
to apply his own theories to works of art in various mediums, i.e. “representations.” In other 
words, this chapter is in part an attempt to evaluate Peckinpah’s film on his own terms, an 
attempt to discover what, for lack of a better phrase, he was up to; it is not, however, an act of 
apologetics or even a defense. Further, while Aristotle was not, of course, a film theorist, he was 
a drama theorist and was keenly interested in narrative and genre; Peckinpah, I contend, was first 
and foremost a dramatist who chose the medium of film -- and all of its tools -- in an effort to 
more effectively tell his stories. The editing techniques I discuss here, for example, are employed 
with the hopes of intensifying the drama and supporting the narrative. This is true of virtually 
every film and filmmaker, to be sure, but Peckinpah’s obsession with a few thematic threads that 
run through each of his films suggests to me that a consideration of narrative and storytelling 
(and, in this case, tragedy and generic mode) is at least as important as a consideration of his 
technical choices and abilities. 
The main purpose of this chapter is twofold: a) to examine the characters in ​Straw Dogs 
and their motivations and b) to consider how characterization contributes to the film’s narrative 
and its themes (and those themes that permeated Peckinpah’s work as a whole, namely the 
relationship between power and individuation). What’s more, my essential purpose is an 
application of Aristotelian ideas regarding narrative and genre to this film, as it more so than 
perhaps any of Peckinpah’s others contains rich, complex, and flawed characters. That said, it is 
important to remember that characters exist, as editing techniques are employed, to serve a 
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 narrative or plot. As Malcolm Heath writes with regard to Aristotle: “Aristotle's arguments for 
the primacy of plot are therefore primarily arguments for the primacy of plot over character. He 
begins by claiming that 'tragedy is not an imitation of persons, but of actions and of life'” (xx). 
This film is, I argue, clearly a tragedy; further, the characters are not necessarily meant to be seen 
as representations of real figures. Instead, they are closer to abstractions, i.e. rough likenesses, 
personified ideas, that allow Peckinpah to convey his thoughts, as flawed as they might be, about 
reality and existence. The question he attempts to answer here is this: can we transcend our 
animal nature? His conclusion is clearly that we can’t, yet I argue that ​Straw Dogs ​, despite 
arguments to the contrary, is not a nihilistic film; rather, its core theme is that we might be 
surprised by our ‘true’ selves and capabilities, revealed in moments of stress, whether we see 
those as good or bad. 
 
Introduction: 
Sam Peckinpah's work tends to inspire passionately disparaging responses from many 
critics. ​Straw Dogs ​ (1971) is, perhaps, the best example of this phenomenon. Pauline Kael 
famously dubbed the film “a fascist work of art,” for example, and argued that it depicts and 
mindlessly celebrates male “fantasies” of rape and violence. In “Peckinpah's Obsession” from 
Deeper Into Movies ​, Kael posited that the “goal of the movie is to demonstrate that David ​enjoys 
the killing, and achieves his manhood in that self-recognition” (396). Kael continued, “The 
movie takes not merely a non-pacifist position but a rabidly anti-pacifist position; it confirms the 
old militarists' view that pacifism is unmanly, is pussyfooting, is false to 'nature'” (397). Kael's 
conclusion is that the film “confirms their [men, in general] secret fears and prejudices that 
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 women respect only brutes; it confirms the male insanity that there is no such thing as rape” 
(398). Roger Ebert, too, labeled ​Straw Dogs ​ as “pseudo-serious” and claimed Peckinpah was 
merely trying to sell tickets by depicting graphic sex and savagery. But reviews like these 
necessarily depend on the reduction of the film's characters to caricatures, interpreting their 
actions as mere projections of Peckinpah's id; moreover, they ignore the critical function certain 
ostensibly objectionable scenes and the aestheticization of tragic events, e.g. Amy's rape and the 
film's climactic siege, play with regard to the larger narrative. In other words, some critics of 
Straw Dogs ​ often reduce its characters to two-dimensional cartoons and do not seem to consider 
how these characters, even if they are representations of ideas, support a larger theme or 
argument: that what we are capable of can be surprising and deeply disturbing. 
Peckinpah has his supporters, of course. Stephen Prince, writing in ​Savage Cinema: Sam 
Peckinpah and the Rise of Ultraviolent Movies ​, for example, defends the director's meditation on 
violence, noting that Peckinpah “seized the violence theme partly because it had already been 
placed on the national agenda [i.e. the war in Vietnam], and no doubt because it was a 
fashionable and sexy topic. But his exploration of this issue, I believe, was totally serious and 
generally nonexploitative even if he was at times a co-conspirator in the media's construction of 
him as 'Bloody Sam,' prophet of violence” (44). Michael Bliss, too, fundamentally disagrees with 
critics like Kael and Ebert. In ​Justified Lives: Morality & Narrative in the Films of Sam 
Peckinpah ​, Bliss argues that David's “victory” in the film is essentially ironic and is made 
possible only because of his tragic flaw: a lack of compassion. Bliss writes, “For all of his 
intelligence, [David] is too ignorant to realize that his insecurity, which is based on his failure to 
measure up to the traditional conception of the 'rough and tough' male, does not derive from a 
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 fault in himself but from the rigid, conventional conception of what it means to be a man” (163). 
According to Bliss, then, ​Straw Dogs ​ is an explicit attack on society's idea of “what it means to 
be a man” and certainly not a celebration of masculinity and machismo. While some in this 
group of supporters soberly respond to Peckinpah's work, others are as affected by their 
adoration as Kael (at least in terms of her response to this particular film) and Ebert seem to be 
by their disdain. In other words, “positive” analyses of ​Straw Dogs ​, while at times insightful, 
often fail to acknowledge the film's shortcomings and also overlook some of the reasons why the 
film works, for example, on a structural level. 
In this chapter, I will argue that the film qualifies as a tragedy (in the classical sense), as 
opposed to being a mere exploitation film or failed drama, and has what Aristotle called in 
Poetics ​ a “complex plot,” which the philosopher preferred over all other types. Plot, of course, 
depends on a connected series of events: a discussion of ​Poetics ​ here—and a justification for its 
use when analyzing film—will reveal why the two scenes that have attracted the most negative 
attention, Amy's rape and the film's violent concluding siege, are necessary in order for the film 
to succeed, structurally speaking, as a tragedy (Northrop Frye's ​Anatomy of Criticism: Four 
Essays ​ and Seymour Chatman's ​Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film 
will also be useful here). Further, I will expand on the thinking of several scholars who suggest 
that ​Straw Dogs ​ is a film without a hero and that, in fact, the protagonist, David, is a villain, a 
reading that directly challenges most negative reviews of the film that claim David's violent 
awakening is intended to be celebrated. As I'll discuss, David is indeed a character of 
questionable morality and integrity, and whether one thinks we, as viewers, are meant to cheer 
his actions during the siege seems to inform his or her overall feeling about the film. The 
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 interpretive possibilities here are numerous and provocative, and an Aristotelian analysis of the 
film's structure, individual scenes within it, and characters will create some clarity with regard to 
the presence, function, and arguable necessity of those scenes. 
Even more specifically, I will examine both negative and generally favorable reviews of 
and scholarship on ​Straw Dogs ​ in order to explore two related possibilities. First, that Kael and 
Ebert were essentially correct in their assessment that ​Straw Dogs ​ is gratuitously brutal and that 
it fails in its attempt to tell a compelling story. However, I'll consider the possibility that its 
“failure” is due to reasons other than those they cite (namely, because Peckinpah does not 
include a sympathetic protagonist which, in turn, complicates a defense of the inclusion of the 
offending scenes). And, second, that champions of the film are right to celebrate ​Straw Dogs ​ but 
for reasons beyond those they give, i.e. Peckinpah's decision to include such disturbing images 
and scenes was—again, in terms of Aristotle's notion of tragedy—necessary in order for viewers 
to empathize with, if not pity, such an unlikable lead character. 
 
Plot Overview and Review of Existing Criticism: 
Straw Dogs ​ is, without a doubt, a difficult film to watch. The infamous rape scene, in 
particular, has attracted much attention from detractors and defenders alike; however, the film's 
violent and bloody conclusion (the “siege”), which actually accounts for roughly one-quarter of 
the movie's total runtime, is plenty provocative, too. One's interpretation of these and other 
aspects of the film obviously informs his or her general response to or feeling about it, i.e. does 
Peckinpah mean to simply toy with and titillate viewers or is his desire to pose and explore 
questions that are necessarily uncomfortable through equally uncomfortable imagery? Is there 
35 
 perhaps some overlap between these two possibilities? Indeed, many critics find it difficult when 
writing about his films to avoid talking about Peckinpah as a personality, often trying in effect to 
psychoanalyze him through his work: does ​Straw Dogs ​, for instance, reveal the man to be a 
nihilist, a misogynist, or perhaps even a humanitarian? This reaction is, in part, due to his 
outspoken and often outrageous nature, which came through in the many interviews he gave, but 
it is also the result of Peckinpah's decision to explore in his films such ​personal​ subject matter: 
isolation, failure, inadequacy, and anxiety, for example. Whether one enjoys his films or not, it is 
hard to resist their invitation—or, more strongly, their demand—to reconsider our own principles 
and beliefs; those who do resist, however, often do so at the expense of careful reflection, i.e. we 
can only resist by treating Peckinpah's characters as caricatures and by personally attacking the 
filmmaker. The provocative quality of Peckinpah's work raises yet another question, however, 
and it is one his aforementioned detractors often ask: who would make a film like ​Straw Dogs 
and why? Negative reviewers have attacked Peckinpah as a misogynist and a nihilist, for 
example, perhaps as a way to avoid thinking about and discussing the difficult and personal 
questions the work poses. But other critics, those willing to engage with the work, to consider it 
on its own terms, have developed some insightful (if imperfect) theories about ​Straw Dogs ​ and 
what it might have to offer us in the way of ideas about the importance of vulnerability and 
honesty in our personal relationships. 
Another issue to consider here is the fact that the film's plot is rather simple (though not, 
as I'll discuss later, in an Aristotelian sense) and this, I think, leads many critics and reviewers to 
respond reductively and to describe the film in rather shallow terms. These analyses necessarily 
fail to consider the movie's moral ambiguity and the difficult questions it raises and explores 
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 (e.g. David's indecisiveness and anxiety or the fears and desires of individual characters, who 
are, as I suggested, too often interpreted as caricatures rather than three-dimensional beings with 
particular and complicated motivations). What follows in this section is a relatively brief 
summary and analysis of the film (certain aspects of it will be explored in more detail in other 
sections of this chapter) along with a review of some of the existing criticism on ​Straw Dogs ​. 
 
ACT ONE: THE ARRIVAL 
The opening title sequence of ​Straw Dogs ​ is filmed in black and white, and a rather 
ominous score accompanies these preliminary shots: we first see some headstones and then the 
image quickly moves out of focus. While still out of focus, there is a cut to a new image, which 
isn't at first clear; what appears to be a shot of some scurrying ants is soon, after a return to 
sharper focus, revealed to be a group of playing children. Simultaneously, color fades into the 
image, the credits conclude, and some ringing church bells match the melody of the score, which 
now fades out. 
As the church bells continue to ring, we see the first of the film's main players: David 
Sumner (Dustin Hoffman) is exiting a store with a box of groceries while one of the playing 
children, who is now carrying a dog, looks in his direction as if he's an oddity, quite obviously 
out of place. The shot returns to the children and a group of boys stop to stare; however, their 
collective gaze is directed at Amy (Susan George), David's wife, who is wearing a white sweater 
and, quite obviously, no bra. To emphasize this, the first shot of Amy that Peckinpah gives us is 
a closeup of her chest. The camera slowly drifts up to her smiling face and the next cut is to 
37 
 Charlie Venner (Del Henney), who we will later learn is Amy's former boyfriend, as he emerges 
from a phone booth—Venner sees Amy yet she, apparently, doesn't notice him. 
The camera is now above Amy, who is still walking along, and we see that two children 
trail her. They are carrying a massive steel trap. David (an American) approaches Amy (a Brit) 
from the opposite direction and asks her what the children are carrying. She says it is a gift 
specifically for him and calls it a “man trap” (we later learn that David is not comfortable 
committing to anything and requires pushing or “trapping” before he will act). Just as these 
words leave her lips, Venner enters the frame; before David can respond to Amy, Venner says, 
“They used to use it for catching poachers.” This is significant, as we will see, since the trap is 
one of the weapons David chooses to use during the siege, when he's fighting off Venner and his 
friends, who attempt to “poach” Amy. Venner reintroduces himself to Amy, saying he is 
surprised she remembers him, as David and the two children awkwardly put the trap into the 
couple's convertible sports car. 
Much has been made by critics of the differences between Amy and David, and the 
physical dissimilarities are, of course, immediately apparent. He is conservatively dressed and 
appears rather stuffy or nerdy. Amy, on the other hand, is considerably more free in her 
appearance. As Michael Sragow writes in his essay “From ​The Siege of Trencher's Farm ​ to 
Straw Dogs ​: The Narrative Brilliance of Sam Peckinpah,” in which he champions Peckinpah's 
film relative to the awful novel/source material, from ​Peckinpah Today ​: 
Critics like Kael often charged that David and Amy as a couple made no sense: 
that Peckinpah had in effect staged a shotgun marriage to make his story work. 
But Amy's entrance into the film suggests one reason why this sensual, feisty 
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 woman would have married a successful if constipated academic. As she marches 
through the narrow, winding street, breasts first, braless under a tight sweater, 
she's putting herself on parade, not merely as a sex object but also as a small-town 
girl made good. Her sexuality is part of her identity; she may flaunt it foolishly, 
but it's a mistake for critics to think she is going to give anything away. She is a 
woman of the world circa 1972, returning to a hamlet that hasn't changed much 
since 1672. (73) 
Sragow continues, “This couple is made up of opposites in every way: he's far-sighted, but Amy 
needs reading glasses. […] Peckinpah fixes our attention on each character's gaze. The film turns 
on how men and women see and misperceive each other” (73-4). The differences between David 
and Amy, then, serve a narrative function, as they create a necessary tension; as we will see, and 
as Sragow suggests, ​Straw Dogs ​ is at least in part about a couple who cannot effectively 
communicate with or trust one another. The physical differences we notice immediately during 
these introductory shots mirror the psychological or emotional differences that will be revealed 
and explored later. Kael's characterization of Amy as a caricature (I will explore Kael's remarks 
in more detail later) suggest that Peckinpah was producing mere exploitation. Roger Ebert, too, 
in his review of the film from December 27, 1971, called ​Straw Dogs ​ a “major disappointment in 
which Peckinpah's theories about violence seem to have regressed to a sort of 19th-Century 
mixture of Kipling and machismo.” Ebert continues, “The violence is the movie's reason for 
existing; it is the element that is being sold, and in today's movie market, it should sell well. But 
does Peckinpah pay his dues before the last 20 minutes [which serve as the film's violent 
climax]? Does he keep us feeling we can trust him? I don't think so.” Ebert also writes, “And 
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 then the movie ends with the worst piece of pseudo-serious understatement since Peyton Place 
left the air. After Hoffman has killed them all, he drives the idiot back to the village [and utters 
the line about not knowing where he figuratively lives].” But as Michael Bliss argues in ​Justified 
Lives: Morality & Narrative in the Films of Sam Peckinpah ​: 
Straw Dogs ​ is far too structured and sophisticated to be anything other than a 
consciously created artifact rather than the result of prejudiced moviemaking. The 
film shows unsympathetic men abusing women and then links this activity with 
other forms of objectionable behavior; it should thus be clear where the director's 
sympathies lie. ​Straw Dogs ​ is a dramatization of sexual bigotry, not an example 
of it. (142) 
As I will explore later, so much criticism of Peckinpah becomes personal, e.g. he's a bigot or a 
fascist, because he attacks and destabilizes us as viewers; moreover, through his attempts to 
disorient us—in space and time via his editing techniques, for example—we can feel somehow 
psychologically violated, which is, of course, uncomfortable and, in turn, can provoke a 
defensive response. We can feel, as Ebert writes, like we cannot trust Peckinpah. (Interestingly, 
Ebert wrote in his review of Rod Lurie's 2011 remake of ​Straw Dogs ​ that his feelings about the 
original “must have changed.” He says, “Perhaps I am more in touch with them now and 
recognize how close to home the movie strikes.”) Regardless, these early moments of the film in 
which Peckinpah establishes the tension between David and Amy, and when he introduces 
Venner as an outside threat to their union, set the stage for the drama—and, as I will argue, the 
tragedy—that will unfold. 
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 As the film continues, Amy introduces Venner and David to one another and it is 
revealed that she and her husband are in England (and in her hometown, in particular, staying at 
Trencher's Farm, a family property) on a sort of holiday; David says he hopes to find some 
“peace and quiet” but Amy quickly and proudly corrects him, saying that David is working on a 
book, though she cannot quite explain what it is about. David condescendingly responds, “good 
try,” and tells her to put the box of groceries into the car. Venner intercepts the box, as Amy 
shoots David a disappointed and irritated look, and insists on placing it in the trunk for her. As he 
does so, Amy suggests to David that maybe Venner can help do some work they need done on 
their garage. Apparently, the man (Scutt) currently employed to do the job is taking too long and, 
apparently and oddly without reservation, David agrees to employ Venner, who is Amy's ex. 
Peckinpah next emphasizes David's otherness, with regard to both nationality and class, 
by showing us an encounter between him and patrons at a local pub, where he goes to purchase 
some cigarettes. One of the patrons looks David up and down (the camera assumes the patron's 
perspective here) and David's white tennis shoes and silk handkerchief set him in contrast to the 
blue collar, working class pub patrons and, generally, the drab and rustic surroundings. An 
exterior shot captures Henry Niles (David Warner) tossing an errant ball back to the playing 
children. We cut back to Amy, who is waiting for David to exit the pub, and Venner, who is 
keeping her company. Amy mentions to Venner that she thought Niles was “to be put away” and 
Venner replies by saying, in another bit of foreshadowing, “We can take care of our own here. 
Usually do.” Venner then reaches into the car, puts his arm around the seated Amy, and asks, 
“Remember when I took care of you, Amy?” She first looks away, seemingly nervous, but then, 
turning to him, says, “But you didn't. Remember?” Venner is clearly feeling somewhat 
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 emasculated by her rhetorical question and responds by somewhat threateningly placing his hand 
around her neck. He says, “There was once a time, Mrs. Sumner, when you were ready to beg 
me for it.” Amy, aghast, says sternly, “Take your hands off me.” At this moment, Peckinpah cuts 
to a shot of David, still inside the pub, peeking through the window, presumably seeing (but, 
significantly, not hearing) what has just transpired between Venner and Amy. As Sragow writes, 
“As this tumult comes to a head, David peers outside and watches Venner cozy up to Amy; he 
can't tell from the window of the pub that Amy is coldly rebuffing her old beau. But David must 
know that Amy is as alienated from their marriage as he is from this parish” (74). 
David then witnesses a drunk local having his way with the bartender, only to be talked 
down and convinced to be on his way; as the man and his friends leave, David is trapped behind 
the opened door through which they exit, further underscoring his isolation and otherness. 
David and Amy leave for Trencher's Farm in their sporty white convertible and, during 
the ride, David's insecurity manifests itself, as he asks Amy how well she knows Venner. Just as 
the question leaves his lips, Peckinpah shows Amy turning sharply and forcefully left at a 
crossroads, perhaps emphasizing that she, at that moment, has made a clear—and perhaps 
symbolic—choice, something David is incapable of throughout most of the film, a problem that 
propels much of the story's conflict (at one point, for example, Amy angrily blames David for 
leaving his American university, suggesting that it was because he could not take a side with 
regard to Vietnam War protests on campus: “You left because you didn't want to take a stand, 
commit”). 
This first sequence lasts under ten minutes but, in it, Peckinpah has set up the entire film: 
David is an insecure, paranoid, patronizing, American intellectual, who (somehow) has an 
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 attractive, fun-loving (she prefers pop music while driving their speeding car whereas he insists 
on classical), young, British wife, who has a past he seems to know little about. The tension 
established here—especially with the man trap, which critic Michael Sragow calls “this film's 
equivalent of Chekhov's Gun,” and Venner in the mix—will build throughout the film, inspiring 
a climax in which the three principle characters we are introduced to here are rendered, in a 
sense, completely unrecognizable (73). 
Amy and David return home and we see Scutt idly sitting atop a ladder against the 
garage. Amy and David kiss until David taps Amy's arm and motions toward Scutt, who is 
approaching their car. David is clearly embarrassed, but Amy just rolls her eyes and leaves. Scutt 
and another worker, Cawsey the rat catcher, carry David's man trap to the house's door. Cawsey 
ambiguously remarks that the trap is too large for David's prey but, again underscoring the 
function of the trap as the Chekhov's Gun of ​Straw Dogs ​, David casually says, “Don't count on 
it.” With Amy and David now inside the house, Peckinpah gives us a short yet significant scene 
between Scutt and Cawsey, who shows Scutt a pair of Amy's underwear he stole while the 
couple was in town. While this exchange is brief and somewhat crude, it too emphasizes the 
couple's vulnerability: they—but especially David—are outsiders here, so much so that they and 
their home, which might represent their union, are penetrated and violated at will, i.e. even their 
home and intimate possessions are not off limits to the locals. This exchange concludes with both 
men discussing their shared desire to have sex with Amy, saying they are not satisfied with 
Cawsey's “trophy” and, instead, want “what's in them.” 
Back inside, Amy and David are looking for their missing cat. When David notes that the 
cat does not answer his call, Amy asks, “Do I?” David replies, presumably seriously, “You 
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 better.” His machismo rings false, however, as there is nothing about his personality or 
appearance to suggest that he is able to control or possess Amy in the way that he wants her to 
believe. He immediately follows up his dictate by insecurely asking Amy why she hired Venner. 
As she enters another room, Amy casually reminds David that he is the one who hired the man. 
Outside, David says if the cat is in his study, he will kill it; immediately upon hearing this, Amy, 
who has entered the study, changes a plus sign in an equation on David's blackboard to a minus, 
arguably a literal and symbolic negation of David and his belief that reason and order are of 
paramount importance. This exchange, again, helps to establish a dynamic between the two that 
will become fundamentally important with regard to the action of the film: David's immature 
attempts to control Amy (and, here, her cat might be seen as an extension of her) and, generally, 
the condescending attitude he has toward everyone around him, sets off a sort of chain reaction. 
David threatens violence toward the cat and, thus, Amy messes with one of his equations. Her 
reaction in this scene is worth keeping in mind as the film progresses: it is clear that Amy does 
not want to be controlled, manipulated, or threatened; it is David's attempt to do these things, and 
his unwillingness or inability to relax (that is, to relinquish his chase for control), that creates the 
tension between him and Amy. It is his immature obsession with his own insecurity/masculinity, 
in other words, that makes him (and Amy) vulnerable, that essentially invites the trouble that is 
to come from Venner and the locals. He wants a kind of power and control—over Amy, over his 
physical space, etc.—that is unreasonable and this, as I will discuss later, is one of the forks in 
the interpretive road with regard to this film: I do not accept the argument that David, despite his 
physical “victory” during the siege, is a hero. Thomas Leitch, author of “Aristotle v. the Action 
Film,” suggests that David is “heroically reactive” (120). And Bernard Dukore, a Peckinpah 
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 scholar, writes, “Becoming a man is what the exemplary hero of ​Straw Dogs ​ does” (32). Both 
Leitch and Dukore are referring here to the violent David, the David at the film's conclusion who 
defends Niles from a lynch mob; however, I want to emphasize again how important it is to 
remember this scene in which David, who at best is half-joking, threatens to kill Amy's cat. He is 
not a particularly nice man now and that will not change; moreover, he is not a secure or 
courageous man now and that will not change either. The only substantive change we see in 
David between this scene and the end of the film is that he disregards his pacifism and becomes a 
killer. No matter the motivation, this hardly qualifies him as a “hero.” Indeed, as Paul Seydor 
notes in ​Peckinpah: The Western Films: A Reconsideration ​, Jay Cocks called ​Straw Dogs ​ in his 
review for ​Time​ Peckinpah's first film without a hero (221). I will return to this argument in a 
later section where I discuss Aristotle's definition of the term and how it relates to types of plot 
and levels of tragedy. 
The relationships and tensions introduced in the film's opening sequences—particularly 
David's hubris and his desire to control—are further explored in the remainder of the first act. 
David repeatedly calls Amy an “animal,” for example, particularly when she tries to engage him 
sexually, and he warns her several times to not “play games” with him. It is clear that David feels 
he ought to be in control yet his actions reveal his insecurity. This is emphasized further when 
Amy again vandalizes his chalkboard, this time brazenly, while he is in the room to see it. She is 
defiant and aggressive, but only after David commands her to clean the kitchen, fix the toilet, 
and to get her “friends” to finish work on the garage (his outburst follows her seemingly 
reasonable request that he spend more time with her). David's vulnerability is highlighted, too, 
by a brief scene in the pub during which Scutt shows off to Venner the pair of Amy's underwear 
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 that Cawsey stole. This scene reminds us of the violation—and of the locals' nature—and, 
immediately following a scene in which two children watch through a bedroom window while 
Amy and David have sex, it supports the contrast between the cerebral, urbane David and the 
instinctual, libidinous townspeople, and it underscores David's general otherness, i.e. he is unlike 
those around him; however, and importantly, David's personal shortcomings reveal him to be 
different from but not necessarily above or better than the other characters in the film, as they 
prove themselves to be worthy if eventually unsuccessful adversaries. 
Amy continues to defy David's orders: first, when he insists that she wear a bra so the 
laborers won't stare and, second, when she essentially allows the workers to watch her bathe by 
refusing to draw the bathroom curtains, as David demands. Amy's actions have been interpreted 
by some critics as childish in contrast to David's supposed sophistication. Pauline Kael, in her 
essay “Peckinpah's Obsession” from ​Deeper Into Movies ​, describes Amy thusly: “she's a sex 
kitten here—an unsatisfied little tart, a child-wife who wants to be played with” (395). But, as 
Michael Bliss notes in ​Justified Lives: Morality & Narrative in the Films of Sam Peckinpah ​, 
David, for all of his supposed self-knowledge, “is not only childish and impetuous but 
maladjusted. Unsure of himself intellectually as well as physically, David can feel secure only by 
degrading others. In this respect, he is as irrational and impulsive as those other characters in the 
film (Amy and the rowdies) whom he implicitly accuses of suffering from these faults” (147). 
Again, David is simultaneously distinct from yet, in many ways, similar to the locals and Amy: 
he is educated and is an American but he, too, is childish and selfish. If anything, his violent 
“victory” over the locals at the film's end serves to make him ​more​ like them, as he abandons his 
pacifism and becomes as lustful and primal as his attackers. The move toward sameness 
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 disqualifies David from being a hero—at least from an Aristotelian perspective, as I will discuss 
later—and it also complicates some critics' assertions that he is meant to be interpreted as a 
realized man at the film's conclusion, since Peckinpah repeatedly portrays the locals as barbaric 
and childish, as when they almost kill David on the road into town and laugh about it (hardly like 
the dignified though still flawed “men” of ​The Wild Bunch ​, ​Ride the High Country ​, or ​Pat 
Garrett and Billy the Kid ​). 
Meanwhile, Amy's cat goes missing once again. Later that evening, Reverend Hood 
(Colin Welland) and his wife stop by Trencher's Farm to invite David and Amy to a party at the 
church hall the following week. Hood says he hopes to see the two there, if they can spare the 
time. David responds by sarcastically jabbing that time is hard to find—a reference to Amy's 
continued requests that David spend more time with her—as are cats. David's insolence 
continues with a brief religious, historical, and philosophical debate of sorts with Hood. David's 
patronizing tone alienates his guests, who quickly but politely leave, and Amy is clearly 
disappointed by David's behavior. Upstairs later that night, however, she is willing to forgive 
him and she reassumes her playful, flirty demeanor. For once, David seems eager to oblige her 
sexually and, just as he goes to put his shirt in the closet, he finds Amy's cat hanging there, dead. 
He quickly shuts the door and is too disturbed to answer Amy's question about what he saw, 
leaving her to see for herself. Naturally horrified, Amy angrily suspects Scutt and Cawsey. David 
seems skeptical, apparently unwilling or unable to admit to himself and to Amy that the locals 
would do such a thing, until Amy spells it out for him: they hung the cat and in this specific 
place to “prove to you they can get in your bedroom.” If Amy's earlier antics, e.g. bathing with 
the curtains open, were a bit imprudent, she is now the one to recognize the serious nature of the 
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 problem facing the new residents of Trencher's Farm. David's denial rightly offends Amy who, 
far from being the child Kael labels her as, is now marshaling her arrogant yet oblivious husband 
(he genuinely replies to her implication of Scutt and Cawsey with: “I don't believe that”). In fact, 
Amy suggests that they leave the farm altogether, which is something most critics overlook when 
painting her as an ignorant bombshell. It is Amy who presents the most reasonable option here: 
not only is the couple unhappy in terms of their relationship, but they are now being threatened; 
Amy would rather actively avoid the imminent conflict whereas David foolishly refuses to listen 
to reason, insisting on staying. Almost immediately, Amy turns. She recognizes she is trapped. 
David will not leave, so the only option now is confrontation, though David refuses to recognize 
this inevitability. Perhaps out of spite, Amy insists that David aggressively confront Scutt and 
Cawsey. Does she realize that David is like a lamb being sent to the slaughter? Does Amy want 
the laborers to assault David? Regardless, it is David's own doing and Amy will not let him 
escape the consequences of choosing to put them both in danger. 
Another detail that is ignored by most critics is a small prop on the table David gets up 
from as he leaves to confront the workers in a later scene: two magnets, which had been avoiding 
each other, are drawn together just as we hear David greet the laborers outside. Opposite polarity 
in magnets is what attracts them, i.e. through difference they become one. The workers here 
represent one pole (i.e. barbarism) and David represents the other (i.e. pacifism and 
sophistication); the joining of the magnets on the table foreshadows the physical showdown 
during the climactic siege—or joining through conflict—between these two sides but, of course, 
as with the magnets, these ostensible differences or distinguishing characteristics disappear when 
the two sides or parts become joined: David will eventually destroy the other men but can only 
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 do so when he adopts their barbarism and, essentially, becomes one of or indistinguishable from 
them. David, even if he might be viewed as noble earlier in the film—and I have attempted to 
demonstrate that he really cannot be—essentially becomes one with the local brutes, brought 
down to their level and, thus, cannot be seen as a higher being, in Aristotelian terms. 
David lures Scutt, Venner, and Cawsey inside by asking them to bring in the man trap 
and has them hang it over the fireplace. As they are doing so, Amy, who thinks David is 
avoiding confrontation, brings in a tray of beer and, next to the beer, she has placed a bowl of 
milk that is presumably intended to force the issue of the dead cat. The men, including David, 
ignore Amy's gesture and, instead, the workers suspiciously invite David to go hunting with 
them the following day. He accepts and Amy, increasingly frustrated, storms out. David has 
failed horribly in his attempt to challenge the men and, what is more, has fallen into the workers' 
trap: while he is hunting with them the next day, he is abandoned and left in a field while Venner 
and Scutt return to Trencher's Farm to rape Amy. 
 
ACT TWO: THE RAPE 
Venner, who arrives first, knocks on the door and Amy initially invites him in not 
because she is happy to see him; rather, she immediately says she would like to know what he 
thinks of cats. As Neil Fulwood describes this incident in ​The Films of Sam Peckinpah ​, 
“Admitting him [Venner], she confronts him about the cat. He reacts by forcing himself on her. 
She protests at first, but her resistance meets with a fist to the face and a flurry of slaps” (71). 
The message here is obvious: Amy is left to confront Venner, ultimately physically, about the 
executed pet because David either would not or could not do it. In other words, through his 
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 weakness and poor judgment—first in his refusal to leave the farm, as Amy requested, and then 
in his inability to confront the workers—David is responsible for Amy's current predicament. 
Venner tells her that he fancies cats (a rather blatant and crude double entendre, one of many in 
the film) and proceeds to kiss Amy, who immediately asks him to leave. He refuses, forcing 
himself on her until Amy slaps him incredibly hard. Significantly, this slap is shown in slow 
motion. As Michael Sragow observes in “From ​The Siege of Trencher's Farm ​ to ​Straw Dogs ​: 
The Narrative Brilliance of Sam Peckinpah,” “The [slow motion] device captures both the 
twisted passion of the man and the shock and agony of the woman. Amy shivers with fear and 
confusion. Venner was her hometown sweetheart; he probably still understands her in ways that 
David can't” (77). This arguably suggests that Amy is emotionally or psychologically 
“homeless,” unable to feel comfortable or secure with any of the people who ​could ​ make her feel 
that way. After Amy's slap, Venner slaps her back, knocking her onto the couch (once again in 
slow motion). Terrified, she gets up and backs against a wall. Venner approaches her, slaps Amy 
multiple times, drags her across the room by her hair (an act David will repeat during the siege), 
and throws her onto the couch, where he, on top of her, kisses Amy again. Amy begs Venner to 
leave. He responds, with his hand raised, “I don't want to reave you, but I will.” He rips off her 
shirt and Amy repeatedly yells “no.” She cries and tries to refuse Venner's advances by turning 
away and crossing her arms over her chest, but it is clear that she does not have much of a choice 
here. Venner takes off his shirt and, as he does, Peckinpah quickly cuts together shots (i.e. flash 
cuts), from Amy's perspective, of Venner and David. As Fulwood writes, “Whether through 
conflicting emotions, numbed insensation or fear of another beating, Amy capitulates” (71). This 
scene, and the flash cuts in particular, has been interpreted in many ways: does Amy picture 
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 David and feign enjoyment in order to survive the attack (i.e. perhaps if she imagines herself 
having sex with David, Venner's assault will be somehow more tolerable)? Is Amy wishing 
David were more “masculine” or aggressive, as Venner is in this scene? Or is Amy recognizing, 
perhaps for the first time, that Venner the rapist and her emotionally abusive husband are not that 
different from one another? That is, while we have no reason to suspect that he has ever forced 
himself on her physically, David certainly bullies and violates her psychologically and 
intellectually. Significantly, after David returns home from the failed hunting excursion and tries 
to make physical advances on Amy, Peckinpah again includes alternating flash cuts of David and 
Venner, suggesting that Amy does indeed conflate the two men, especially with regard to their 
mistreatment of her. 
The rapid editing in this scene is noteworthy and provocative. In ​Savage Cinema: Sam 
Peckinpah and the Rise of Ultraviolent Movies ​, Prince breaks down and details the twenty-seven 
shot series during the rape scene in which Venner and David are conflated through what 
Peckinpah called flash cuts, some of which last only three, four, six, and seven frames, which is 
less than one second. Prince writes, “Peckinpah and his editors had to know that a three-frame 
shot was much too brief to permit a viewer to clearly see the pictured image. It is, therefore, 
tempting to speculate that their edits here were intended to be subliminal” (80). Prince continues, 
“A viewer watching the scene cannot see these images, not in a way that permits recognition of 
their content” (80). And, finally, Prince explains how this sequence helps us, as an audience, 
understand that David is most certainly not presented as a hero, a point I will explore in greater 
detail later: “These shots are no longer just visualizing Amy's psychological perspective but are 
also working now on the viewer, subliminally extending Amy's perceptions of that 
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 David-Charlie link to the viewer” (80). As Michael Bliss notes in ​Justified Lives: Morality & 
Narrative in the Films of Sam Peckinpah ​, “David indicates that he disclaims responsibility for 
the volatile situation developing at the farm—a situation that is, to a great extent, the result of the 
workmen's perceiving what a weak, presumptuous, and emotionally undemonstrative person 
David is” (148). It is during her rape at the hands of Venner that this becomes painfully obvious 
to Amy and the flash cuts communicate this realization to the viewer. 
Reminiscent of Abel Gance's use of sometimes undetectably fast/short cuts during the 
famous cliff scene, for example, in his film ​La Roue​ (1923), Peckinpah's technique has the effect 
of removing Amy—and us, as viewers—from reality and, at least momentarily, creates or 
permits us access to a kind of surreal world of the unconscious. As Stephen Prince suggests, 
“Peckinpah used editing to probe the psychic consequences of this violence [Amy's rape] for its 
victim” (84). Even if we agree with Kael's questionable assertion in “Peckinpah's Obsession” 
that Amy “really want[s] the rough stuff” and that she is a “little beast” who is “asking to be 
made submissive,” Peckinpah clearly demonstrates throughout the remainder of the film the 
traumatic psychological consequences of this act, which he introduces through the rapid, 
schizophrenic editing of this particular scene, something Kael fails to address in her criticism 
(397). 
Elsewhere, Stephen Prince notes in “The Aesthetic of Slow-Motion Violence in the Films 
of Sam Peckinpah” from ​Screening Violence ​ that Peckinpah was obviously inspired by 
Kurosawa's innovative use of multi-camera filming, telephoto lenses, slow motion, and 
disjunctively angular cutting in scenes of violent death. Arthur Penn's use of montage in ​Bonnie 
and Clyde​, which was released just two years before ​The Wild Bunch ​, also influenced Peckinpah. 
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 In particular, Peckinpah was interested in using the combined techniques of slow motion and “a 
temporal non-synchrony of image and sound” to explore or express the disorientation and 
powerlessness—or, as Prince puts it, “a character's loss of physical volition”—people experience 
through violence (182, 185). Peckinpah uses these techniques in ​Straw Dogs ​ during the rape, 
church social, and siege sequences; in each case, the anguish is prolonged and thus intensified, 
and we see human beings as the psychological beings they are. As Prince writes: 
[S]low-motion images derive their poetic force from the metaphysical paradox of 
the body's continued animate reactions during a moment of diminished or 
extinguished consciousness. Slow motion intensifies this paradox by prolonging 
it. It is not just the moment of violent death which is extended, but the mysteries 
inherent in that twilit zone between consciousness and autonomic impulse, that 
awful moment when a personality ceases to inhabit a body that is still in motion. 
(185-6) 
Sylvia Chong, writing in “From 'Blood Auteurism' to the Violence of Pornography: Sam 
Peckinpah and Oliver Stone” from ​New Hollywood Violence ​, takes this a step further. She notes, 
“In violence, the body becomes incontinent; it is merely a body of physical laws rather than a 
body of agency and will” (256). Peckinpah's use of editing in these scenes, perhaps especially 
during Amy's rape and her flashbacks to it, makes this transition—and the tragedy that 
accompanies it—explicitly clear and painful. Of course, critics disagree with regard to the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of these techniques and the message or purpose they ostensibly 
serve. Chong, criticizing Prince's defense of Peckinpah's aestheticized violence later in this same 
essay, writes of ​The Wild Bunch ​ that the “sheer excess of bloody violence at [the film's] end 
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 seems to obliterate any rational meditation on its cause or motivation” (260). One might say the 
same here about about the aestheticizing of Amy's rape. 
Regardless of its appropriateness, this scene clearly not only implicates David but, of 
course, is critical of Venner, too. As Neil Fulwood writes in ​The Films of Sam Peckinpah ​: 
There's no avoiding it—the rape scene ​is ​ disturbing. But then, it should be—any 
film-maker who presents such subject matter palatably is being hugely 
irresponsible. Peckinpah shows the act in all its awful sickening ugliness. Far 
from exploiting women, the director actually delivers a resounding guilty verdict 
against the darkest and most primal urges that inform the male psyche. (74) 
Even if one is inclined to agree with Kael's argument that Peckinpah's depiction of Amy, 
particularly in the rape scene, is an attack on all women, what Fulwood suggests is that ​Straw 
Dogs ​ is at least equally an attack on men. Further, as Bernard F. Dukore writes in ​Sam 
Peckinpah's Feature Films ​: 
Amy's sexual actions and emotions […] are the focus of some of the movie's 
hostile critics, who attack Peckinpah for them. Molly Haskell gratuitously calls 
him “an old geezer” (he was in his mid-forties when he made ​Straw Dogs ​) and 
stridently asserts, not analyzes: Amy “struts around like Daisy Mae before the 
brier-patch yokels, and then gets it once, twice, and again for the little tease she is. 
The provocative, sex-obsessed bitch is one of the great male-chauvinist (and 
apparently, territorialist) fantasies, along with the fantasy that she is constantly 
fantasizing rape.” If anything in the film suggests that Amy fantasizes rape, 
Haskell does not cite it and I have not seen it. […] Apart from a tendency to infer 
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 from the film more than it contains, including a deduction of what the director's 
ideas may be from the actual or presumed views of one or more characters, which 
is unsound criticism, these and similar revelations of Peckinpah's view of women 
are highly selective in the evidence they present, when they present any, and they 
ignore women in other films by Peckinpah. (33) 
In this vein, Joshua Clover, in his essay “Home Like No Place” for the Criterion Collection, 
writes, “Yet to name the movie misogynistic is to mistake the degree to which it is a movie that 
despises everyone, its viewers no less than its characters.” Going a step further, Clover notes that 
like David, Peckinpah left America “to get his work done,” i.e. to shoot ​Straw Dogs ​. While it 
might be—and, well, probably is—a stretch to conflate Peckinpah with David, following 
Clover's logic, the film might arguably be seen as an attack on literally everyone, the whole of 
humanity, including the director himself in the same way that Orson Welles' ​Citizen Kane​ was 
both a critique of Hearst and a kind of anticipatory and self-critical autobiography. Peckinpah, 
after all, did say in his famous ​Playboy​ interview, “When you're doing a picture, first of all, the 
period matters less than what the thing is about. You become all the characters. I've been every 
character in my pictures” (111). 
While some critics have drawn generic and thematic comparisons between ​Straw Dogs 
and Peckinpah's Westerns, Neil Fulwood notes that “westerns boast characters who are decent, 
whose tribulations are undeserved […]. This is not so in ​Straw Dogs ​. Everybody is guilty of 
something” (77). Again, the point here is that it is misguided to attack Peckinpah for his 
supposedly misogynistic depiction of Amy if one does not also emphasize the extent to which he 
shows each of his characters as tragically flawed, perhaps especially the men—and, among them, 
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 David, the supposed “hero,” particularly. Kael is guilty of this when she argues in “Peckinpah's 
Obsession” that ​Straw Dogs ​ is a “male fantasy about a mathematics professor's hot young wife 
(Susan George) who wants to be raped and gets sodomized, which is more than she bargained 
for, and the timid cuckold-mathematician (Dustin Hoffman), who turns into a man when he 
learns to fight like an animal” (394). She ignores the fact, for example, that David is responsible 
for what happens to Amy and that, instead of essentially avenging the rape, David and Amy are 
physically and emotionally separated at the film's conclusion. Fulwood continues: “And David is 
perhaps the most guilty of them all: for letting things reach such a stage. Another line from 
Nietzsche applies: 'He who fights with monsters might take care lest he become a monster 
himself. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you'” (78). Fulwood 
here counters the claim that David is portrayed as heroic during the film's conclusion when he 
has defended himself, Amy, and Niles, and Peckinpah goes to great lengths, as I have detailed 
thus far, to show him as remarkably flawed, broken in a way that can never be overcome; the 
best he can hope for is to beat the villagers at their own violent game but, in so doing, he must 
abandon the few qualities we do admire in him, namely his pacifism and humanistic moral 
principles. As I will explore later, David's fall—and, remember, his status and behavior were 
never as high or righteous as he thought they were—is necessary for this film to qualify as a 
tragedy (as opposed to irony, exploitation, or farce). In other words, his villainous behavior, and 
his culpability for what happens to Amy, reduces him to the level of the rapists, thugs, and 
murderers he opposes, and what makes this fall tragic is that he is responsible for all of the 
horror through his own actions and his failure to understand or come to terms with the nature of 
violence, i.e. through repression, he handicaps himself psychologically to the point where when 
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 he is required to act (fight off the home invaders), and his behavior is relatively animalistic and 
instinctual, not reasoned or responsible. The first real victim of his flaws is Amy, particularly 
when she is brutally raped. 
After the rape, David returns home from the hunting trip/ruse to find Amy alone in bed. It 
is a tense scene in which their shared victimization (though, obviously, to varying degrees) sets 
the tone: Amy is rightfully resentful that David in effect allowed her to get raped, mocking him 
for not hanging his coat in the closet where they earlier found her dead cat, while David is 
ashamed that he was tricked, left alone in the fields, though he is not fully aware here of the 
repercussions of his ignorance and foolishness since Amy does not explicitly tell him about her 
assault (she does, however, somewhat cryptically say in response to David telling her that the 
men “stuck it to me on the moor today” that they “also serve who sit at home and wait”). Amy 
refers to both herself and her husband as “cowards” and, when David goes to kiss Amy at the 
scene's conclusion, Peckinpah again employs flash cuts of David and Venner to underscore 
Amy's trauma and the instability of her emotional state, and also the similarities in terms of 
violence between the two men. The next day, David fires the workers—the only explanation he 
gives them is: “I don't want you around.” As he walks away from the men, Peckinpah shows 
David tripping over a rock and, as the workers leave, one of them trips over another rock. David 
here is again being conflated with the workers and, in turn, their violence. It is a similarity that 
Amy already recognizes, but Peckinpah will make this relationship even more explicit during the 
film's climax. 
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 ACT THREE: THE CHURCH SOCIAL 
The next significant scene in the film takes place during a church social, the one Hood 
invited David and Amy to earlier. Amy is still (and understandably) emotionally distraught and 
distant during the party, and Peckinpah uses flash cuts here to draw attention to the juxtaposition 
between her anguish and the party's merry atmosphere: through these cuts, we see Amy recalling 
and reliving the rape when she sees her attackers drunkenly celebrating at the church. The 
obvious pain she experiences here strongly suggests that, despite what some critics argue, Amy 
did not “enjoy” the rape or, at the very least, that any type of pleasure she did experience was not 
worth the ultimate cost. The psychological effects of Amy's experience are devastating and they 
are compounded by the fact that David remains ignorant with regard to the cause of her distress; 
this further alienates him from Amy and Amy from him. What is more, David, as the result of his 
poor treatment of Amy earlier in the film, is responsible for this situation: not only is he 
responsible for Amy's rape, but he has also created an environment of mistrust, one in which 
Amy is either uncomfortable confiding in David or sees such a disclosure as pointless. If David 
could not confront the workers over the dead cat, for example, why would Amy think he could 
confront the men over this considerably more serious issue with much higher stakes? 
Again, to underscore—or perhaps to exaggerate—this tension, Peckinpah employs flash 
cuts to create a hyper-dramatic flashback sequence during which Amy sees her jubilant attackers 
at present and during her rape. As Stephen Prince writes in ​Savage Cinema: Sam Peckinpah and 
the Rise of Ultraviolent Movies ​: 
The cutting throughout the film gives its scenes a nervous, edgy charge. Many 
compositions are de-centered, and the angular changes in camera position across 
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 succeeding shots are often disorientingly oblique. Peckinpah's editing carved 
space up into fragments, and these fragmentary visual spaces correlate with the 
charged emotional tensions among the characters. Space in the film—psychic, 
physical, visual—is fraught with conflict, subject to attack from without, and 
requiring vigilant defense. (74) 
In some ways, this scene in which Amy recalls and relives the rape is even more disturbing than 
the rape itself, as it eliminates any potential ambiguity with regard to Amy's feelings about 
Venner. David's presence at the church social and during Amy's flashback also creates tension: 
while he is physically close to her while Amy retreats into her own mind and memories, he is 
unwilling or unable to help her. When David does eventually notice Amy's discomfort, he does 
not ask what is wrong; instead, he simply asks if she wants to go home. Neither David nor Amy 
take the initiative to open a potentially productive dialogue; the result is compounding confusion, 
misunderstanding, and distrust. The sense of alienation and even hopelessness Peckinpah creates 
is considerable—both Amy and David are presented as so emotionally broken that we sense 
there is no hope of redemption or recovery. Indeed, even at the film's conclusion, when David is 
“victorious” after the siege, the differences and shared trauma between him and Amy remain 
irreconcilable. 
While David and Amy continue to struggle through their dysfunctional relationship, 
Peckinpah sets up—or, rather, continues—another dramatic thread during this scene: Janice, a 
flirty young girl, has lured Henry Niles, the intellectually challenged pedophile, into a nearby 
barn where the two kiss and grope each other. Once the townspeople realize the two are missing 
from the party, a frantic search commences. Niles, hearing men calling for Janice, is afraid she 
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 will be punished and possibly hurt. In an effort to protect her, Niles accidentally smothers or 
stranglers her while trying to keep her quiet until the search party passes the barn. Terrified, 
Niles hides Janice's body beneath some hay and then runs away. Meanwhile, Amy and David, 
who have just left the party, are driving home through the dark and thick fog when they (David is 
driving now) hit Niles with their car. David feels a sense of great responsibility and insists on 
taking the injured Niles to Trencher's Farm until the police or a doctor can come attend to him. 
The townspeople quickly learn that Niles, who they wish to punish, is being held by Amy and 
David, and they descend on the farmhouse. 
 
ACT FOUR: THE SIEGE 
Rather than explain the film's climactic siege, which lasts for about 30 minutes, in 
considerable detail, I will instead analyze the most relevant points with regard to what I have 
already laid out, especially in terms of the tension between David and Amy and, equally 
important, what is to come in my discussion of Aristotle's ideas about tragedy as they inform 
Straw Dogs ​. 
When the villagers descend on Trencher's Farm, they angrily demand that David release 
Niles to them. David, however, refuses, explaining to Amy that the men are sure to beat Niles to 
death (his obsession with order again manifests itself here in an apparent belief in law and 
justice). Amy unsuccessfully demands that they oblige the attackers, saying that she does not 
care what happens to Niles. Amy's pragmatism—she knows the men will not stop until they get 
what they want—collides with David's idealism: he does not care whether Niles is guilty of rape; 
he a) feels responsible for the man's well-being since David struck Niles with his car and b) is 
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 outraged by the idea that the villagers can get what they want through violence, i.e. vigilante 
justice. But the lines are not clear here. As Michael Sragow notes in “From ​The Siege of 
Trencher's Farm ​ to ​Straw Dogs ​: The Narrative Brilliance of Sam Peckinpah” from ​Peckinpah 
Today​, “We may agree in principle that David should protect a terribly vulnerable man from a 
small mob. But Peckinpah fills the air with ironies. When David says, 'This is my house, this is 
me, this is who I am,' you can't help thinking, no, this is Amy's house (earlier in the film she had 
sneered, 'Every chair is my daddy's chair')” (79). Throughout the siege, moreover, David shifts 
and assumes a sort of middle position. While he is still outraged by the villagers' violence, he 
realizes the men, especially after they accidentally shoot and kill Major Scott, who arrives on the 
scene and attempts to protect David, Amy, and Niles, have no intention of letting the couple—or 
at least David—live. They have, as David notes, gone too far to turn back. The matter is no 
longer one of principle but is now an issue of survival: David is fighting for his life, yes, but also 
for his marriage, as Amy threatens and even attempts to leave him during the attack. Whether 
this is because she realizes her relationship with him and what he personally stands for are not 
worth her life or because she knows the villagers, particularly Venner, will spare her is not made 
clear. 
Eventually, and through brutal means, David is able to kill all of the attackers. During a 
moment of sober reflection, he says: “Jesus, I killed them all.” There is an ambiguous expression 
on David's face here: it is unclear if he is proud of or disgusted by his actions. This and other 
scenes in the film are morally ambiguous, despite some critics' claims, as were Peckinpah's ideas 
about violence. In his famous ​Playboy​ interview, for example, he says: 
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 True pacifism is manly. In fact, it's the finest form of manliness. But if a man 
comes up to you and cuts your hand off, you don't offer him the other one. Not if 
you want to go on playing the piano, you don't. I am not saying that violence is 
what makes a man a man. I'm saying that when violence comes you can't run from 
it. You have to recognize its true nature, in yourself as well as in others, and stand 
up to it. If you run, you're dead or you might as well be. (108) 
And, in an attempt to address the charges of fascism and anti-intellectualism against him, most 
notably from Kael—who writes in “Peckinpah's Obsession” that “Hoffman, the victim of the 
villagers' (and the director's) contempt, is that stock figure of [...] the priggish, cowardly 
intellectual” and that “It's embarrassing that a man of Peckinpah's gifts should offer such stale 
anti-intellectualism” (395)—Peckinpah in the same interview says: 
[A real man] doesn't have to prove anything. He's himself. My dad put it another 
way. When the time comes, he used to say, you stand up and you're counted. For 
the right thing: For something that matters. It's the ultimate test. You either 
compromise to the point where it destroys you or you stand up and say, 'Fuck off.' 
It's amazing how few people will do that. So if I'm a fascist because I believe that 
men are ​not​ created equal, then all right, I'm a fascist. But I detest the term and I 
detest the kind of reasoning that labels that point of view fascistic. I'm not an 
anti-intellectual, but I'm against the pseudo intellectuals who roll like dogs in their 
own verbal diarrhea and call it purpose and identity. An intellectual who 
embodies his intellect in action, that's a complete human being. But sitting back 
and quarterbacking from the stands is playing with yourself. (108) 
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 But when is violence appropriate or necessary? This is not an easy question, of course, and it was 
further complicated at the time of this film's production by the ongoing Vietnam War, to which 
the film implicitly refers, and the consequent protests against it. As Stephen Prince states in 
Savage Cinema: Sam Peckinpah and the Rise of Ultraviolent Movies ​, Peckinpah “liked to 
observe that 'Things are always mixed,’ and that 'There was no such thing as simple truth,' [and] 
did not have a single or simple attitude toward anything in his films. The electric tensions and 
uniquely provocative edge to his work are due to the impacted and contending moral and 
emotional perspectives entangled within the films” (7). Prince continues: “This is why Peckinpah 
cannot simply be dismissed with a convenient label, such as fascist or misogynist” (7). Further, 
Paul Seydor writes in ​Peckinpah: The Western Films: A Reconsideration ​: “Peckinpah has always 
been ambivalent about the so-called codes of the West, the masculine attitudes and gestures by 
which his heroes often define themselves, and the virtues of extreme and isolate individualism. It 
is not accurate to call him a critic of the cult of masculinity, because he is not a didactic artist” 
(221). If we grant the filmmaker the benefit of the doubt, as Prince and Seydor suggest he 
deserves, Peckinpah seems to be at least implicitly asking through ​Straw Dogs ​ if and when 
violence is appropriate. In other words, where is the line? When must one fight? Is David truly a 
coward if he opposes the violence in Vietnam yet defends his home by the most brutal means? Is 
he a coward precisely because he resorts to violence in defense of his home? Does David even 
have a moral center, despite what he likes to believe about himself? In the same interview 
mentioned above, Peckinpah says: “I'm basically a storyteller. I'm not even sure anymore what I 
believe in. I once directed a Saroyan play in which one of the characters asked another if he 
would die for what he believed in. The guy answered, 'No, I might be wrong.' That's where I am” 
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 (109). It is reasonably safe to say ​Straw Dogs ​ is an exploration of ambiguity more than it is a 
pronouncement of a particular position. This is not to say, of course, that it is a nihilistic film; 
rather, it reflects existential confusion and the ongoing process of self-discovery and 
identity-development in both the context of war and everyday life. 
In her essay “The Violent Dance: A Personal Memoir of Death in the Movies” from 
Screening Violence ​, Vivian C. Sobchack explains why ​Straw Dogs ​ resonated so much with her: 
What is the difference between my responses to [ ​Un Chien Andalou ​ and ​Straw 
Dogs ​]? Both play upon hidden fear in the audience. Both have moments of 
extreme violence. Why should I be able to watch one [ ​Straw Dogs ​], but not the 
other? The answer lies, I think, in the qualitative nature of the violence involved. I 
don't have the pressing need to see a woman's eyeball slit by a razor; seeing it will 
do nothing but disturb me. And this particular violent action—although terrifying 
with or without its Freudian implications—seems to have little to do with my life 
as I live it every day. […] Watching that scene, in other words, is not going to 
instruct me; it is not going to reveal to me something that is terrible, but which I 
need to know. The nature of the violence in ​Straw Dogs ​ is different. It may not be 
treated surrealistically, but it is not totally realistic either. (115) 
However, as Stephen Prince notes in “The Aesthetic of Slow-Motion Violence in the Films of 
Sam Peckinpah” from ​Screening Violence ​, the violence ​is ​ treated or depicted surrealistically. 
Prince writes, “By breaking the established representational conventions [and by] using graphic 
imagery of bloodletting and the montage aesthetic, Peckinpah aimed to bring the era's violence 
inside the movie theater, which would no longer function as a place of refuge by shielding 
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 viewers from horrific images” (176-7). And this is, in part, what makes the violence in ​Straw 
Dogs ​ so disturbing. Sobchack continues, referencing both the domestic and potentially 
militaristic violence the film explores: 
[ ​Straw Dogs ​] involves the kind of violence that one fears now, today. Sickened, 
terrified, I ​had​ to watch the film. I had to learn and know what I fear and, 
however painful the experience was, for the moment I found a certain security in 
the fact that I had not backed away from instruction. In short, I was doing my 
homework—trying to learn how to survive. David in that movie was much like 
myself, the people around me. We all just wanted to mind our own business and 
yet found ourselves, our homes, our lives, threatened by people and things which 
plainly didn't make sense, weren't at all rational. (116) 
Indeed, contrary to what some critics have suggested, ​Straw Dogs ​ is most certainly not a 
revenge tale; instead, it is, while certainly imperfect, more of a query or meditation, and through 
its ambiguity avoids answers and prescriptions. The most obvious piece of evidence for this is 
that David, throughout the film, remains unaware of the fact that Amy was raped, i.e. as far as he 
knows, he has no motive for revenge. Instead, the film explores mob violence and how an 
idealistic and physically inferior person might hope to stand against such violence ​when it is 
brought to him ​, whether it is perpetrated by a drunken gang, as in the film, or a state's military. 
Further, as Bernard F. Dukore argues in ​Sam Peckinpah's Feature Films ​, one might think of 
Straw Dogs ​ as a film primarily about commitment and existentialist responsibility. Dukore 
writes: 
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 [David], who in a scene with the local minister appears to reject the view that 
religion gives life meaning or purpose, finds his own way, blazes his own trail, 
commits himself, chooses to act, and becomes responsible for his actions. I have 
quoted Camus as saying, 'This is called becoming a man.' Becoming a man is 
what the exemplary hero of ​Straw Dogs ​ does. He achieves this status by 
defending a man who is incapable of defending himself, by killing people who 
would kill both of them as well as his wife, and by assessing his conduct as 
justifiable and honorable in these circumstances. (32-3) 
While Dukore's analysis does speak helpfully to the ideas of ambiguity and responsibility 
mentioned above, it unfortunately fails in the way it depicts David's assessment of his own 
motives and actions. While David feels justified in defending Niles from the mob, he slowly 
loses his grasp on his own idealism or, at the very least, fails to recognize the consequences of 
his actions and, in turn, fails to recognize himself. This is demonstrated through both his 
ambiguous “Jesus, I've killed them all” line and his admission to Niles at the film's conclusion: 
when Niles tells David he is not sure how to find his way home, David admits that he does not 
either. David has lost himself. He has, he thinks, chosen and acted wrongly and consequently has 
become something other than his idealized self and has descended into existential chaos. In the 
aforementioned ​Playboy​ interview, Peckinpah says of David's line about being lost that Hoffman 
wanted to “say it with a smile, because the irony is too much for him to say it straight” (102). 
This (and the context for the line in the film itself) certainly does not suggest David enjoys his 
newfound “masculinity,” as Kael suggests. 
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 Moreover, while David is able to fend off the villagers during the siege and is by one 
standard “successful,” he and Amy remain, throughout and after the siege, separated, both 
emotionally and physically; again, there is no hope of reconciliation between them, and David 
leaves Amy alone (while he drives Niles home) in their blood-drenched house before the final 
credits roll. The fact that Amy had to shoot and kill the final intruder, who was attacking David, 
also challenges readings of the film that suggest David has “become a man” through his actions; 
indeed, he is even unable to articulate his appreciation to Amy after she saves his life, 
underscoring his shortcomings, and would not have been able to defend 'his house' without 
Amy's help. As a bit of further tragic irony, it is Venner and not David who saves Amy while she 
is attacked and nearly raped by Scutt during the siege. 
In the final moments of the film, when David tells Niles he does not know his way home, 
David's admission anticipates another one of Peckinpah's tragic leading characters, Rolf Steiner 
(played by James Coburn in 1977's World War II drama ​Cross of Iron​), who begins a romance 
with a nurse after suffering a concussion but decides to return to the front, knowing that his unit 
has little chance of “winning.” Steiner says to her, after making love, “I have no home.” All he 
knows is violence and, perhaps, survival. She counters, effectively, by saying that without the 
war—and he is not a particularly patriotic or nationalistic person—he would be lost, i.e. the 
suggestion is violence and maybe brotherhood is all he knows and these things thus define him. 
David, who despite his reluctance to take sides on virtually anything, e.g. the Vietnam War 
protests and confronting the laborers over Amy's murdered cat, believes he adheres to a kind of 
moral code. Indeed, perhaps ambivalence or a commitment to ambiguity is this code. Once he 
realizes he is capable of the kind of brutality that he would otherwise condemn, however, he is 
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 lost. Violence has come to define him, just as it does Steiner. In other words, like Steiner, David, 
after experiencing chaos, has “no home,” which is the sentiment he communicates to Niles at the 
conclusion of ​Straw Dogs ​. 
As Michael Sragow observes in “From ​The Siege of Trencher's Farm ​ to ​Straw Dogs ​: The 
Narrative Brilliance of Sam Peckinpah,” Peckinpah's “greatest achievement was imbuing 
classical Hollywood narrative with a modernist sensibility. No Hollywood filmmaker suffused 
traditional storytelling with more ambivalence and gallows humor, defiance and despair. And his 
accomplishment was never more audacious or complete than it was in ​Straw Dogs ​” (69). As 
Sragow continues, “It doesn't just compel you to get to know its characters in action; it asks you 
to question every choice they make about matters of life and death and love and sex” (69). In 
“Peckinpah's Progress: From Blood and Killing in the Old West to Siege and Rape in Cornwall,” 
Dan Yergin writes, “Peckinpah's real theme, the source of his power, is how men become 
obsolete” (90). Put another way, David, who is depicted as impotent and ineffective throughout 
the film, comes to realize his own shortcomings—or the failures of his idealism—but only 
through ostensible “victory.” His philosophy, what he valued most and came to define him, is 
rendered obsolete, as he must violate his own code in order to preserve his own life. As 
Peckinpah said in his ​Playboy​ interview: 
There's a point in the middle of the siege when David almost throws up, he's so 
sick, and he says [to Venner] 'Go ahead, pull the trigger.' He's sick of it, sick of 
himself, sick of the violence that he recognizes in himself. I can't believe anyone 
can miss this point in the movie. He's just used a poker to kill a man who's just 
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 tried to kill him. He looks at what he's done with despair and absolute horror and 
he doesn't care at that moment whether he lives or dies. (102) 
This annihilation of self is what makes David both a truly tragic and an arguably singular 
character in Peckinpah's body of work. As Neil Fulwood writes in ​The Films of Sam Peckinpah ​, 
“​Straw Dogs ​ is the first of the contemporary westerns; David Sumner is the first loner to appear 
in Peckinpah's work. There is no celebration [in ​Straw Dogs ​] of masculine codes of honour” 
(77). David, particularly at the end of the film, is utterly alone and alienated, even from himself; 
the real and ultimate tragedy here is that he feels dehumanized—and it is his fault, as he is 
responsible. 
The moral ambiguity, especially with regard to violence, at work in ​Straw Dogs ​ has 
inspired a tremendous range of critical responses. While many critics ridiculed the film, labeling 
it—and particularly its conclusion—a twisted celebration of machismo, others (e.g. Michael 
Sragow) have overcompensated by defending every aspect of the film. Stephen Prince's ​Savage 
Cinema: Sam Peckinpah and the Rise of Ultraviolent Movies ​, however, finds a sort of sober 
middle ground. As Prince notes, [ ​Straw Dogs ​] “demonstrates not the conversion of an egghead 
intellectual to a real man, as many critics have argued, but a nightmare vision of a pathologically 
repressed man finally losing control of his rage” (128). Prince's assessment of the film's purpose 
and function also strikes me as informative and serves as a nice introduction to the next section 
of this chapter in which I will begin analyzing ​Straw Dogs ​ via Aristotle's ​Poetics ​: 
Peckinpah's perspective here was oblique. Because David is such an emotionally 
warped and myopic individual, and is himself so out of touch with his own rage, 
he is an unreliable moral guide through the narrative. Although he is the 
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 protagonist, he is not the exemplar of any affirmative principle that the film 
wishes to represent. […] Because this is an unusual method for constructing an 
American film, many critics felt sure that David must be Peckinpah's mouthpiece. 
Accordingly, they took the film as if it were offering a conventional hero and 
interpreted the climax as a violent rite of passage through which David was 
reborn as a more masculine and potent character. (186) 
 
Why Use Aristotle?: 
It might seem odd to analyze any film, perhaps especially one of Peckinpah's, through 
Aristotle's ​Poetics ​. For starters, as translator and professor of Greek language and literature 
Malcolm Heath notes, “There have been, and still are, fundamental disagreements about the 
meaning even of [Aristotle's] key concepts, like ​hamartia​ and ​katharsis ​” (viii). These 
disagreements, at least in part, are due to the almost aphoristic form of ​Poetics ​, i.e. ideas are 
introduced and claims are made, but there is nothing in this text resembling a thorough 
discussion. As a result, readers have been charged with putting together the pieces, so to speak, 
and filling in the many gaps. Disagreements about the key concepts Heath mentions have 
naturally arisen. These disagreements and even arguably misunderstandings have entered the 
realm of Peckinpah scholarship, too. For example, several critics have discussed Aristotle's 
theory of catharsis with regard to both ​Straw Dogs ​ and ​The Wild Bunch ​, probably because 
Peckinpah freely cited this concept when defending the former film in an interview with William 
Murray from ​Playboy​: 
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 I'm a great believer in catharsis. Do you think people watch the Super Bowl 
because they think football is a beautiful sport? Bullshit! They're committing 
violence vicariously. Look, the old basis of catharsis was a purging of the 
emotions through pity and fear. People used to go and see the plays of Euripedes 
and Sophocles and those other Greek cats. The players acted it out and the 
audience got in there and kind of lived it with them. What's more violent than the 
plays of William Shakespeare? And how about grand opera? What's bloodier than 
a romantic grand opera? Take a plot, any plot—brother kills brother to sleep with 
the wife, who then kills her father, and so on. Want to have some fun? Read 
Grimms' Fairy Tales ​. When you point things like this out to the New York cats, 
they tell you it was all art, which is crap. These plays and operas and stories were 
the popular entertainment of their day. (102-3) 
Some critics accept Peckinpah's explanation while others do not. But understanding and 
responding to these critics' retorts is complicated, again, by the fact that the very concept of 
catharsis, for one, is difficult to nail down. Out of deference, I will use Heath's definition, which 
states that “tragedy aims to excite a response of pity and fear. Tragedy is 'an imitation … of 
events that evoke fear and pity'” (xxi). Heath continues, noting that in ​Poetics ​ Aristotle “refers at 
once to pity and fear: tragedy is an 'imitation not just of a complete action, but also of events that 
evoke fear and pity'” (xxviii). The question poets are concerned with is, naturally, how to make 
this evocation as potent as possible. Aristotle, writes Heath, “identifies two things which make a 
sequence of events particularly effective: 'these effects occur above all when things come about 
contrary to expectation but because of one another'” (xxix). And, finally: “'Contrary to 
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 expectation' introduces the notion of astonishment, while 'because of one another' provides an 
anchor to the discussion of necessary or probable connection that has gone before” (xxix). This is 
relevant with regard to our discussion of Peckinpah because I want to examine the function or 
purpose of violence in ​Straw Dogs ​ with regard to catharsis, yes, but even more importantly as 
these concepts inform the film's characters and their motives and, consequently, our responses to 
them. In other words, how is the “sequence of events” functional in terms of Peckinpah's attempt 
to create a maximally effective tragedy? Such a question is often ignored in the existing work on 
Straw Dogs ​, as critics—especially those who claim to be offended or disappointed by the 
film—largely prefer to denounce Amy's rape and the siege as gratuitous or exploitative. 
Stephen Prince, in his essay “Graphic Violence in the Cinema: Origins, Aesthetic Design, 
and Social Effects” from ​Screening Violence ​, writes: 
The concept of catharsis derives from Aristotle's well-known discussion in the 
Poetics ​ wherein he asserted that tragedy uses language and acting to evoke pity 
( ​eleos ​) and fear ( ​phobos ​) in a manner that purges such feelings from the spectator. 
Aristotle's discussion is brief, and, rather than constituting a theory, it provides 
only the hint of an idea. He does not work out the body or the implications of his 
idea in any detail. […] Significantly, Aristotle does ​not​ mention aggression, and, 
furthermore, he identified ​language​ and ​acting ​ as the vehicles effecting the 
cathartic purge. He described a medium—classical tragedy—which conveyed its 
effects through language and in which horrific violence occurred offstage. (19-20) 
Prince goes on to say, “Thus, [Aristotle's] remarks about catharsis do not necessarily generalize 
to a medium like cinema, whose design is so different than classical tragedy. […] As I noted 
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 previously, filmmakers use editing, camerawork, and sound to heighten the sensory qualities of 
violent episodes, and these are ​shown​ in film rather than described verbally, as in classical 
tragedy” (20). Depending on one's interpretation of the concept of catharsis, however, (s)he 
could argue that this intensification or heightening of sensory qualities permitted by film actually 
allows for greater catharsis, in some ways making the purge of pity and fear even more efficient 
or profound. Regardless, I am not as interested in defending Peckinpah's claims about his 
understanding and attempted use of catharsis as I am in a) examining the existing criticism that 
does this and b) thinking about how some of Aristotle's other ideas, especially those regarding 
the various types of plot, might be useful in responding to some of this existing criticism. Indeed, 
Peckinpah arguably misunderstood the relationship between catharsis and tragedy; as Health 
writes, “[K] ​atharsis ​ is not the function of tragedy, but a beneficial effect which tragedy has on 
some members of the audience” (xlii). 
In his essay “Aristotle v. the Action Film,” which appears in ​New Hollywood Violence ​, 
Thomas Leitch argues: 
American audiences are always ready to ignore their status as citizens of the most 
powerful nation on earth and identify with the underdog, and Hollywood has 
obliged with heroes [like the] mousy David Sumner (Dustin Hoffman) in ​Straw 
Dogs ​ (1972), goaded into a long-overdue but horrifyingly grisly response to the 
British roughnecks who have raped his wife and now plan to kill them. The 
initially peace-seeking but heroically reactive [hero of ​Straw Dogs ​ is] motivated 
by revenge, a personal animus which naturally strengthens [his] heroic status and 
the audience's commitment to [him]. (120-1) 
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 Leitch's use of the word “heroic” here is somewhat problematic, though, and his claim that 
audiences are meant to identify with David is one that has been challenged by other critics. As I 
detailed earlier, David is not a heroic figure and we see this most notably through Amy's 
conflation of him and Venner during her rape and at other times. Furthermore, as Aristotle 
explains in ​Poetics ​ when discussing the best kinds of tragic plot, the most effective protagonist in 
a drama must be one “who is not outstanding in moral excellence or justice” and who sees his 
fortune change from good to bad as the result of a “serious error” of some kind that is “not due to 
any moral defect or depravity” (21). But David's lack of hero status does not necessarily, though 
others have argued otherwise, make him a villain. On the one hand, David could be seen as 
failing to meet Aristotle's criteria on both of the aforementioned counts, as he ​is ​ arguably 
“outstanding” with regard to justice (his defense of Niles, for example) but also ​is ​ morally 
defective (e.g. his insecurity and pretentiousness and his mistreatment of Amy) and, thus, does 
not qualify, in Aristotelian terms, as an effective, sympathetic lead. Indeed, his “defects” actually 
allow tragic events to unfold: the murder of Amy's cat, Amy's rape, and finally the siege. 
However, contrary to what Leitch suggests, David is not motivated by revenge since, as I noted 
earlier, he is never even aware that Amy was raped. The complexities of David's character and 
actions, I think, defy simple reduction to caricature. As Heath writes, “Aristotle's point, then, is 
that a tragic plot is more likely to evoke fear and pity if a person inflicts harm on a ​philos ​ [family 
member or friend], someone close to them” (xxxiii). Again, David is arguably responsible for the 
harm, notably the rape, that comes to Amy. But, as Heath also says: 
When someone knowingly plans or inflicts injury on one of the people with 
whom he or she is most closely connected we feel disgust, and our sense of 
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 revulsion interferes with the emotions of fear and pity. It is better, therefore, to 
have the character act in ignorance; there is then no sense of outrage to interfere 
with our sense of pity. Indeed, someone who unwittingly harms a person close to 
them is to be pitied; so in these situations we can pity the agent as well as the 
victim. (xxxiv) 
The question of David's knowingness—or, whether he should have known or understood the 
potential consequences of his behavior—becomes central here. In other words, Peckinpah 
invokes and relies on pity, with regard to both Amy and arguably David; at the very least, even if 
we do not quite pity David (because we fault him for his unknowingness) we cannot reasonably 
claim, as Kael and others mistakenly do, that he is meant to be celebrated. Heath suggests that 
“tragedy aims to excite fear and pity; these emotions are responses to success and failure” (xxi). 
It follows, then, that David's failures in particular must be emphasized, both in the film and our 
discussion of it, as a way to guard against his glorification. 
A tension emerging here that I will revisit later is between Aristotle's definition of a high 
tragedy and the various interpretations—especially with regard to the characters' 
motivations—of ​Straw Dogs ​, i.e. one might rightly criticize the film for failing to meet 
Aristotle's standard, but critiques that rely on reducing the characters to caricatures (which is 
different from looking at them as abstractions in service of an idea or theme), instead of looking 
at them as emotionally damaged beings who struggle and often fail in many ways, are ultimately 
unsatisfying. As Heath writes: 
Tragedy, like all poetry, is an imitation. Specifically, it is an imitation of a certain 
kind of action. So one constituent part of tragedy is ​plot​, the ordered sequence of 
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 events which make up the action being imitated. An action is performed by 
agents, and agents necessarily have moral and intellectual characteristics, 
expressed in what they do and say. From this we can deduce that ​character ​ and 
reasoning​ will also be constituent parts of tragedy. (xviii-xix) 
Unfortunately, as I noted earlier, too much criticism on Peckinpah's film ignores the complexity 
of ​character ​. As Stephen Prince writes in ​Savage Cinema: Sam Peckinpah and the Rise of 
Ultraviolent Movies ​, “I don't know what movie these critics [Kael, Joan Mellen, Lawrence 
Shaffer, etc.] have seen, but their remarks demonstrate the tendency for discussions of ​Straw 
Dogs ​ to opt for easy caricature and neglect the remarkable nuances of the film” (133). Further, as 
Paul Seydor notes in ​Peckinpah: The Western Films: A Reconsideration ​, “Peckinpah would 
write elaborate back-stories for the characters [in ​Straw Dogs ​],” though “[n]one of this material 
ever made it to the screen as such; but writing it, he felt, gave him and his actors a better 
understanding of the people and the story” (99). The main point here is that Peckinpah, while 
never one to shy away from spectacle, was principally interested in exploring the psychology of 
his characters (and in turn examining larger human concerns), and he did this by first fleshing 
them out, as Seydor says, and then by placing them into tense, dramatic situations. The 
characters' shortcomings, especially here in ​Straw Dogs ​, often exacerbate these situations and 
sometimes even lead to extreme violence. 
However, Peckinpah's invocation of catharsis is not the primary issue here; instead, I am 
concerned with critics who appear to misread ​Straw Dogs ​ and who use ​Poetics ​ as their defense. 
Aside from the concept of catharsis, Aristotle provides several useful lenses through which we 
might view Peckinpah's film. I find his comments on narrative structure, in particular, to be the 
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 most interesting and germane. To respond to critics like Prince, who see the use of Aristotle in a 
discussion about film to be inappropriate, though, I turn again to Heath, who notes in the 
introduction to his translation of ​Poetics ​: 
This passage in chapter 4 of the ​Poetics ​ is one of many in which Aristotle refers 
to painting and the visual arts in order to make a point about poetry. He regards 
these analogies as valid because he believes both painting and poetry to be forms 
of ​mimêsis​, a word which I shall translate as 'imitation'. Many scholars would 
object to this rendering, and prefer 'representation.'” (xii-xiii) 
As Heath says, Aristotle himself was to some extent concerned with art generally when 
discussing his theories. In other words, any form that served as a “representation” was, in terms 
of certain theories of his, analogous to the others. In this sense, then, Aristotle's ideas regarding 
narrative and tragedy are absolutely relevant when discussing film, though there are obvious 
differences between cinematic storytelling and that which is intended for the stage (however, 
these differences are not, contrary to what a critic like Prince argues, somehow obstructive). 
Indeed, Aristotle relies on such analogies in order to present and explain his ideas regarding 
mimêsis​, for example, and to show how they relate to drama. Heath notes: 
For example, an arbitrary symbol on a map may 'represent' an airport, but the 
representation is purely conventional; the symbol is not a ​mimêsis​ of the airport. 
A scaled outline of its runways would be a ​mimêsis​. Aristotle is quite explicit in 
linking ​mimêsis​ and similarity even in cases where we would find it odd to speak 
of 'imitation'; he says, for example, that melody and rhythm can be 'likenesses' 
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 and 'imitations' of character and emotion […], effectively equating the two terms. 
(xiii) 
Aristotle's principle concern is what he calls imitation. As he writes in ​Poetics ​: “So imitation can 
be differentiated in these three respects, as we said at the outset: medium, object and mode” (5). 
And on medium, specifically, he writes: “Some people use the medium of colour and shape to 
produce imitations of various objects by making visual images (some through art, some through 
practice); others do this by means of the voice” (3). Arguably, he suggests here that we can apply 
his ideas about catharsis, etc. to mediums other than the stage drama. Further, as he writes later 
in the text, “The poet is engaged in imitation, just like a painter or anyone else who produces 
visual images” (42). 
At the risk of belaboring the point, I will invoke just one more example: Aristotle also 
speaks a bit about the evolution of modes and mediums. Tragedy, he writes, originally 
“developed from improvisations. […] Then tragedy was gradually enhanced as people developed 
each new aspect of it that came to light. After undergoing many transformations tragedy came to 
rest, because it had attained its natural state” (8). He continues: 
The number of actors was increased from one to two by Aeschylus, who also 
reduced the choral parts and made the spoken word play the leading role; the third 
actor and scene-painting were introduced by Sophocles. In addition, the 
magnitude increased from short plots; and in place of comic diction, as a 
consequence of a change from the satyric style, tragedy acquired dignity at a late 
stage, and the iambic verse-form was adopted instead of the trochaic tetrameter. 
(8) 
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 Of course, Aristotle could not have been aware in any meaningful way of the relative technical 
limitations of his time, i.e. he could not have anticipated the next stages of the aforementioned 
evolution (from stage drama/tragedy to cinema). What I am at least partly engaged in here is a 
thought experiment: how would Aristotle have applied his dramatic theories to film? 
The discussion above, while brief, I think adequately defends the use of Aristotle's ideas, 
especially those presented in ​Poetics ​, to aid in an analysis of a film. Peckinpah's “imitation” of 
violence (and his obvious attempts to heighten or intensify this violence, most obviously by 
aestheticizing it), for example, can be discussed vis-a-vis ​mimêsis​ (and even, though perhaps less 
productively, catharsis) just as one can apply the concepts to a stage production. One final point 
here: Heath notes that “tragedy also includes ​spectacle ​ […]: it refers to everything that is visible 
on stage, and is not limited simply to striking effects” (xix). He continues, “Spectacle is a part of 
tragedy in the sense that tragedy (unlike epic) is potentially performable; so the poet has a duty 
to ensure that his text can be performed without visual absurdity” (xix). While there are, again, 
obvious differences between a stage production and Peckinpah's films, even his harshest critics 
cannot deny his use—some might say reliance on—spectacle. And, as Bernard F. Dukore 
suggests in ​Sam Peckinpah's Feature Films ​: 
The confined locale of the battle that concludes ​Straw Dogs ​ is like the 
culmination of a stage play: besieged people trapped in a house. In Peckinpah's 
hands, cinematic directorial means enforce dramatic methods. He intensifies 
suspense by increasingly raising the stakes, by making each attack more 
threatening and dramatically consequential to the potential victims than the 
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 previous assault, and by having each side employ greater violence at every 
successive stage. (97) 
So, yes, of course there are differences between the forms—especially when it comes to camera 
angles, editing, and so on—but stage productions and films can be analogous in ways, e.g. 
characterization and narrative construction, and they can inform one another. Moreover, as Heath 
demonstrates, we can appropriately apply some of Aristotle's theories and terms to artistic modes 
outside of the theater: “Understanding why an insect or a worm has the form it does is a source 
of pleasure; this is analogous to the pleasure which can be derived from the study of a painting if 
one has an understanding of its ​tekhnê— ​that is, of the reasons why this was the right way to 
depict that subject” (xi-xii). Though Peckinpah's understanding of Aristotelian catharsis may 
have been crude, for example, his interpretation is not any more wrong or misguided than that of 
some of his critics; further, the major point here is that Peckinpah was clearly inspired by 
Aristotle's ideas and that alone might be justification enough to discuss those ideas here with 
regard to ​Straw Dogs ​. Additionally, a consideration of Aristotle's theories about types of 
character(s) and their relationship to tragedy (and narrative, generally) offer certain interpretive 
possibilities that have been heretofore unexplored. 
 
Aristotle, Tragedy, Character (and Caricature), and Plot: 
The following passage from Heath's introduction to Aristotle's ​Poetics ​ is informative, 
especially with regard to the attacks against Peckinpah's depiction of Amy, who critics such as 
Kael see as “a little tart”: 
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 Poetic plots do not deal in generalizations ('people usually get up in the morning'); 
they make statements about what a particular individual does at a particular time 
('Bill got up this morning'). Indeed, the actions with which tragic plots are 
concerned are typically so exceptional that it would be absurd to talk of 
generalization. Orestes killed his mother; but it is not true that people generally 
kill their mothers, nor even that people like Orestes generally kill their mothers in 
such circumstances; such circumstances do not arise in general—that is one 
reason why Orestes' situation is such a potent basis for tragedy. (xxvii) 
Again, this reveals the problem with Kael's claims, such as her reading, as it is presented in 
“Peckinpah's Obsession,” of ​Straw Dog​'s most infamous episode: “The rape scene says that 
women really want the rough stuff, that deep down they're little beasts asking to be made 
submissive” (397). While Peckinpah claimed in his ​Playboy​ interview that Amy “asked for the 
rape” (something with which I don't agree) and that David “obviously married the wrong dame,” 
the implication is clear: Amy does ​not​ represent all women; her strengths, weaknesses, fears, etc. 
are hers and hers alone, just as David does not represent all intellectuals, and Venner, Scutt, and 
the locals do not stand in for all people who live in rural England (104, 105). Their 
characteristics (e.g. attitudes and behaviors) seem more relevant to me than gender, though one 
can certainly argue that the two are not as distinct as I might seem to claim here. Regardless, as 
Heath writes in the introduction to his translation of ​Poetics ​: “[P]oetry is better if it has a 
structured plot [and] poetry is better if (to use terminology of chapter 3 [of Aristotle's ​Poetics ​]) 
its mode is dramatic rather than narrative. Poetry is imitation; it seeks to create likeness” (xvii). 
Of course, likeness is not the equivalent of sameness; we might identify with characters in a 
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 drama—and to some extent they might even ​resemble ​us—but they are clearly not us. To further 
emphasize this distinction, Heath writes: “Aristotle's arguments for the primacy of plot are 
therefore primarily arguments for the primacy of plot over character. He begins by claiming that 
'tragedy is not an imitation of persons, but of actions and of life'” (xx). 
Perhaps this seems like an obvious point; however, it is one that is either ignored or 
attacked by those who are critical of the film. (And, again, I think there are plenty of reasonable 
criticisms one can make of ​Straw Dogs ​, but none that rely on this sort of totalizing reductionism 
are very effective.) As Heath notes above, a poetic plot is concerned with how individuals 
respond to events, and Peckinpah's film imagines how individuals, each with their own unique 
flaws, play off one another and react to events that are, to varying degrees, out of their control 
(and David, at least, is disturbed by how his response challenges his ideas regarding his own 
identity). As Aristotle writes in ​Poetics ​, the way an audience responds to a character's change in 
fortune is informed by whether the character experiences a “reversal” or a sense of 
“recognition.” As Heath explains, “A ​complex​ plot [which is the type Aristotle preferred] also 
satisfies the first two conditions [events are continuous and unified, and there is a change of 
fortune], but unlike the simple plot it does have reversal or recognition” (xxix-xxx). Heath goes 
on to explain that recognition is a change from ignorance to knowledge and that reversal 
involves a realistic or probable inversion of the expected outcome of some action. Here, for 
example, is an opportunity for an insightful critique: does David experience “recognition,” a 
change from ignorance to knowledge? The last scene of the film, in which David admits to Niles 
that he no longer knows his way “home,” might be viewed as an acknowledgment of his 
continued ignorance. Then again, his confession is made possible only by an awareness of his 
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 ignorance, i.e. David is now aware of what he does not know and, removed from the insecurity 
he displayed earlier in the film, is finally able to admit this, that he had failed himself and Amy. 
The ambiguity seems clear to me, though critics have pounced on this scene, too, by arguing that 
David is somehow heroic here—that he has “become a man” through violence—and that the 
“evolution” of his character justifies the extreme violence he has just committed in order to 
realize this maturation. 
In order to better understand how the existing criticism on ​Straw Dogs ​ deals with David's 
metamorphosis, and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of this criticism, I would like to 
review a few illuminating passages from Northrop Frye's ​Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays ​. In 
this first bit of text, Frye echoes Aristotle: “If superior neither to other men nor to his 
environment, the hero is one of us: we respond to a sense of his common humanity, and demand 
from the poet the same canons of probability that we find in our own experience. This gives us 
the hero of the ​low mimetic​ mode” (34). I would argue that this might describe David, who at 
first appears to be superior—with regard to intelligence, for example—to the villagers but who is 
later intimidated and tricked by them. However, I am not entirely sure viewers are meant to 
recognize and respond to a “sense of common humanity” vis-a-vis David, as he remains 
inhumane throughout the film, first through his condescension toward Amy and then by the 
brutal, savage violence he commits during the siege. Frye continues: “If inferior in power or 
intelligence to ourselves, so that we have the sense of looking down on a scene of bondage, 
frustration, or absurdity, the hero belongs to the ​ironic​ mode. This is still true when the reader 
feels that he is or might be in the same situation” (34). And here is where things can get tricky in 
terms of classification, as one could also argue that this description applies to David since, 
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 despite his obvious intellect, he lacks a kind of common sense or street smarts, especially relative 
to the laborers (and Venner, in particular). We, as viewers, know David is flawed—perhaps 
especially with regard to how he treats his wife, Amy—even if he does not realize it, and this 
compounds the issue: not only is he flawed (e.g. emotionally unavailable, patronizing, and so 
on), but he is ignorant of these flaws. His ignorance and impotence isolate him from the others; 
his lack of knowledge about Amy's rape and his responsibility for it further set him apart and, in 
turn, intensifies both the narrative drama and increases the pity we feel for David, though he 
alone is responsible for his condition and situation. 
As Frye continues with his definitions, however, the issue is further complicated: 
In low mimetic tragedy, pity and fear are neither purged nor absorbed into 
pleasures, but are communicated externally, as sensations. In fact the word 
'sensational' could have a more useful meaning in criticism if it were not merely 
an adverse value-judgement. The best word for low mimetic or domestic tragedy 
is, perhaps, pathos, and pathos has a close relation to the sensational reflex of 
tears. Pathos presents its hero as isolated by a weakness which appeals to our 
sympathy because it is on our own level of experience. […] We notice that while 
tragedy may massacre a whole cast, pathos is usually concentrated on a single 
character, partly because low mimetic society is more strongly individualized. 
(38) 
This description does seem apt with regard to David, but only if we believe that his flaws appeal 
to our sympathy, that they are understandable and to some extent reasonable. He is isolated, for 
example, being the only American character in the film; further, his wife is younger and more 
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 attractive than him, and the villagers treat him with contempt. In this sense, the resentment 
toward Amy he displays might be misplaced but is somewhat understandable, though not 
excusable. If Peckinpah had given us scenes of the couple in America before leaving for 
England, we might have a better sense of David's natural state, his disposition when comfortable 
and unthreatened. On the other hand, David tells Amy that part of the reason he agreed to come 
to England was because she said she thought they would be happier there; this suggests that 
tensions between the two existed before David was ostensibly alienated and made a stranger, and 
I suspect David was responsible for these tensions at least as much as, if not more than, Amy 
and/or other factors. 
Frye continues: 
The root idea of pathos is the exclusion of an individual on our own level from a 
social group to which he is trying to belong. Hence the central tradition of 
sophisticated pathos is the study of the isolated mind, the story of how someone 
recognizably like ourselves is broken by a conflict between the inner and outer 
world, between imaginative reality and the sort of reality which is established by a 
social consensus. […] The type of character involved here we may call by the 
Greek word ​alazon​, which means impostor, someone who pretends or tries to be 
something more than he is. The most popular types of ​alazon​ are the ​miles 
gloriosus ​ and the learned crank or obsessed philosopher. (39) 
The low mimetic mode, then, seems less and less fitting as Frye elaborates. While it is true that 
David seemingly attempts to fit in or “belong” to the villagers' “social group,” his efforts are at 
least slightly disingenuous. When he agrees to go hunting with the laborers, for example, before 
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 the rape scene, his motive seems inspired by spite for his wife, who had just embarrassed him 
during the cat saucer incident. In fact, it would be more accurate to say David does not want to 
belong to any group. As we learn through his discussion with Amy about why they left the 
United States, he did not want to take a side with regard to the Vietnam War protests on campus. 
What's more, once in England, he gets upset any time he is asked or forced to leave his study. 
Frye's terms “the learned crank” and “obsessed philosopher” might seem apposite, but, from 
what we can tell, David is a legitimate and respected academic; he has been awarded a grant, for 
example, and though he struggles with the equation on his chalkboard, his obsession is 
professional, not abstract, i.e. he feels a sense of duty to finish his work. 
So we are left with Frye's ironic mode, as David is in many ways presented as inferior, 
and the scene, or really the entire narrative of the film, we are looking down on is certainly one 
of literal and figurative bondage, frustration, and absurdity. As Frye writes later in ​Anatomy of 
Criticism ​: “Irony does not need an exceptional central figure: as a rule, the dingier the hero the 
sharper the irony, when irony alone is aimed at” (210). Given the narrative details of ​Straw Dogs 
and especially the film's climax and conclusion, this classification seems appropriate. If, then, 
Straw Dogs ​ qualifies as a tragically ironic film—though it is difficult to ascertain whether this is 
what Peckinpah “aimed at,” since he, most notably in the ​Playboy​ interview, arguably betrays 
the richness, depth, and complexity of his own film—what are the shortcomings of some of the 
existing criticism on it? And my principal concern here: in what ways might Aristotle be of help 
in terms of filling in some of these critical gaps in terms of classification, in particular (I, for one, 
am reluctant to categorize ​Straw Dogs ​ as irony)? How might a look at ​Poetics ​ help to make 
Peckinpah's use of aestheticized violence more intelligible? 
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 As I stated earlier, I am not terribly interested in the supposed relationship between ​Straw 
Dogs ​ and the concept of catharsis, though I would be remiss if I did not at least introduce some 
of the scholarship that has been done on this point. In “Human Striving, Human Strife: Sam 
Peckinpah and the Journey of the Soul” from ​Peckinpah Today ​, Cordell Strug writes: 
One of the oldest ideas about the effect of tragic drama comes from Aristotle: the 
audience experiences catharsis, often understood as a purging of emotions. I've 
heard Peckinpah in interviews speak defensively of his work this way, as being 
shaped toward catharsis, intended to purge society of violence by its vivid 
portrayal. He can't have believed this, and the notion of purging never seemed to 
make much sense anyway, except as a defense against moralists. Martha 
Nussbaum, in a penetrating work on Greek thought, has argued that catharsis was 
not about purgation but about clarification: tragedy clarified life and its values. 
(137) 
Strug's take, as it is presented here, is as useful as it is refreshingly sober or cogent—and, most 
important, it speaks to my aversion of Peckinpah's invocation of catharsis as a defense. Strug's 
passage is also useful in providing a segue, via Nussbaum, to a more productive discussion of the 
narrative​ function of rape and violence in ​Straw Dogs ​. In other words, how do the rape and siege 
sequences operate on a psychological level as opposed to a visceral one, if in fact we can 
separate the two? How do they serve the plot? If we follow Nussbaum's suggestion, Peckinpah's 
film is not so much an explicit commentary on violence or a sort of directive to viewers to think 
a particular thing or feel a certain way (though the director would argue otherwise) as it is an 
invitation for reflection and meditation, a vehicle for questions about violence of both the 
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 psychological and physical varieties; the film's depiction and framing of rape and violence, then, 
forces us to consider difficult questions about them. 
To continue pursuing this line of thought, I return to Frye, who writes: “Tragedy is 
intelligible, not in the sense of having any pat moral to go with it, but in the sense that Aristotle 
had in mind when he spoke of discovery or recognition as essential to the tragic plot. Tragedy is 
intelligible because its catastrophe is plausibly related to its situation” (41). In philosophical 
terms, of course, “intelligible” means that something is understandable by intellect and ​not​ by the 
senses alone. We can, for example, understand why David reacts violently during the siege even 
if we do not think his behavior is just. We might understand why Amy appears to “enjoy” the 
rape even though Venner's actions offend us deeply. But a tragedy, as Frye says, need not have 
or present a “pat moral.” Indeed, the best tragedies present a series of connected events, which 
happen to or are experienced by particular characters and, because these characters are 
individuals, i.e. not caricatures, the plot really cannot moralize or be prescriptive in the way that 
Kael, for example, suggests through her reading of the film as misogynistic. In other words, we 
as viewers can empathize with characters but we are not to mistake those characters as 
representatives of ourselves—we can approach an understanding of their fears, desires, 
motivations, and actions, but we cannot and should not conflate ourselves with them. When Kael 
suggests that Peckinpah, through Amy, is saying that women want to be raped, for example, she 
is denying the Aristotelian intelligible. What Peckinpah does through ​Straw Dogs ​, intentionally 
or not, is ask us a) to think about and possibly understand why ​these​ particular characters behave 
the way they do given their particular traits and circumstances, and b) to ask ourselves, in turn, to 
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 reflect on the moral questions presented, to ask ourselves how we might react similarly or 
differently to comparable circumstances and ​why​. 
The effectiveness of such a methodology is dependent on a variety of factors, of course. 
Indeed, this is the line Peckinpah walks: if his “hero,” David, is too dislikable or reacts to his 
conditions in a way that is too unbelievable, the filmmaker runs the risk of alienating the 
audience. David, because ​Straw Dogs ​ is a tragedy, must be flawed; however, his flaws must not 
render him fully unsympathetic. In a response to those critics who have attacked the depiction of 
Amy in ​Straw Dogs ​, Michael Sragow, in “From ​The Siege of Trencher's Farm ​ to ​Straw Dogs ​: 
The Narrative Brilliance of Sam Peckinpah,” points out that the character of David is equally 
imperfect though ultimately intelligible. Sragow writes, “Peckinpah never denigrates David's 
ambition as a mathematician working on an astral physics project, but he does despise David's 
smugness toward everyone else, especially Amy, and his inability to balance his personal and 
professional life” (75). He continues: 
David instigates this silliness [e.g. “cruel teasing interspersed with childish byplay 
and sex”] as much as Amy does, as a way of consolidating his position of 
pseudo-maturity and mastery: in a queasy-comical scene, he starts out berating 
her for acting like a fourteen-year-old and ends up joking that he freaks out for 
eight-year-olds. He is, in a way, the bigger child, selfish and sullen. (75) 
While other critics have argued that David is, in fact, a villain (and I don't necessarily disagree 
with this assertion), he is a villain in the way that Frankenstein's monster is, i.e. he is a stranger 
who is—paradoxically, considering his occupation—incapable of dealing with disconcerting 
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 predicaments in a rational way. Arguably, his failure here is what makes him at least a bit 
pitiable and, in turn, deserving of our commiseration. As Frye explains: 
In romance the characters are still largely dream-characters; in satire they tend to 
be caricatures; in comedy their actions are twisted to fit the demands of a happy 
ending. In full tragedy the main characters are emancipated from dream, an 
emancipation which is at the same time a restriction, because the order of nature 
is present. However thickly strewn a tragedy may be with ghosts, portents, 
witches, or oracles, we know that the tragic hero cannot simply rub a lamp and 
summon a genie to get him out of trouble. (206-7) 
Kael, as I suggested earlier, misinterprets ​Straw Dogs ​ as a satire, i.e. she sees the characters as 
caricatures, but Frye's explanation of tragedy, I think, is most fitting with regard to this film. 
David's inability to “summon a genie” and the responsibility he thus has for his flawed behavior 
and actions is what a) qualifies the film as tragic and b) marks David as a—partially, at 
least—sympathetic character. The tragedy is heightened, of course, through his alienation from 
both his wife and the villagers. While David remains ignorant of Amy's rape, for example, the 
audience cannot forget it. If Amy did indeed “enjoy” it, which is a position that I do not think 
can be adequately defended, we pity David for choosing to stay with and defend her, as she 
could be seen as having “betrayed” him and, perhaps consequently, the villagers did not target 
her during the siege. And if Amy did not “enjoy” the rape, as I believe and have tried to 
demonstrate above, David is further emotionally isolated from her by virtue of the fact that she is 
not comfortable telling him about it, either because she knows he will not confront the men or 
because she probably rightly suspects he will somehow blame her for the incident. Regardless, 
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 David's regrettable yet ultimately “intelligible” behavior is what renders the film a tragedy; 
further, the rape and the siege (along with the incredible tension that precedes these events), as 
unbearable as they can be, are necessary for viewers to recognize David's tragic intelligibility, in 
particular. 
As Dukore notes in ​Sam Peckinpah's Feature Films ​, “The climactic war against the 
House of Sumner, so to speak, occupies more than a fourth of the film” and “[e]ach phase of the 
siege is a minidrama, with a beginning and end, and a conflict different from those of the phases 
before and after” (97). In a way, these “phases” serve to create a kind of mise en abyme, each 
intensifying the tragedy. Another dramatic technique Peckinpah employs that serves a similar 
function is “reversals and recognitions,” which Aristotle calls in ​Poetics ​ “the most important 
devices by which tragedy sways emotion” (12). Aristotle defines “reversal” as “a change to the 
opposite in the actions being performed, as stated—and this, as we have been saying, in 
accordance with probability or necessity” (18). The reversal in ​Straw Dogs ​ is, of course, David's 
evolution (or devolution) from insecure intellectual to savage, merciless brute. “Recognition,” 
Aristotle says, “is a change from ignorance to knowledge, disclosing either a close relationship 
or enmity, on the party of people marked out for good or bad fortune” (18). In the film, David 
becomes aware of his ignorance, as I discussed earlier, and experiences this kind of recognition; 
the enmity disclosed is, ultimately, between him and arguably everyone else in his world, except 
for Niles, the other obvious outcast. And, finally: “So there are these two parts of the 
plot—reversal and recognition; a third is suffering. Of these, reversal and recognition have 
already been discussed; ​suffering ​ is an action that involves destruction or pain (e.g. deaths in full 
view, extreme agony, woundings and so on)” (19). Aristotle's definition does a few things: first, 
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 it is a retort of sorts to those critics who suggest it is inappropriate to apply the ideas in ​Poetics ​ to 
film, as Aristotle's examples of suffering (deaths in full view, extreme agony, woundings, etc.) 
often occurred offstage in the theater. His reference to them here does not suggest the 
anticipation of cinema, of course, but he was clearly open to and supportive of the innovation 
and evolution of dramatic presentation; further, his own use of analogies suggests Aristotle 
would have supported the application of his ideas to other mediums. ​Straw Dogs ​ (and 
Peckinpah's films generally) exemplifies Aristotelian suffering; moreover, it meets two of his 
other criteria for tragedy: reversal and recognition. The second thing this definition does is 
contextualize the brutality in and the discomfort inspired by the film, i.e. if we apply Aristotle's 
theory of tragedy to ​Straw Dogs ​, the events in the film no longer appear gratuitous but, instead, 
serve a clear dramatic purpose. Peckinpah's aestheticized depiction of violence serves this 
purpose, too, as I have discussed. 
Those familiar with ​Poetics ​ might object to the above for one reason in particular. As 
Aristotle writes elsewhere in his text: “It is also clear from what has been said that the function 
of the poet is not to say what ​has ​ happened, but to say the kind of thing that ​would ​ happen, i.e. 
what is possible in accordance with probability or necessity. […] Poetry tends to express 
universals, and history particulars” (16). His use of the terms “universals” and “particulars” is 
ostensibly problematic, as I argued earlier that Peckinpah's characters—or those in any form of 
“poetry”—are not meant to represent us as viewers or any particular group, e.g. Amy is not 
women ​; she is one woman. However, it is reasonable to assume that Aristotle intended for 
“universals” to represent something like the concept of universal human truths—that we will all 
suffer to some degree, for example, or that miscommunication between people is inevitable—and 
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 not in the reductionist sense. “Particulars,” then, might be analogous to “details” in the way that 
history gives us specifics about individual (and, importantly, ​real​) lives. It is impossible to say 
for certain, though, as Aristotle does not further explore in ​Poetics ​ the tension or distinction 
between the universal and the particular. 
There remains the question of whether David qualifies as a hero, villain, or something 
else entirely. If my case for ​Straw Dogs ​ as a classical tragedy with reversal/recognition (i.e. as 
Aristotle said, “a change not ​to ​ good fortune ​from ​ bad fortune, but (on the contrary) ​from ​ good 
fortune ​to ​ bad fortune—and this must be due not to depravity but to a serious error on the part of 
someone of the kind specified”—as opposed to irony or generic action or exploitation film) is to 
stand, Hoffman's David must meet Aristotle's standard for a compelling, complex protagonist as 
he presents it when discussing the best kinds of tragic plot (21). Aristotle writes, “We are left, 
therefore, with the person intermediate between these. This is the sort of person who is not 
outstanding in moral excellence or justice; on the other hand, the change to bad fortune which he 
undergoes is not due to any moral defect or depravity, but to an error of some kind” (21). David 
rather clearly qualifies, though the concept of “error” here deserves some clarification. In ​Sam 
Peckinpah's Feature Films ​, Dukore writes, “According to Aristotle's ​Poetics ​, ​hamartia​, which is 
a mistake or error (chapter 13), brings about ​catharsis ​, which consists of pitiful and fearful acts 
that purge these emotions (chapter 6)” (95). This definition is lacking, however, as Aristotle did 
not insist that hamartia (or “error”) necessarily lead to or result in catharsis, though it certainly 
can. First, as Malcolm Heath writes in the introduction to his translation of ​Poetics ​:​ “ ​[K]​atharsis 
does not purge the emotion, in the sense of getting rid of it; it gets rid of an emotional excess and 
thus leaves the emotion in a more balanced state, mitigating the tendency to feel it 
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 inappropriately. Why should this be pleasurable? From an Aristotelian point of view any process 
that restores one to a natural or healthy state is pleasurable” (xl). What is most important here is 
the distinction Heath makes between a total purge of particular emotions or feelings and the 
restoration of balance. While many scholars—and even Peckinpah himself—have cited catharsis 
as a justification of the highly aestheticized violence in Peckinpah's films, they often mistake 
cathartic purge as a total elimination of violent impulses in viewers. What Heath suggests, 
however, is that only “excess” impulses are removed, which in turn suggests that some feelings 
of pity and fear—and, by extension, anger and aggression—are normal, healthy, and even 
necessary in human beings. As Heath writes: 
References to “healing” and “relief” imply that ​katharsis ​ does in some sense put 
right something that is wrong with us [and that by] stimulating the emotion to 
which they are excessively prone, tragedy discharges the tendency to excess; it 
thus relieves the pressure which their disordered emotional make-up exerts on 
them, so that in ordinary life they will not be so prone to indulge the emotion in 
question. (xxxix) 
In other words, through the display of violence, Peckinpah is asking viewers to confront their 
own fear and aggression, to ask themselves not how to totally eliminate these feelings but how 
we can live with and manage them in an appropriate way. We can say that Peckinpah turned out 
to be wrong or even naïve regarding this concept, but there is no reason to doubt his sincerity, i.e. 
his belief that catharsis is a real and productive phenomenon, just as there is no reason to doubt 
Aristotle's. Still, whether David manages his aggressive impulses in an appropriate way is an 
open question. On the one hand, he is left without many options once the siege begins: he can 
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 turn over Niles, a defenseless man, who will almost certainly be killed or, at least, savagely 
beaten by the mob of townies, or he can protect Niles and his own home and family. Of course, 
David's own behavior earlier in the film can arguably be seen as having at least contributed to the 
fact that he is faced with this choice (and I would go so far as to argue he is largely responsible 
for nearly all of the tragedy in ​Straw Dogs ​). Another question Peckinpah leaves with viewers is 
whether David makes the right choice in defending Niles through savage brutality. A second 
point of clarification: Heath writes, “The Greek word ​hamartia​ covers making a mistake or 
getting something wrong in the most general sense” (xxxii). He continues, “ ​Hamartia​, then, 
includes errors made in ignorance or through misjudgment; but it will also include moral errors 
of a kind which do not imply wickedness” (xxxiii). Whether one sees David as a hero, villain, or 
something in between almost wholly rests on the question of his “error,” i.e. if one believes 
Peckinpah presents David as a victorious hero at the film's conclusion, then there is no error or 
mistake and, in turn, the film is reduced to mere irony, as Kael and others suggest; if, however, 
we view David—with his broken glasses and psyche—as disoriented and damaged during that 
car ride with Niles, there is at least the chance that he views his own actions during the siege 
and/or those leading up to it as wrongheaded. 
Specifically, what makes ​Straw Dogs ​ a tragedy, in the Aristotelian sense, is that David in 
particular constantly makes mistakes, which ultimately lead to the siege (and, arguably, his moral 
downfall or collapse); of course, Venner and his friends did not have to attack Trencher's Farm, 
but David's behavior toward them—and, even more importantly, toward Amy—makes this 
outcome more and more likely, if not inevitable, as the narrative progresses. But it is this idea of 
hamartia, or David's error(s), that makes the film and David compelling: he does not recognize 
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 his mistakes as he makes them and, in turn, cannot anticipate the consequences. He is not 
malicious or evil, and he is not a villain in the traditional sense; instead, he is insecure and 
confused, occasionally ​appearing ​ to others as villainous, and this gives his character depth and 
makes him worthy of our pity. Heath's description of the most effective type of protagonist in an 
“ideal tragic plot” describes David almost perfectly: 
So the ideal tragic plot cannot be constructed around an exceptionally virtuous 
person or a wicked person; it must therefore be based on someone between these 
two—broadly speaking virtuous, but not outstandingly so. Because their virtue is 
not outstanding, we do not find their downfall morally repellent; because their 
downfall is undeserved, we can pity them. (xxxi) 
Again, David's errors propel the film's action, i.e. each “mistake” intensifies the drama 
and drives the characters toward confrontation. The causal link between character and action is, 
as Seymour Chatman explains in ​Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film ​, 
of utmost importance, particularly in tragedy. As Chatman writes, “It has been argued, since 
Aristotle, that events in narratives are radically correlative, enchaining, entailing. Their sequence, 
runs the traditional argument, is not simply linear but causative” (45). He continues, discussing 
Paul Goodman's ​The Structure of Literature​: 
[Goodman] goes on to say: “The formal analysis of a poem [or any drama, really] 
is largely the demonstration of a probability through all the parts. Or better, in the 
beginning anything is possible; in the middle things become probable; in the 
ending everything is necessary.” This is an important insight: the working out of 
plot (or at least some plots) is a process of declining or narrowing possibility. The 
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 choices become more and more limited, and the final choice seems not a choice at 
all, but an inevitability. (46) 
The key here, I think, is the detail or intricacy to which Chatman and Goodman refer with regard 
to plot. In a tragedy, each event—particularly the “mistakes”—is ​necessary​. If one looks at 
Straw Dogs ​ as something other than tragedy, for example, David's behavior earlier in the film 
serves no purpose other than to create ‘little-d’ drama; as a tragedy, however, David's actions are 
needed to bring about his “recognition” and “reversal,” and to propel the character into 
emotional and moral chaos, which is further intensified for us through Amy's rape. Because 
Straw Dogs ​ is a tragedy, David's behavior and its consequences are necessary in a way they 
would not be in mere irony. In other words, David is responsible for his own downfall and, thus, 
despite contrary claims from Kael and others, cannot be seen—or could not have been intended 
to be seen—as heroic, despite his physical victory over the intruders. Indeed, his “victory” is 
pathetic and the violence that leads to it is regrettable to David. 
Further, as Chatman notes, suspense—which is a key feature of tragedy—is desired over 
surprise, as the latter is a gimmick with little payoff for the viewer or reader; in suspense/tragedy, 
however, a character's “doom” may surprise a work's hero but does not surprise the audience 
because the author has prepared us for it through foreshadowing, etc., as Peckinpah does with the 
man trap (59). Hitchcock was a master of this, of course, as he reminds us many times in 
Sabotage​ (1936), for example, that the bomb Stevie is carrying will explode at a specific time. 
Aristotle again on the distinction between simple and complex plots: 
By ​complex​, I mean one in which the change of fortune involves reversal or 
recognition or both. These must arise from the actual structure of the plot, so that 
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 they come about as a result of what has happened before, out of necessity or in 
accordance with probability. There is an important difference between a set of 
events happening ​because​ of certain other events and ​after ​ certain other events. 
(18) 
And with regard to the specific events that together constitute a narrative, Aristotle writes: 
The imitation is not just of a complete action, but also of events that evoke fear 
and pity. These effects occur above all when things come about contrary to 
expectation but because of one another. This will be more astonishing than if they 
come about spontaneously or by chance, since even chance events are found most 
astonishing when they appear to have happened as if for a purpose. (17) 
This attention to craft and careful plotting, in terms of both suspense and the causative 
relationship between events, further elevates tragedy above irony and other modes—tragic works 
are those that can be returned to by viewers and readers, as we understand and experience them 
as puzzles. As Heath clarifies: 
[W]hen something happens ​both ​ unexpectedly ​and​ nevertheless as a necessary or 
probable consequence of what has gone before, this combination increases the 
audience's astonishment and thus enhances the emotional impact of events. This is 
important: Aristotle's preoccupation with necessary and probable connection is 
not the product of an abstract formalism; he believes that there is an intimate 
connection between the cohesion of the plot and the emotional impact at which 
tragedy aims. (xlix) 
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 In ​Straw Dogs ​, for example, the man trap is introduced early in the film as a gift from Amy to 
David and is, of course, used as a deadly weapon during the climactic siege. Upon repeated 
viewings, I might come to understand this instrument as something more than a prop that inspires 
conversation between David and the workers when they help him hang it above his mantel; I 
might, say, recognize its potentially symbolic value (e.g. as vagina dentata, as Michael Bliss 
curiously suggests in ​Justified Lives: Morality & Narrative in the Films of Sam Peckinpah ​) and, 
at the very least, the way it works as a Chekhovian plot device, foreshadowing the violence to 
come and, in turn, heightening the suspense throughout the film, i.e. we know it will be used, but 
we do not know when, how, or why. Further, as Michael Bliss argues, “The rape sequence [in 
Straw Dogs ​] is certainly shocking, as it should be. However, its frightening aspect does not 
derive from surprise; we expect some sort of exaggerated response from the workers given the 
dialogue concerning the [hunting] expedition, the subtle teasing of David, and the repeated 
suggestive references to shooting” (151). These are the lines to which Bliss refers: 
Venner: Mr. Sumner, would you like to shoot with us sometime? 
David: Oh, I've, uh, I've never hunted much. 
Scutt: Oh, but you've shot, Mr. Sumner? 
Venner: At Trencher's, good shooting's right outside the door. 
The suspense here, unlike surprise, serves to build tension; the effect is unsettling and even 
disturbing in a way that quick shocks and revelations cannot be. 
Some scholars, like Thomas Leitch, however, are suspicious of the ways in which 
contemporary storytellers use suspense, particularly in “action” films. Writing in “Aristotle v. the 
Action Film” from ​New Hollywood Violence ​, Leitch says: “Just as the target audiences for 
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 musicals or hard-core pornography look forward to the song-and-dance numbers or the sex 
scenes their genres distinctively feature, action viewers are less interested in each new story as 
the Aristotelian ​imitation of an action ​ than in a ​collection of actions ​ of the sort Aristotle called 
spectacles” (122). Interestingly, despite his goal to show “just how remote is Hollywood's idea of 
action from Aristotle's,” Leitch's invocation of Carol Clover here and his apparent criticism of 
“action viewers” serve to support my aforementioned reading of ​Straw Dogs ​ since they illustrate 
at least one way in which the film—with its complexity in terms of character, narrative, editing, 
etc.—does not qualify as a mere “action” film, as Kael and others have categorized it (104). 
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 Excess Ain't Rebellion: Capital, Rejection, and Individuation in Sam Peckinpah's “Road 
Movies” 
 
Preface: 
A common thread running through much of Peckinpah's work – at least the Westerns and 
his road movies, the latter being in many ways derivative of the former – is the characters' need 
of money to do what they think is good and appropriate, even or especially when this conflicts 
with the morals or customs of the culture in which they find themselves; for Peckinpah, this 
means escaping the hold of a corrupt society in order to start a family in a pastoral and 
uncivilized or uncorrupted place. Moreover, these characters will do relatively objectionable or 
morally questionable things to get the capital required to ultimately do what they think is right. 
In Peckinpah's world, the ends justify the means, and the presence of capitalism and the way it 
corrupts people make it nearly impossible for “good” characters to earn an honest living; in turn, 
crime is, ironically, the only way for them to ultimately live a crime-free and unburdened life. 
This is a theme that pervades Peckinpah’s work, and his apparent obsession with the notion that 
people can’t be truly free in the context of society is something he addresses, to varying degrees, 
in each of his films. It makes sense, then, that he explores this idea within the genre of road 
movies as, like Westerns, it allows his characters a figurative and literal means of escape: the 
road to freedom. That is, if these protagonists can’t quite establish or realize their identities by 
defeating the mechanisms of oppression that surround them, they can at least travel elsewhere 
and fulfill what they see as their individual potential. As I’ll explain in this chapter, though, 
Peckinpah’s version of the road movie is decidedly more conservative than that of his 
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 contemporaries. In a way, his refusal to adhere to the genre’s thematic conventions is an exercise 
in freedom: his refusal to embrace the progressive ideals of his contemporaries in the genre was a 
way to declare and defend his relatively contrarian position, something his protagonists attempt 
to do in these very films. 
 
Introduction: 
Sam Peckinpah's “road movies” – ​The Getaway​ (1972), ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo 
Garcia ​ (1974), and ​Convoy​ (1978) – represent, more than anything else, a missed opportunity; 
that said, they are each still interesting and provocative in their own ways, especially with regard 
to how they represent Peckinpah’s ideas about freedom and rebellion. Instead of using the fluid 
conventions of this evolving and exciting genre to develop or even challenge (given the ways in 
which society was changing) the morally conservative themes of his earlier work, which I have 
examined in other chapters, Peckinpah continued to celebrate in these films values such as the 
importance of family and loyalty. Whereas other road films of the time – like Dennis Hopper's 
Easy Rider ​ (1969), Richard Sarafian's ​Vanishing Point​ (1971), and Monte Hellman's ​Two-Lane 
Blacktop ​ (1971) – were existential meditations on alienation inspired by political assassinations, 
Altamont and the death of the hippie movement, the war in Vietnam (and the draft), ongoing 
racial tensions, the Kent State massacre, and later Watergate, Peckinpah's road movies were, 
despite his earlier technical innovations, relatively conventional and arguably banal. ​Alfredo 
Garcia ​, for example, in which Warren Oates' character drives around with a decapitated head as 
his passenger for a considerable amount of time, ends with the death of its protagonist; this 
death, however, is presented as a form of justice (Bennie, who adopts the cynicism and violence 
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 of the capitalist forces he earlier opposes, must die in Peckinpah's world) and not a comment on 
nihilism, hopelessness, and rejection/denial as are, say, the deaths of Billy and Captain America 
in ​Easy Rider ​ or Kowalski in ​Vanishing Point​. That said, Peckinpah did examine in his road 
movies the intersection of the individual (especially with regard to individuation or the creation 
of one's identity), freedom, escape/liberation (through both travel and death), and capital, i.e. as 
he did in his earlier work, Peckinpah was critical in these films of the effects of capitalism, 
power, and corruption on the common man. In short, Peckinpah did rather interestingly, despite 
his relatively conservative moralizing on other matters, rebuke the ways in which capital can 
alienate and dehumanize people, essentially subjugating them and denying them the ability to 
create their own identities and morals. For this reason, his road movies are worthy of 
examination. 
While road movies obviously existed before the 1960s, films like Arthur Penn's ​Bonnie 
and Clyde​ (1967) and Dennis Hopper's ​Easy Rider ​ arguably reignited and reinvented the genre, 
and these films reflected the anxieties of their time. The forces against which the protagonists of 
these films were fighting mirrored The Establishment, e.g. corrupt law enforcement officials, 
representatives of capitalism, the military-industrial complex, and, except where Peckinpah was 
concerned, outdated “conservative” cultural mores in general. (Interestingly, Peckinpah was 
fascinated with Penn's film, and he reportedly had a print of ​Bonnie and Clyde ​ on the set while 
filming ​The Wild Bunch ​ (1969); it seems obvious now that ​Bonnie and Clyde ​'s thematic content 
as well as Penn's innovative visual style would have resonated with and inspired Peckinpah, and 
it is significant that he would go on to produce some violent, anti-establishment road movies of 
his own.) Road movies of this time were, again, generally reflective of society's concerns: they 
103 
 were explicit critiques of cultural and political issues. Today's road movies, on the other hand, do 
not often aim to explore, let alone critique, society beyond the self; they tend to be solipsistic, 
especially when compared to the philosophically (even if we were presented with a sort of 
hopeless nihilism) and politically charged, though sometimes implicitly, films of previous 
decades, e.g. ​Easy Rider ​, Bob Rafelson's ​Five Easy Pieces ​ (1970), ​Two-Lane Blacktop ​, and 
Vanishing Point​. Peckinpah, with the commercially successful ​Convoy​, produced one of the last 
“serious” road movies of the '70s, though the film is admittedly more than a little ridiculous in 
several ways, which at least in retrospect seemed to signal the end for a certain type of 
message-centered road film. 
In her book on the aesthetics and rituals of the British indie music scene, ​Empire of Dirt​, 
anthropologist Wendy Fonarow observes, “Differentiation is at the heart of the process of 
definition” (26). In other words, one comes to realize and acknowledge his or her values and 
beliefs – and, in turn, creates an identity – through an examination of others', rejecting those that 
seem somehow incongruous to one's idea of him- or herself. Moreover, philosopher and 
psychologist Erich Fromm, in his essay “Disobedience as a Psychological and Moral Problem” 
from the book ​On Disobedience: Why Freedom Means Saying 'No' to Power ​, expresses what is 
in some ways a similar idea: “If mankind commits suicide it will be because people will obey 
those who command them to push the deadly buttons; because they will obey the archaic 
passions of fear, hate, and greed” (4). For Fromm, rejection and rebellion are not only necessary 
for the survival of the species, but these acts are also the means by which one creates and 
expresses his or her individual identity. He continues, “Obedience to a person, institution or 
power […] is submission; it implies the abdication of my autonomy and the acceptance of a 
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 foreign will or judgment in place of my own. Obedience to my own reason or conviction […] is 
not an act of submission but one of affirmation” (5). One's conviction, Fromm argues, is ​part​ of 
him or her, if that conviction is “authentic.” 
The ideas Fonarow and Fromm express regarding differentiation, disobedience, and 
individuation are certainly provocative in their own right, but they are also quite informative 
when considering the work of Sam Peckinpah, who so often – that is to say, almost always – 
made films about men who were at odds with the institutions and societal norms around them. 
These protagonists are, to put it simply, outsiders. Significantly, though, they are typically 
portrayed as more morally good than the forces to which they are opposed; moreover, they see 
justice and freedom as the ultimate of human rights, and they are often willing to risk their lives 
for their causes. The courage required to do this, of course, is incredible. What's more, their 
rejection of established beliefs and practices (especially when it comes to matters of money and 
corruption), which are often represented as archaic and unjust, is somewhat paradoxically a 
positive or affirmative act. Or, as Fromm writes in “Prophets and Priests,” “Disobedience, then, 
in the sense in which we will use it here, is an act of the affirmation of reason and will. It is not 
primarily an attitude directed ​against​ something, but ​for ​ something: for man's capacity to see, to 
say what he sees, and to refuse to say what he does not see” (24). The difference between acting 
against something and for something is slight, to be sure, but certainly a consideration of one's 
motive is the key to making this distinction; rebellion for its own sake, in other words, is a 
negative or even nihilistic act, whereas “morally” motivated rejection is an affirmative one, i.e. it 
is a defense of one's identity, integrity, and freedom. 
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 In American cinema, two genres, perhaps more than any others, explored this tension: 
Westerns and road movies. American Westerns quite obviously serve as precursors of the road 
movie, especially those like ​Two-Lane Blacktop ​ (1971) and ​Smokey and the Bandit ​ (1977), etc. 
that feature men on a trip, often motivated by the potential for monetary gain, who are 
antagonized by representatives of the law and/or big business. (It is no coincidence, too, that the 
road movie became popular in America as Westerns fell out of favor with audiences; the road 
movie took some of the conventions of Westerns but updated them by substituting cars for 
horses, for example, and by speaking to changing, less conservative attitudes in society. ) 7
Peckinpah's ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ and ​The Getaway​ are examples of this, but so 
is ​Convoy​. ​Convoy​ is particularly interesting for how opposed, in terms of aesthetics and tone, it 
is to the rest of Peckinpah's oeuvre, even ostensibly similar films like ​Garcia ​. While there are, as 
Pauline Kael in “Circles and Squares” and others have noted, obvious problems with auteur 
theory, there is no denying that Peckinpah's body of work is unique with respect to other 
filmmakers and is infused with his signature themes, character archetypes, and filming and 
editing techniques. ​Convoy​, however, in its arguable banality is the most unusual of his films 
relative to his other work, though it shares much in common with other commercial road movies 
of the late '70s. Back to the original point: as David Laderman writes in his introduction to 
Driving Visions: Exploring the Road Movie ​, “The driving force propelling most road movies 
[…] is an embrace of the journey as a means of cultural critique” (1). Laderman emphasizes the 
genre's rebellion against what he calls conservative social norms, writing, “Such traveling, coded 
as defamiliarization, likewise suggests a mobile refuge from social circumstances felt to be 
7 Though, this is precisely what makes Peckinpah’s road movies interesting: they contained the themes present in his 
Westerns while opposing a more general cultural shift. He, like his protagonists, was rebelling against expectations, 
conventions, and so on. 
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 lacking or oppressive in some way [and often feature] desperate characters lighting out for 
something better, someplace else” (2). The road in these films, he argues, “represents the 
unknown,” a hope for, not a promise of, a more humane way of living. But, again, what makes 
Peckinpah's road movies unique is that they, unlike those being made by Hopper, Hellman, etc., 
celebrate “conservative social norms,” and the characters in these films pursue “mobile refuge” 
as a way to reestablish these values, not unlike a cult leader who builds his compound in a rural 
area so he will be free from the influence and control of society and its laws; the main characters 
in ​The Getaway​, for example, must flee to Mexico in order to start a family (or so we are meant 
to believe), as America is no longer hospitable to honest living, i.e. “conservative” enough, as the 
characters in this film can only provide for themselves by robbing banks and committing other 
crimes. For Peckinpah, then, “society” has been corrupted by capitalism, and his characters – 
who are exploited by businessmen, politicians, and law enforcement officials – can only find 
their freedom outside of it via the road. 
Of course, Sam Peckinpah was hardly the only filmmaker to explore the values, function, 
and individuation of the “outsider,” but he did this more frequently than most others; his 
obsession with rejection and rebellion is expressed, usually explicitly, in each of his 15 movies. 
Films such as ​The Wild Bunch ​ and ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ (1970), for example, present and 
to some extent explore men who are unwilling or unable to conform to the changing society 
around them; further, a movie like ​Straw Dogs ​ (1971) illustrates the contrast between an urban 
intellectual and a mob of uneducated country laborers. And, while Peckinpah began this 
exploration when making his early Westerns, he widened his scope throughout the 1970s and 
made a few interesting – albeit in different ways – “road movies,” a genre that is perhaps the 
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 most appropriate vehicle for his ostensibly antisocial denouncements. What I will argue in this 
chapter, however, and it is an idea that runs through this project, is that Peckinpah's themes are, 
despite the filmmaker's reputation, remarkably conservative, i.e. they champion cooperation, 
family values, and loyalty; the only thing to which they are opposed is the corruption of these 
mores (which, in his films, usually happens as the result of the influence of money). We see this 
to be true in each of his three road movies: the protagonists in ​The Getaway​ are thieves, but they 
ultimately escape the hopelessly corrupt United States to, we are supposed to believe, start a 
family in the pastoral land of Mexico; the protagonist of ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia 
dies at the end of the film because he has engaged in wanton violence and comes to represent 
values that are antithetical to the moral fabric of Peckinpah's ideal society; and ​Convoy​ celebrates 
hard-working, blue collar men and women, and it offers the rather uncontroversial argument that 
people deserve dignity, which they are often denied by the representatives of capitalism (though 
I am rather certain Peckinpah did not intentionally do this, he invokes Marx's ideas about the 
relationship between commodity, value, and the exploitation of labor in this film). 
As controversial and technically innovative as Peckinpah was, he is ultimately a 
conservative figure with regard to his themes and messaging. What is more, his tendency toward 
sentimentality and arguably misguided nostalgia – i.e., longing for a time that never really 
existed – pervade even those films that, given the updated conventions of their genre, should 
have been the most daring and inventive: his “road movies.” In this chapter, I will critically 
examine Peckinpah's road movies and discuss the ways in which they champion conservative 
values while largely failing to be thematically risky or technically innovative (though, again, this 
rebellion is precisely what makes his road movies worthy of consideration). To do this, I will 
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 briefly discuss some key features of the road movie genre, and then I'll analyze ​The Getaway​ and 
Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ ( ​Convoy​, however, is arguably not substantial enough to 
warrant a lengthy discussion ) using ideas from theorists like Erich Fromm, Carl Jung, and David 8
8 ​By the late 1970s and into the early '80s, road movies lost much of their ability or power to function as social 
criticism, as, somewhat ironically – given the opposition of exploitation and the establishment the films in this genre 
from the early '70s exhibited – they had come to be seen by studios as major cash-cows. Comedies like ​The Gumball 
Rally​ (1976), ​Smokey and the Bandit​ (1977), and ​The Cannonball Run​ (1981) are just a few examples of successful 
attempts capitalize on the commercial potential of the genre. Road race and trucker films comprised some 
sub-genres, and Peckinpah's ​Convoy​ (1978) is a prime example of the latter. Inspired by a novelty country song 
about CB radio, ​Convoy​ has rightly not received much praise from critics. Michael Bliss, in ​Justified Lives ​, for 
example, calls it Peckinpah's weakest film and notes, “The fight [scene] in ​Convoy​ has too many slow-motion shots 
of men falling down, so that even this usually successful technique fails to keep us from being bored” (288). 
Dukore, writing in ​Sam Peckinpah's Feature Films ​, is even more critical: “Its redolence of existentialism and of 
Peckinpah's familiar themes reveals ​Convoy​ to be an empty shell” (59). Finally, Stephen Prince, writing in ​Savage 
Cinema: Sam Peckinpah and the Rise of Ultraviolent Movies ​, goes even further by calling the film an 
“embarrassment” (6) and a “sorry spectacle” (155). While it's true that many road movies of this time lacked, at least 
relatively speaking, teeth, ​Convoy​ is particularly noteworthy because it represents Peckinpah's penultimate and 
ultimately unsuccessful attempt to convince studio executives that he was still competent (while ​Cross of Iron​, the 
film that preceded this one, demonstrates the director's abilities, it performed poorly at the box office and was not 
particularly well received at the time). Peckinpah's addiction issues, however, seem to have affected not only his 
judgment in choosing to shoot this film's script but also the decisions he made on set. As Prince notes, ​Convoy​'s 
“script was so devoid of the attributes that one would associate with the work of a major director that Peckinpah's 
agreement to do the film was widely perceived as a terminal error and further proof of a career beyond salvage” 
(216). Additionally, Prince claims that the “concept unifying the film was so badly out of focus that Peckinpah 
considered using out-of-focus shots to portray the convoy and to suggest that the political movement it symbolized 
was fatuous” (216). The theme of ​Convoy​, however, is similar to what Peckinpah presents in both ​The Getaway​ and 
Alfredo Garcia​: the struggle of the proletariat against corrupt agents of power. It is doubtful that the director saw the 
political movement represented in ​Convoy​ as truly fatuous, although the actual narrative is. While most critics agree 
that this film is incoherent at worst and boring at best, as David Weddle notes in ​If They Move … Kill 'Em ​, “The 
final irony of the ​Convoy​ debacle was that it turned out to be​ ​Peckinpah's highest-grossing picture, the biggest 
box-office hit of his career” (518). Peckinpah got the financial success he wanted, but it was arguably the result of 
the film's subject matter (and the drawing power of its stars, Kris Kristofferson and Ali MacGraw) and not because 
of anything he did as a filmmaker. He would only direct one more feature after this, 1983's ​The Osterman Weekend​. 
Like Peckinpah's other road movies, ​Convoy​ depicts the tension between average, working-class people – 
in this case, a group of truckers – and those who wield power and control over them, portrayed here by police 
officers and politicians. As Michael Bliss writes in ​Justified Lives ​, “Clearly, the truckers' passions and pleasures 
threaten the instincts and behaviors of the country's traditionalists, who are represented in the film by short-haired 
policemen” (291). Rubber Duck (Kristofferson) becomes the reluctant leader of the titular convoy after a local 
sheriff, Dirty Lyle (Ernest Borgnine), extorts money from the truckers in a clear abuse of power and, later, when the 
team gets into a fight with police over racist comments they make about one of truckers, Spider Mike (Franklyn 
Ajaye), who is trying to make it home to his pregnant wife. The convoy must make it across the state line in order to 
avoid prosecution for the fight, but their mission changes once Mike is captured by the police and held in jail. The 
convoy grows as it is joined by other truckers, and it becomes something of a phenomenon, even being welcomed 
into one town by a marching band, when it draws attention from the media. A politician, Governor Jerry Haskins 
(Seymour Cassel), offers to help Duck and the truckers but only because he sees Duck as a folk hero who could help 
bolster his popularity if he aligns himself with Duck. Haskins claims to want to help, but he won't spring Mike from 
jail; in turn, Duck refuses the politician's opportunistic, exploitative offer and leaves the convoy with Melissa 
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 Harvey to make sense of the intersections of capital, violence, and individuation in these works. 
The point I wish to underscore here is that while Peckinpah's road movies have interesting 
moments, their themes are ultimately conservative and arguably trite, especially when compared 
(MacGraw) to go free his captured friend. Duck's defiant spirit is repeatedly made explicitly clear: the truckers crash 
through roadblocks and bypass weigh stations (representative of society's attempt to control them), and Duck says to 
one cop who identifies himself as a representative of the law, “Well, piss on you, and piss on your law.” The badges 
the officers wear are presented as shields that allow them to deflect judgment and accountability, and this is 
principally what Duck and the other truckers object to: the abuse of power and authority. The members of the 
convoy abandon their jobs in pursuit of their freedom (thus clearly rejecting the ​having​ mode in favor of ​being​), and 
they ultimately aim to escape into Mexico, a popular destination for the protagonists in Peckinpah's films. 
It is never made clear how the truckers (and the traveling hippie evangelist in his bus) who join the convoy 
early on learn of the “movement” or why exactly they choose to join, and it is also not clear why people see Duck as 
a hero since he is essentially acting as little more than the leader of a long motorcade, but frankly there is a lot about 
Convoy​ that does not make sense. Peckinpah, however, does include many figures and events that support his theme 
of individuality and freedom. For example, Duck chooses not to join the Teamsters, though the union would afford 
him a certain degree of protection (presumably, he sees the organization as corrupt and/or sees his “independence” 
as paramount). Additionally, Lyle crashes through a religious billboard during the early stages of the big chase and, 
in so doing, symbolically destroys the ancient institution; significantly, Fromm cites religion in ​The Sane Society​ as 
an example of one way in which humans attempt to establish “substitutes for a truly individual sense of identity” 
(62). Further, at one point, Duck is asked about the purpose of the convoy, and he replies, “The purpose of this 
convoy is to keep moving.” As Bliss notes, “Despite ​Convoy​'s attempt to portray its truckers as rebels, they seem to 
be nothing other than working-class men with no significant political ethic—at least, none that we can divine 
through ​Convoy​'s awkward script” (291). The road for these figures clearly represents the potential to escape and a 
way to reject what they view as the “establishment,” e.g. police and politicians. They are not necessarily making any 
explicit political statement, though, as Duck's vague answer suggests; instead, their rebellion against racism, 
corruption, and exploitation is a kind of generalized angst that is underscored during the film's conclusion when the 
convoy prematurely leaves a huge public funeral service being held for Duck, who the authorities believe to be dead, 
being attended and used by Haskins for his own benefit. In the politician's speech during the memorial, Haskins says 
the truckers carry on the cowboy tradition and that Duck “gave his life to dramatize a cause so vital to us all.” 
Haskins, however, cannot identify this “cause” – probably because, other than the vague notion of individuality, the 
film never makes it clear – and the truckers leave in disgust, making clear their refusal to be co-opted or exploited by 
the establishment, which does not represent their values and best interests. 
Duck is revealed to have survived the crash in which the authorities believed he perished (he is hiding in 
one of the trucks at his own funeral service), however, and the film suggests he and Melissa will remain a couple. 
The aforementioned crash is reminiscent of the one that kills Kowalski at the end of ​Vanishing Point​, as Duck drives 
into a barricade seemingly prepared to die, but Peckinpah's sentimentality demands that his protagonist, because of 
his moral superiority, not only survive but end up with his romantic interest. Unlike Bennie in ​Alfredo Garcia​, Duck 
acts honorably throughout this film, and thus he is rewarded. While nothing close to a masterpiece, ​Convoy​ does 
conclude Peckinpah's trilogy of road movies by repeating the romantic themes concerning individuality and 
individuation introduced in the first two and, while the film has plenty of flaws, David Weddle correctly notes it has 
its good qualities, too: “Amidst the rubble of the final product it was possible, if one looked hard enough, to spot the 
glittering fragments of a once-great talent; the old poetry still sang forth here and there in the images of the big rigs 
thundering across the vast expanse of the American West” (518). 
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 to films of the same genre that were produced around the same time; moreover, Peckinpah's 
commentary on the importance of family, the tensions between freedom and capital, the function 
– or even necessity – of violence, and the place of the individual within a greater society is, 
despite what the director said in interviews, closer to Nixon's ideology than that of a free-spirited 
radical, which is how Peckinpah often presented himself. 
Indeed, as Fromm writes with regard to the concept of disobedience, the refusal or 
rejection expressed by Peckinpah's characters is not nihilistic in nature, though they are often 
seen this way; instead, they are opposed to the established – but corrupted – order, seeking a 
more just and humane (as they see it) alternative, though they lack the knowledge or, in some 
cases, power required to create a new paradigm. There is, then, something essentially optimistic 
and idealistic about these characters' apparent negativity and the violence it inspires: they are 
disappointed because their wholesome hopes, dreams, and longings meet constant opposition, 
and, as a response, they seek out and quest for their desired alternative, journeys so appropriately 
set on and around roads, which represent both leaving something behind and arriving somewhere 
new just as individuation, as I noted when discussing Fonarow above, involves both 
distinguishing oneself from some and forming affiliations with others. But these are the same 
ideas Peckinpah expressed in his earlier Westerns. Moreover, Peckinpah never did anything 
particularly imaginative within the reimagined and revitalized road movie genre, i.e. he did not 
explore the bleakly existential questions we see in films like ​Two-Lane Blacktop ​, ​Vanishing 
Point​, and even ​Five Easy Pieces ​; no, Peckinpah rather exploitatively used the popular genre for 
its commercial benefits, recycling the themes from his earlier works and placing them on the 
road, as it were, arguably in an effort to cash in. That said, these films are interesting precisely 
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 because they are so different relative to their contemporaries; the rebellion Peckinpah’s 
characters champion manifests itself in Peckinpah’s refusal to adopt the attitudes and themes of 
his contemporaries. 
 
Capitalism, Disillusionment, the 1970s, and the Road Movie: 
In ​Lost Illusions: American Cinema in the Shadow of Watergate and Vietnam, 
1970-1979 ​, David A. Cook comments on what, specifically, made the '70s such a unique period 
for American cinema. In particular, Cook points to the “degree of self-examination extraordinary 
for this country in any medium at any time” and says “American commercial cinema was 
experimenting with social criticism” while also, and interestingly, making money in the process 
(xv). This criticism via self-examination was leveled at many facets of American culture, but the 
aspect that is most germane with regard to my discussion here is one that Cook makes a point of 
highlighting. The decade of the '70s was, he writes, “bracketed by two films, ​McCabe & Mrs. 
Miller ​ (Robert Altman, 1971) and ​Heaven's Gate​ (Michael Cimino, 1980), that offered 
uncompromising critiques of frontier capitalism and, by extension, of the American economic 
system at large” (xv). Perhaps not coincidentally, both of these films are Westerns – this genre, it 
goes without saying, is particularly productive when it comes to critically examining American 
values and the nation's beliefs about itself, as Westerns (can) deal with the establishment and 
development of these values and beliefs. Of course, myth is often intertwined with belief, and in 
general the films of the '70s – both Westerns and non-Westerns – are remarkable for their 
interrogation of these intersections. 
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 The road movie, as noted earlier, is also a good vehicle for such reflection. And even 
more than many Westerns made before, during, and after the '70s, the significant road movies of 
this era looked both outward and inward, i.e. they examined cultural values in a general sense but 
also took an arguably psychoanalytic approach to explorations of the individual and his/her place 
within that culture, especially with regard to the tension created by, as Freud has discussed, the 
demands of civilization on the individual. More specifically, movies like ​Easy Rider ​, ​Vanishing 
Point​, ​Two-Lane Blacktop ​, ​Five Easy Pieces ​, and others explored the question of whether the 
individual could be both free and sane during a time of oppressive capitalism, political 
assassinations, and hopeless wars. Indeed, the question was: have we all gone mad? Further, is 
there any hope? Any meaning? Both ​Easy Rider ​ and ​Vanishing Point​ seemed to argue there is no 
escape from the madness of society and its control over – or, at least, its demands on – us, i.e. if 
one dares to rebel, he will be hunted down and exterminated by the powers that be in the interest 
of maintaining order and preserving power. 
While such an ostensibly bleak diagnosis – and even prognosis, i.e. things are and will 
remain hopeless – seems nihilistic, one can arrive at a different conclusion through an 
interrogation of that very concept. We might, for example, interpret these deaths as a form of 
liberation in the sense that, say, the protagonists in ​Easy Rider ​ are freed through death from a 
cruel, oppressive, and senselessly violent world. Death, in other words, is the ultimate form of 
both rejection/rebellion and individuation. Critics might label such an interpretation as 
“nihilistic,” but using the word in this way is rather narrow. Gianni Vattimo, in ​Nihilism & 
Emancipation ​, offers an alternative. He writes, “I interpret 'nihilism' in the sense first given it by 
Nietzsche: the dissolution of any ultimate foundation” (xxv). Such a definition is particularly 
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 useful when it comes to making sense of road movies of the 1970s, as it suggests the possibility 
that these films were more than hopeless laments; instead, they expressed the frustrations only 
idealists can feel, and they seem to cry for alternatives to the dominant paradigm. Vattimo 
continues: “The Nietzschean term nihilism acquires the sense of emancipation for me when it is 
read in light of another famous expression of the German philosopher: 'God is dead, and now we 
wish for many gods to live'” (xxvi). While death is obviously not a solution, these characters' 
fates suggest that the status quo is unacceptable; further, their deaths illustrate the severity of the 
problem: capitalism and corruption are destructive forces that must be opposed. 
Cook's comment above regarding the critiques in '70s cinema of “frontier capitalism” and 
the American economic system at large speaks to these tensions and frustrations, i.e. the desire 
for the freedom to create and pursue another way of being in the world, and we see the 
labor/capital relationship as a major contributing factor. Capitalism in these films, in other 
words, is the proverbial wet blanket on freedom and individuality. In ​A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism ​, David Harvey discusses the alienating effects – with regard to alienation from 
oneself, from one's peers, and from the economic apparatus that manages labor – of capital, and 
his analysis is useful when attempting to make sense of the critiques of “frontier capitalism” 
found in '70s cinema and, specifically, the road movie. Harvey writes that with capitalism, a 
contradiction arises between a seductive but alienating possessive individualism 
on the one hand and the desire for a meaningful collective life on the other. While 
individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed to choose to 
construct strong collective institutions (such as trade unions). (69) 
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 He continues: “The freedom of the masses would be restricted in favour of the freedoms of the 
few” (70). So, while the ability to earn money ostensibly appears to be a form of freedom – and, 
in turn, the capital we earn would seem to provide us with the ability to purchase, as it were, 
additional freedoms – workers are, in the process, commodified and alienated, and this can 
obviously detrimentally affect one's process of individuation. Indeed, how can the individual 
create a unique identity if (s)he's routinely manipulated and exploited (and while this exploitation 
is an inherent trait of capitalism, it is exacerbated when workers are subjected to the control of 
corrupt banks and businessmen such as those we see in Peckinpah's films)? When industry tells 
you, implicitly or explicitly, that you are a mere cog in the machine and you are prohibited from, 
say, organizing – an idea central to Peckinpah's ​Convoy​ – as a means to improving your quality 
of life, the obvious result is a crisis of an existential nature, and that condition is precisely what 
many road movies from the '70s explore. 
Not only are individuals forced to surrender to what Harvey, in ​A Companion to Marx's 
Capital​, calls “the discipline of abstract forces […] that effectively govern their relations and 
choices” (42), but these individuals are also “perpetually at risk of being ruled by fetishistic 
constructs that blind [them] to what is actually happening” (47). Many of the characters – or 
protagonists, at least – in '70s cinema experience precisely what Harvey describes here, i.e. they 
have lost control and, too, the agency required for individuation. But what makes so many of 
these characters interesting is that they have not been blinded; instead, they recognize that they 
have lost control and seek to regain it by first putting a face on the controlling “abstract forces” 
and then by attacking or otherwise rebelling against them. It is in this rejection and rebellion that 
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 these characters begin the process of individuation; whether they are ultimately successful is, 
however, another question. 
One problem these characters face once they are free (by “hitting the road,” for example) 
from the constraints of capitalism is creating or discovering another way of being in the world. 
As David Laderman writes in ​Driving Visions: Exploring the Road Movie ​, “Rather than leading 
to freedom and exploration, the early-'70s road often leads nowhere in particular, sometimes in 
circles, invoking a forlorn mood of wandering” (83). The road in these films can simultaneously 
represent hope (for something better) and frustration (over not know what or where that 
“something” is). Laderman, however, in contrast to Cook, argues that '70s road movies focus “on 
existential loss more than social critique” (83). Laderman's mistake, though, is his failure to see 
the relationship between the two: in other words, how the representation of existential loss can be 
a form of social critique, i.e. while many road movies may not offer explicit alternatives to 
capitalism, for example, they often examined that system's devastating effects on individuals. 
Indeed, the disillusionment represented and explored in the films of this era was a sort of 
political statement through critique or at least via rejection of the dominant capitalist paradigm 
and its dehumanizing effects. The absence of clear alternatives, which is what Laderman 
seemingly desires, does not somehow mean the critique itself is absent. In fact, as Erich Fromm 
writes with regard to the process of individuation, rejection and disobedience, which road movies 
of the late 1960s and '70s depict in spades (and the films themselves, with regard to their 
unconventional narratives and so on, were a form of rejection), are among the first steps toward a 
more fully actualized self. In ​Escape from Freedom ​, Fromm states this explicitly: “The growing 
process of the emergence of the individual from his original ties [is] a process which we may call 
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 'individuation'” (24). What's more, Fromm speaks to the difficulties of such a process, noting, 
“[T]he degree to which the individual, figuratively speaking, has not yet completely severed the 
umbilical cord which fastens him to the outside world, he lacks freedom; but these ties give him 
security and a feeling of belonging and of being rooted somewhere” (24). These first steps, so to 
speak, away from what is being rejected and toward an uncertain, potentially nonexistent future 
are bound to be shaky ones; further, the temptation to return to the security of the “known,” an 
act which Fromm describes as impossible, is strong. The process, in other words, is disorienting, 
and one must take responsibility for his own individuation, though this begins by establishing 
what he is not (in terms of values, etc.) through the rejection of and rebellion against the sources 
of his oppression and anxiety. 
To some extent, though, Laderman's analysis is correct: if we consider films like ​Easy 
Rider ​ and ​Vanishing Point​, for example, it would seem that one's rebellion is hopeless and 
ultimately futile, as the only true escape from the demands of society and its “values,” which the 
rebel sees as antithetical to his own, is not the road – and the path to a more liberal society it 
represents – but death. Of course, this is not a prescription for change, and it does not offer any 
practical alternatives (assuming one wants to go on living). But, again, the protagonists in these 
films are taking the first steps – or driving the first miles – on their path toward Frommian 
individuation. Arguably, they ought to fail, as any other outcome could be interpreted as unlikely 
or impossible, i.e. these characters are awakened but are not yet enlightened. They may be read 
as struggling with the existential demands of their newly found freedom. As Fromm writes in ​On 
Disobedience: Why Freedom Means Saying “No” to Power ​, “A person can become free through 
acts of disobedience by learning to say no to power. But not only is the capacity for disobedience 
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 the condition for freedom; freedom is also the condition for disobedience. If I am afraid of 
freedom, I cannot dare say 'no,' I cannot have the courage to be disobedient” (9). Whether 
through exhaustion, frustration, or fear, these characters do fail, but the important point here is 
that their acts of disobedience are at least as affirmative as they are a form of rejection. Again, 
Fromm from ​On Disobedience​: “Disobedience, then, in the sense in which we use it here, is an 
act of the affirmation of reason and will. It is not primarily an attitude directed ​against 
something, but ​for ​ something: for man's capacity to see, to say what he sees, and to refuse to say 
what he does not see” (24). These protagonists are disillusioned, of course, but they are 
attempting to discover or create an alternative, and this act is essentially hopeful, positive, and 
optimistic. Returning briefly to Vattimo's definition of “nihilism,” we might see the deaths of 
these protagonists as an essential step in the process of individuation (not only for the individual 
characters but also for everyone they represent): 
The hermeneutic way out of tragic and negative nihilism naturally entails the 
inclusion of many aspects of the latter: we might say, with Nietzsche, that it is not 
possible to build without destroying. Or again, and perhaps more realistically, that 
the wellsprings of metaphysical authoritarianism never run dry, so that the task of 
secularization—that is, the unmasking of the sacrality of all absolute, ultimate 
truths—is an ongoing one. (xxvii) 
The deaths of these characters reflect the formidability of the institutions and cultural values 
against which they are rebelling, and these protagonists arguably die a martyr's death: they are 
exterminated in the process of trying to destroy what must be destroyed – e.g. capitalism, 
authority, and so on – before the rebuilding of society can begin. The road here represents a way 
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 out, a path toward an alternative space where this society might be established if it cannot be 
built on the ruins of the present one, but the grasp of the “authoritarian,” who will protect his 
existence at all costs, is strong, merciless, and far-reaching. 
The feelings and experiences of the protagonists in many of these films obviously 
reflected the anxiety and cynicism felt by not an insignificant number of Americans during the 
close of the 1960s and throughout the '70s. The hippie dream arguably died – or, more 
accurately, was killed – in 1968 with the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, and its grave was 
spit upon in 1969 during The Rolling Stones' performance at the disastrous and deadly Altamont 
concert, which was chronicled brilliantly by Albert Maysles, David Maysles, and Charlotte 
Zwerin in the documentary ​Gimme Shelter ​ (1970). In addition, Nixon's victory in the 1968 
election and his re-election in '72, the Kent State massacre in 1970, the ongoing war in Vietnam 
(and, perhaps even more significantly than the war itself, the draft), the Watergate scandal, Ford's 
pardon of Nixon in '74, the assassination of Harvey Milk in '78, and other events all contributed 
to a growing sense – among young people and members of the counter-culture in particular – of 
powerlessness and the loss of agency. The dream of a better tomorrow was replaced by a living 
nightmare, and filmmakers during the '70s were working, as were the protagonists in the 
aforementioned films, to envision and perhaps even create a more inclusive, humane future. 
As Laderman writes, “In most early-'70s road movies, the tension between rebellion and 
tradition [...] has been softened or muted: character and narrative drive often appear through a 
murky lens, or not at all. In this existential focus, the genre's core conflict with conformist 
society has been internalized, 'rebellion' thus becoming an amorphous anxiety about self” (83). 
While I do not agree entirely with Laderman's assessment, he (without appearing to do so) 
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 invokes Freud's ideas about this tension as they are expressed in ​Civilization and Its Discontents ​. 
In this book, Freud examines the causes of man's frustration with the demands and limits placed 
on him by the civilization in which he lives, and he explores a rather provocative paradox: while 
one is inclined to believe he would be happier outside of civilization and away from its violence, 
corruption, etc., “in whatever way we may define the concept of civilization, it is a certain fact 
that all the things with which we seek to protect ourselves against the threats that emanate from 
the sources of suffering are part of that very civilization” (38). What's more, the institutions we 
identify as representative of “civilization” are reflections and ultimately manifestations of human 
will. The question, then, as Laderman rightly suggests, is this: are we running from a diseased 
society or are we running from ourselves, or are the two concepts are intertwined? The 
protagonists of early-'70s road movies in particular are to varying degrees meditating on this, 
though many – and this is certainly true with regard to Peckinpah's characters, in his Westerns, 
road movies, and (as I will explore later) war movies – seem to agree with Freud's suggestion 
that the “liberty of the individual is no gift of civilization. It was greatest before there was any 
civilization” (49). 
The individual and civilization are, of course, inextricably linked: societies would not 
exist without humans, and humans would, arguably, not be distinct from animals without their 
societies. But as we see in '70s road movies, particularly those from early in the decade, the 
society does place sometimes unreasonable and often unjust demands on its members, and these 
demands, which often call for a concession of what we might call “freedom,” are what these 
films and their characters aim to critique, and economic structures – emerging neoliberalism, in 
particular – are portrayed as a primary source of alienation, exploitation, and oppression. Again, 
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 Fromm's thinking on the tensions between societies and the individuals within them is helpful 
here. In ​Escape from Freedom ​ he writes, “Just as a child can never return to the mother's womb 
physically, so it can never reverse, psychically, the process of individuation” (29). He continues 
by discussing the consequences the child faces if he does attempt to reverse the process: 
“Consciously the child may feel secure and satisfied, but unconsciously it realizes that the price 
it pays is giving up strength and the integrity of its self” (29). We might see this as a metaphor in 
which the child represents the individual longing for independence and the mother stands for 
society and its systems, namely its economic structure (which is intelligible, and thus familiar 
and seductive but ultimately exploitative). In terms of the films – and the cultural issues to which 
they respond – under consideration here, we see their protagonists beginning the process of 
individuation through the rejection of what they interpret as unjust economic conditions in 
particular, but once the “safety” of these conditions is left behind they must still work to find or 
establish a different way of providing for themselves (in Peckinpah's road movies, this meant the 
establishment of a family outside of society). Put another way by Georg Simmel in ​On 
Individuality and Social Forms ​: 
If every interaction among men is a sociation, conflict – after all one of the most 
vivid interactions, which, furthermore, cannot possibly be carried on by one 
individual alone – must certainly be considered a sociation. And in fact, 
dissociating factors – hate, envy, need, desire – are the ​causes ​ of conflict; it 
breaks out because of them. Conflict is thus designed to resolve divergent 
dualisms; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the 
annihilation of one of the conflicting parties. (70) 
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 If the ultimate goal is unity or harmony, then, the individual must be prepared for conflict 
(whether of a personal, financial, environmental, or other manner), and conflicts are best 
confronted with assistance from others. The hippies' solution to this problem was the commune 
(which we see in ​Easy Rider ​, for example, though such an arrangement is not hospitable to the 
protagonists of that film, and they fittingly die) while more traditional workers relied on labor 
unions, as we see in Peckinpah's ​Convoy​. 
The rebel, then, cannot succeed alone; he depends on other likeminded individuals, and 
only together do they create the relationships and, thus, conditions necessary for an alternative 
society. (Biker films of this era, e.g. Roger Corman's ​The Wild Angels ​, are something of an 
exception to this, though some of them explore similar themes, but those movies were generally 
less about social critique and were more commonly presented as exploitation.) Not only do we 
see this idea represented in road movies of the early 1970s, i.e. loners who do not pool their 
resources tend to perish, but it is one Fromm addressed in his work. Again in ​Escape from 
Freedom ​, he argues that “primary bonds” cannot be mended once they are severed. “Once 
paradise is lost,” he writes, “man cannot return to it” (35). The solution, he says, is for the 
“individualized man” to live in “active solidarity” with others, and this will “unite him again 
with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and independent individual” (35). Unions, of 
both the personal and economic varieties, are then – and somewhat ironically – critically 
important in the process of individuation. With regard to Peckinpah's road movies, we see this to 
be true: Carol and Doc survive in ​The Getaway​ because they have each other, Benny is gunned 
down at the end of ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ because he loses his partner and 
engages in antisocial and ruthlessly violent behavior (in other words, he severs all “primary 
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 bonds” and rejects all moral codes in favor of vengeance, and this, as Fromm says, cannot be 
undone), and Rubber Duck is victorious in ​Convoy​ because he has the help of his girlfriend and 
fellow truckers. 
What distinguishes Peckinpah's road movies from others of the era is his ostensible 
obsession with the role capital (and labor/power relations) plays in the process of individuation 
with regard to romantic unions between men and women. He presents money, and the problems 
it presents as well as some of the freedom it allows individuals to essentially purchase, as the key 
product of and symbol for civilization. While other films of the time were responses to the 
various aforementioned problems in America during the late '60s and early to mid '70s, 
Peckinpah's focus in these films was almost exclusively on the exploitation and dehumanization 
of people as a result of their relationship to capital. Additionally, Peckinpah's films suggest the 
solution to this was to form ​traditional​ family units outside of the corrupted mainstream society; 
however, as the characters in his road movies learn, one can only do this by fighting that culture 
directly and taking from it the capital he needs to survive on the outside. This paradox – 
depending on the society to live outside of it – is problematic, as is Peckinpah's insistence that 
returning to The Garden, i.e. a return to the values of a mythic past, is somehow ideal or even 
possible. While critics label films like ​Easy Rider ​ and ​Vanishing Point​ as nihilistic, at least they 
were honest enough to admit uncertainty; they were critical of the contemporary culture, as was 
Peckinpah, but they, to their credit, did not insist that they had the answers. Colin Wilson – who, 
like Fromm, wrote about the tensions between man and society – addresses this idea of honesty 
through the expression of uncertainty in his book ​The Outsider ​. Wilson writes, “The Outsider is 
not sure who he is. 'He has found an “I,” but it is not his true “I.”' His main business is to find his 
123 
 way back to himself” (147). When this idea is applied to Peckinpah, and specifically to the 
certainty he presents in his road movies, we come to see the director as less of a radical or 
revolutionary and, instead, as more of a delusional cultural conservative. 
Despite their shortcomings, Peckinpah's road movies are worthy of examination here for 
a few reasons. First, it is interesting to see how themes he introduced in his earlier Westerns are 
represented in a different, but related, genre. As Laderman notes in ​Driving Visions: Exploring 
the Road Movie ​, both genres explore a “home/wandering antinomy,” and both Westerns and road 
movies examine “conflict between nature and culture” and “tension between rebellion and 
conformity” (35). While it is true, as Laderman suggests, that the “rebellion/conformity duality” 
theme can be found in many or even most classical genres, it is at the fore in these two genres in 
particular, and “the road movie's modernist portrayal of rebellion pushes countercinema 
strategies to the foreground, where the narration along with the narrative challenges typically 
passive viewer reception,” (35) and it is significant that Peckinpah made films in each, though he 
was somewhat ironically relatively less inventive, as the genre invited innovation, whilst making 
his road movies. Second, though similarly, considering his road movies along with others of the 
time allows us to see the ways in which, despite his reputation and claims he made about 
himself, Peckinpah was actually a romantic but conservative idealist, and his representations of 
individuation through rebellion in these films confirms this, and it also positions him as 
rebelliously and defiantly unique vis-a-vis his contemporaries. 
Another reason Peckinpah's road movies are worthy of examination here is that, to 
varying degrees and for different reasons, they have been mostly overlooked by scholars and 
those contemporary critics who do not focus exclusively on Peckinpah. Even Laderman, for 
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 example, who defines ​The Getaway​ in his aforementioned book as a “key outlaw road movie,” 
never mentions – let alone critically examines – it again in that text's 300 pages. Similarly, there 
is not a single mention of this film in ​The Road Movie Book ​, a nearly 400-page collection of 
essays on the genre that was edited by Steven Cohan and Ina Rae Hark. While ​The Getaway​, 
Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​, and ​Convoy​ each have their shortcomings and are not 
necessarily career-defining works (with, perhaps, the exception of ​Garcia ​), they were each 
significant in their own ways, too, and they deserve attention: ​Convoy​ was a commercial 
triumph, for example, and Laderman favorably compares ​Alfredo Garcia ​ and ​The Getaway​ to 
classic “quest” road movies like ​Five Easy Pieces ​, ​Two-Lane Blacktop ​, ​Vanishing Point​, and 
Badlands ​ (82). 
 
The Getaway​ (1972): 
The principal argument Peckinpah articulates through ​The Getaway​ (1972) is not a 
unique one; indeed, it arguably follows Marx's thinking and is, consciously or not, inspired by 
the work of thinkers affiliated with the Frankfurt School (especially of the postwar period), 
which was responding to problems created by civilization for the individual and was to some 
extent popular and influential among certain circles in America in the 1960s. Specifically, ​The 
Getaway​ examines how individuals corrupted by capitalism are at once victims and victimizers, 
as they in turn exploit others in effort to achieve their goals. The romantic couple at the center of 
this film, Doc (Steve McQueen) and Carol (Ali MacGraw), are, in short, caught up in a cycle of 
committing crimes as a way to repay Doc's “boss,” Jack Benyon (Ben Johnson), who arranges to 
have Doc released from prison only after Carol agrees to sleep with Benyon, and the couple 
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 agrees to help with a bank heist he has planned. Benyon, a corrupt businessman, has considerable 
power and influence, and he uses it to exploit others for financial gain. In order to free 
themselves from Benyon's control, Doc and Carol must capitulate to Benyon, though their 
compliance somewhat ironically earns them the money they need to escape to Mexico. 
In the film, Benyon is presented as wise, as one who knows the rules of and happily plays 
the game, i.e. he understands how to use people to get what he wants (money and power), and he 
is also clearly respected by others with power. As Stephen Prince notes, the corrupt executives 
(and the henchmen they employ) in Peckinpah's films “visualize Peckinpah's conviction of the 
lethal nature of corporate America, with its interlocking economic and political interests. 
Peckinpah viewed modern America as a society where the highest levels of power are wielded 
by businessmen and politicians with blood on their hands” (38-9). In this way, Benyon represents 
the society at large and, in particular, its power structure and capitalist mechanisms. He behaves 
the way one must within such a system to thrive; though we may see him as behaving in ways 
that are morally reprehensible, he arguably acts smartly with regard to his own self-preservation 
and thus represents what Adorno calls in the 36 ​th​ section of ​Minima Moralia ​ the “sickness of all 
individuals” and serves as evidence that “contemporary sickness exists precisely in what is 
normal” (58-60). If Benyon represents power, Doc and Carol are ostensibly helpless: they must 
obey regardless of their objections, and there is no one they can appeal to outside of Benyon 
since the entire society is “sick” and subscribes to the philosophical and economic ideas he 
represents. Fromm, in ​To Have or to Be? ​, describes this sickness in stark post-materialist terms 
by suggesting that “we live in a society that rests on private property, profit, and power as the 
pillars of its existence. To acquire, to own, and to make a profit are the sacred and unalienable 
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 rights of the individual in the industrial society” (59). Benyon, obviously, represents the ​having 
mode of being Fromm describes here. On the other hand, Doc and Carol represent the ​being 
mode, which Fromm describes as the “mode of being [that] has as its prerequisites independence, 
freedom, and the presence of critical reason,” which are the qualities the couple has and/or seeks. 
Fromm also explains that being “active” “means to give expression to one's faculties, talents, 
[and] to the wealth of human gifts with which – though in varying degrees – every human being 
is endowed. It means to renew oneself, to grow, to flow out, to love, to transcend the prison of 
one's isolated ego, to be interested, to 'list,' to give” (76). Benyon then, as an antagonistic foil, 
seeks to stifle Doc's ​being ​ and ​becoming ​; he aims to oppress Doc, to stop this “expression” and 
“renewal,” in an effort to protect his own power and his ability ​have​. The prison metaphor 
Fromm uses is doubly useful here as Doc seeks to both escape the literal prison in which he is 
confined in the film's opening (and to which he would return if Benyon wished) and the 
figurative prison that is his association with Benyon. 
As a brief aside, it is worth noting that Fromm associates language, and names in 
particular, with the ​having ​ mode. He writes, “The name of a person […] creates the illusion that 
he or she is a final, immortal being. The person and the name become equivalent; the name 
demonstrates that the person is a lasting, indestructible substance—and not a process” (69). 
“Doc,” of course, is a nickname, not Carter McCoy's given name, and it thus represents or 
reflects his “process” of becoming, i.e. he is, in Frommian terms, ​being ​ as opposed to being 
principally concerned with ​having ​ like Benyon is (this is also true of Rubber Duck, Kris 
Kristofferson's character in Peckinpah's ​Convoy​, who mostly goes by his CB handle and not his 
given name). “Doc,” not coincidentally, is also short for “doctor,” one who selflessly helps and 
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 heals others, and this further highlights the contrast between him (and by extension Carol) and 
Benyon (and what Benyon represents). 
Indeed, the film's title and opening scenes tell us in explicit terms that ​The Getaway​ will 
be about the tensions between freedom and captivity, ​being ​ and ​having ​, individuation and the 
exploitative effects of capitalism. Of course, this was a favorite theme of Peckinpah’s. As Prince 
notes in ​Savage Cinema ​, “The narratives of his films tend to be about characters waging a losing 
gambit against events that are extinguishing the conditions of their lives, and they dramatize 
processes of diminishment, disillusion, compromise, and defeat” (93). One does not need to “get 
away,” for example, unless they are being oppressed or held captive, and these conditions are 
precisely what we see at the beginning of the movie: deer are grazing outside of a prison. The 
walls and fences here establish a stark contrast between the power, authority, and control 
exercised by the state (whose principal goal is the ostensible safety of its citizens and to protect 
its own power and not the bestowment of freedom) and the relative autonomy enjoyed by the 
animals on screen. The prison in particular is a powerful symbol of society's insistence on 
conformity: follow its rules or be forced to submit your illusory freedom. In prison, the illusion 
of freedom is revealed to be just that, and within its walls prisoners must fully submit and 
conform. We are reminded of this through scenes of inmates operating machinery – they 
become, in effect, rather anonymous, interchangeable parts of these machines – and entering 
their cells in unison, essentially functioning as a machine. More than anything, this is the central 
theme of ​The Getaway​: the limitations society places on individuals are ultimately 
dehumanizing, though most are too preoccupied with ​having ​, as Fromm defines it, to object, i.e. 
they believe the sacrifices they make in order to belong or fit in are worth the cost. As Fromm 
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 writes in ​The Sane Society ​, “Many substitutes for a truly individual sense of identity were sought 
for, and found. Nation, religion, class and occupation serve to furnish a sense of identity” (62). 
For most, then, what they think is individuation comes through the repression of the will and, 
ultimately, through submission, though Fromm notes that this “sense of identity […] is an 
illusory one” (63). Fromm continues, “In the United States […] the sense of identity is shifted 
more and more to the experience of conformity” (62). Peckinpah's manipulation of images and 
sounds during the opening minutes of ​The Getaway​ represent this very idea; society grants you 
the opportunity to conform on your own, but you will be forced to submit if you do not act on 
this opportunity. Most people choose the former path, as it is the one of least resistance as long 
as you can repress the desire to ​be​ (as opposed to ​have​). 
We learn early in the film that Doc is serving a sentence for armed robbery and assault 
with a deadly weapon, crimes society should not and cannot tolerate. In this way, the character is 
not entirely sympathetic; however, we also learn during his parole hearing that he has been a 
model prisoner, yet his appeal for early release is denied. His conformity whilst in prison, in 
other words, does not earn him his freedom – this serves as a metaphor for one's captive state 
with regard to the restrictions of society – in part because Benyon, the aforementioned corrupt 
but powerful and respected businessman, wields his influence on the parole board. We will later 
learn that Benyon is responsible for Doc's fate, and he is holding out until Doc agrees to do 
business with him. In one of these early scenes, we see Doc playing chess with a fellow inmate. 
Out of frustration, Doc knocks over the pieces, and his opponent says, “Oh, man, it's just a 
game.” But, as Michael Bliss argues in ​Justified Lives ​, it is more than a game to Doc: “chess is a 
visible reminder of his status as a pawn controlled by Benyon” (202). Benyon's desire to ​have​, in 
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 other words, has repercussions on others, notably Doc, and it impinges on others' autonomy and 
freedom to ​be​. Indeed, that is arguably a major theme of ​The Getaway​: the cost of freedom is 
high and is set by those – significantly represented here by a corrupt businessman and various 
law enforcement officials – who ​have​ as a result of their oppression or exploitation of others. 
After the parole hearing, Peckinpah presents a montage of sounds and images: we see and 
hear prisoners operating heavy machinery, suggesting the prison itself is both a literal and 
figurative societal mechanism of control, and Doc has slow-motion flashbacks to love-making 
sessions with his partner, Carol. David Weddle accurately describes this montage thusly: “the 
sequence jumped back and forth in time in a breathless rush of images” (439).  He adds, “The 
soundtrack too was a montage of elements—the voices of guards urging the prisoners to work 
harder, the teletype pounding of the textile machines—synched not literally to the images on the 
screen, but to the inner reality of Doc McCoy as he reached his breaking point” (439). The 
scenes of prison work are, as Weddle notes, intercut with those of love-making and Doc's 
memory with increasing rapidity and, likewise, the sounds become more and more intense and 
do not always match up with the images we are shown, and all of this reflects Doc's building 
frustration and schizophrenia until he finally snaps, experiencing a traumatic dissociative break: 
he crushes an intricate model bridge he has been working on in his cell. This act signifies his 
realization that working within the system, i.e. following the prison's rules, will not earn him his 
freedom; the bridge, while representing industrial and thus societal achievement, invokes ideas 
about the road; Doc realizes that his freedom resides elsewhere, and he will have to leave the 
familiarity and comfort of the known if he is to ​be​. That is, Doc must leave behind the corrupt 
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 political/economic structure that only served to rob him of his autonomy, an act that requires 
both literal and figurative “travel.” 
After Doc's psychotic break, he is visited in jail by Carol, and he tells her that he cannot 
handle being imprisoned anymore. He orders Carol to tell Benyon that he (Doc) is “for sale” at 
Benyon's “price.” Doc's desperation is clear, though he has no way to know exactly what 
Benyon's price will be. Carol does what she is told, though the viewer is not privy to the details 
behind her deal with Benyon, and Doc is quickly released from prison because of Benyon's 
influence over the parole board. Carol picks up Doc outside of the prison's menacing walls, 
arriving late because of a salon appointment, and asks if he wants to drive. This seemingly 
simple gesture is, in fact, significant: like Doc's model bridge, their car makes clear that the 
couple is about to go on a journey of self-discovery and individuation (in this film and in many 
road movies, unlike in Peckinpah's ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​ and other Westerns, cars 
represent a way towards freedom if not a form of freedom itself). What is more, Carol is offering 
to relinquish control to Doc. Doc, however, jokes that his license is expired. Though he says this 
with a smile, Doc is expressing a serious idea: he cannot enjoy the privilege granted to some by 
society to travel, explore, discover, and escape, i.e. he is still being controlled though he is 
ostensibly free. This control affects Doc in profound ways: though he knows what he would like 
to leave behind (the prison and what it represents with regard to society's control), he is not sure 
to where he might escape and, even if he was, he is not fully free to do so. Further, as we will see 
later in the film, the price of his freedom – what Carol had to give Benyon – is unconscionable. 
As the old Republican cliché goes, freedom is not free, but the price for Doc and Carol is 
considerable. Doc must agree to do Benyon's bidding, essentially becoming the latter's slave, and 
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 is in effect dehumanized, as this exploitative relationship further robs Doc of his autonomy. We 
all experience this to some degree in our everyday lives, of course, but by making Doc's situation 
so extreme, Peckinpah is able to make perfectly clear the effects of exploitative labor conditions 
or relationships. Further, as we eventually learn, Carol had to agree to have sex with Benyon in 
order to secure Doc's release. Arguably, this is a form of rape – at the very least, it is a clear 
abuse of power – and Carol is objectified in the process. Soon after his release, Doc asks Carol 
directly if she had been with any other men in the years he had been locked up, and she replies 
somewhat cryptically, perhaps realizing the truth would devastate him since he is partly 
responsible for her submitting to Benyon, saying, “I'm still here, Doc!” Regardless, the couple 
has sex, though they both admit to being nervous. This anxiety, perhaps even uncertainty, 
mirrors the destabilization Doc is feeling as a newly “free” man: where will he go and what will 
he do? What, precisely, is Benyon's price? How can he establish a relatively safe and normal life 
for himself and Carol? Additionally, the notion of risk is raised via their admission: when one is 
uncertain or nervous, the stakes somehow seem higher. This feeling mirrors the experience of 
hitting the road, and it serves as foreshadowing (when the couple eventually crosses the boarder 
into a “wild” yet somehow more hospitable Mexico), as travel is often an improvisational act. 
According to biographer Garner Simmons, Peckinpah's director of photography Lucien Ballard 
claimed McQueen thought Doc should rape Carol after being released from prison. Ballard 
reported that McQueen's argument went like this: “This guy's been in prison for five years, and 
he just comes home and really takes what he feels is rightfully his. [McQueen] couldn't 
understand what Sam wanted him to do. He thought it was phony. But Sam insisted and again it 
played perfectly” (161). ​The Getaway​, and specifically the dynamic between the two 
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 protagonists, would have been remarkably different had McQueen won this fight; the couple's 
first love scene is crucial in terms of establishing both Doc's vulnerability and, ultimately, his 
moral superiority. In other words, it is in no small part responsible for us seeing Doc as a 
sympathetic character who must flee the crushing weight of the society and its corrupt figures 
around him. 
The next day, when Doc meets with Benyon, the latter makes clear the dynamics of their 
relationship when he explains he wants Doc to manage a bank heist operation. Benyon says, 
“You run the job, but I run the show.” In this way, Doc has simply traded one form of 
imprisonment for another, and he sees that his newly found freedom is an illusion. Beynon, who 
others see as upstanding, is corrupt and wields great power. There is no one to whom Doc can 
appeal. In effect, Benyon is the law. Benyon here reflects the diseased society, from which there 
is no easy escape. 
In order to pull off the job Benyon has planned, vehicles are key, and no fewer than three 
of them are involved: a van that Carol drives and the floor of which serves as a door through 
which Doc can covertly enter the sewer (where he will cut the bank's power lines), a hay truck 
stashed outside of town that will serve as a getaway vehicle, and another car in which Benyon's 
hired goons (and Doc's unfortunate accomplices) arrive. The vehicles in this film, while 
symbolic of maneuverability and escape, also serve as tools, just as Benyon is using Doc as a 
tool, and the real “getaway” begins after the robbery sloppily concludes and one of Benyon's 
henchmen reveals his plan to kill Doc and take the money. In self-defense, Doc shoots the man 
and mistakenly leaves him for dead. 
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 At this point in the film, Doc and Carol are not only fleeing from Benyon but from the 
cops, and in this way Benyon is conflated with the society's “official” authority, and Benyon's 
transgressions (e.g. organizing the heist) are granted tacit approval by this authority as they come 
to share a common enemy in the team of Doc and Carol. The outlaws, Doc and Carol, are 
individuals who refuse to submit to this authority, whether it is just and ethical or not. In an 
attempt to present the illusion of conformity, Doc and Carol swap their getaway car for a station 
wagon, perhaps the ultimate symbol – aside from a house – of domesticity, and this vehicle 
allows them to easily pass through a police check point, i.e. the station wagon allows Doc and 
Carol to present themselves as non-threats, as having “bought in.” 
On their way to Benyon's office, Carol realizes their haul is $250,000 light. Upon 
arriving, Doc begins to settle up with his boss when Carol sneaks up behind Doc with a gun, and 
it appears as though she worked out a deal with Benyon to kill Doc once the heist was complete, 
but she ultimately shoots Benyon instead. Doc, now suspicious of Carol and her motivations, 
engages her in a short standoff, but they soon enough hit the road again. Doc, who was confused 
from the start, is now even more alienated: the only person he believed he could trust is now in 
question, and his frustrations erupt when he pulls over the car to slap Carol around. Feeling 
betrayed, he says, “Stupid. Why didn't you tell me?” Carol responds, “You sent me to him, you 
know?” Carol's reluctance or inability to explain herself, and thus allowing the cloud of 
confusion to linger if not grow, further exacerbates Doc's angst and alienation – again, the one 
person he could trust has been corrupted by Benyon (a representation of society and its economic 
structure) and his money. Benyon's surviving thug, meanwhile, is in pursuit of Doc and Carol 
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 and kidnaps a veterinarian and his wife, who he brings along with him (in their car, which he 
commandeers).  
Doc and Carol continue to struggle to trust one another after fleeing Benyon's office with 
the money, and at one point Doc suggests they split up for good. At this time, with their fate as a 
couple undetermined, they plan to trade in their current vehicle – the loss of the station wagon 
suggests, if temporarily, that the illusion of domesticity and conformity has been shattered. Not 
coincidentally, it is during this same time that it becomes clear to Doc that Carol did, in fact, 
sleep with Benyon, something she was doing her best to not explicitly acknowledge. Her 
infidelity, though not really her fault, is interpreted by Doc as a betrayal, as a denial of his dream 
of a happy, “normal” life with his partner (again, this is emphasized through the loss of the 
symbolic station wagon). To further underscore this, Peckinpah has Carol do nearly all of the 
driving during this stage of their getaway, an ostensible reversal of traditional gender roles; 
however, it is not uncommon in heist movies for women to do the driving, as it is typically the 
men who must rapidly exit and re-enter vehicles while performing “jobs.” Indeed, after Doc and 
Carol have a shootout with police and eventually get a new car to replace their old one – 
interestingly, cars are not only tools in this film, but they are also treated as disposable 
commodities that are easily ditched and replaced – Carol continues to do the driving, but Doc, 
like Benyon previously, is giving all of the orders, i.e. “directions.” This reveals yet another 
dimension to the film: the way in which men dominate women. 
Eventually, Carol acquires yet another vehicle, and she and Doc decide to head to 
Mexico, which is implicitly presented as an alternative to the exploitative realities they have 
experienced in America. Mexico, as it does in many of Peckinpah's films, represents existential 
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 or spiritual freedom from corrupt American businessmen and law enforcement officials (and 
what they represent). Mexico's relative lawlessness, as opposed to being anarchic, allows the 
individual to be free and expressive in the Frommian sense, to focus on ​being ​ instead of ​having ​, 
as there is a relative absence of rigidity with regard to oppressive institutions and the regulations 
they impose on individuals. This, too, reveals Peckinpah’s decidedly libertarian values. Mexico 
is seen here as a pastoral paradise where one – or, in this case, a couple that is seeking to repair a 
relationship – can (re)define him- or herself freely and without unsought influence or 
manipulation. 
Appropriately, Doc and Carol intensify their effort after they are nearly crushed to death 
by a garbage truck that had picked up and emptied a dumpster in which they were hiding. While 
the metaphor here is a bit heavy-handed, it effectively conveys Peckinpah's point: Doc and 
Carol, because of their refusal and rebellion, are seen by society as “trash” that must be disposed 
of. The dump into which Doc and Carol are eventually deposited is, in effect, the same as the 
prison where Doc was held to keep him away from society. 
After a shootout in a hotel with Benyon's men, Doc and Carol flee, and they commandeer 
a truck being driven by a redneck (Slim Pickens). They ask the accommodating and affable 
cowboy to take them to Mexico, their imagined paradise, and once they cross the border, Doc 
and Carol generously give the man $30,000 for his truck and his troubles after he reveals he 
earned just $5,000 the previous year. This scene confirms the essentially morally conservative 
nature of Peckinpah's film: though Doc and Carol fight against the law, that law (and everything 
it represents with regard to safety and society) is hopelessly corrupt. For Doc and Carol to be 
truly free, and for them to be able to create a life together, they must escape. While there is no 
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 doubt about the couple's criminal status, both Doc and Carol are portrayed as generous, with 
regard to their monetary gift to the cowboy, and as acting justly, doing what is necessary to 
combat the oppressive forces at work against them (and, notably, Doc only kills when it is 
absolutely necessary). As Dukore argues, Doc's decision to capitulate and carry out Benyon's 
heist is layered, but it ultimately reflects Doc's moral superiority. His “crime” has a Robin Hood 
quality to it, on the one hand, as banks (as institutions) are symbols of the corrupt society, but, 
Dukore writes, Doc is also morally obligated to do the job as a form of repayment: Doc decides 
“to retire from his profession the way Bishop of ​The Wild Bunch ​ hopes to, after making one big 
score. In Doc's case the robbery is more necessary than in Bishop's, since in addition to giving 
him the wherewithal to leave his life of crime, it is payback to the man responsible for getting 
him out of jail” (42). Further, Doc and Carol are praised by the cowboy who drives them into 
Mexico, an implicit affirmation from or endorsement by a hard-working and morally upright 
character, and we are meant to believe the couple will fly right and perhaps even start a family 
now that they have won their freedom to ​be​  – notably, in a land that, at least as it's represented 
in Peckinpah's film, has not yet been corrupted by industrialization, neoliberal economic policies, 
and so on – after fleeing through “a labyrinth of malevolent machinery,” which includes “banks 
of television monitors, surveillance cameras, automated prison gates, hammering textile 
machines, and carnivorous garbage trucks” (Weddle 440). As Neil Fulwood notes, Peckinpah in 
this film comments on one of his favorite themes: “men out of time – the onset (or onslaught) of 
modernity. In this respect, ​The Getaway​ is definitely a western brought into the second half of 
the twentieth century” (92). At the film's conclusion, the cowboy heads back to America on foot 
while the couple drives south on an open Mexican road – Adam and Eve returning to The 
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 Garden – which clearly represents freedom, purity, and opportunity, i.e. the open road is a blank 
slate, and it suggests the couple will be able to honestly express their identities and experience 
individuation without having to make compromises with or otherwise conform to a restrictive, 
oppressive, corrupt, and violent society. 
As Simmons suggests, ​The Getaway​, which we might categorize in the “bandit-gangster 
subgenre,” is remarkable in a few ways. First, it mostly follows generic conventions in that the 
film “involves a bandit couple (a man and a woman) who clearly adhere to a traditional Western 
set of values. They are associated with the rural while they carry out raids against urban society 
(usually banks). Because society no longer understands the meaning of the traditional code, it 
hunts the couple down, considering them to be gangsters” (Simmons 156) or, more specifically, 
an existential threat. But, as Simmons also notes, “the bandit-gangster couple [is] generally […] 
killed at the end of the film [because] they have no place in modern society” (156). Doc and 
Carol, however, survive and “escape to Mexico, a place more suited to traditional Western 
values” (Simmons 156). Or, as Stephen Prince writes in ​Savage Cinema ​, the film “with its 
plot-driven characters offers a sense of regeneration and deliverance through [necessary] 
violence as Doc and Carol manage to patch up their marriage and escape to Mexico” (226). Doc 
and Carol, then, ultimately represent “traditional Western values,” and their marriage is what 
they were fighting to protect all along from outside threats, e.g. when Benyon forces Carol to be 
unfaithful and Benyon's emasculation of Doc by essentially owning him. Unlike many road 
movies that were produced around the same time, the family unit, threatened by the corrupt 
forces of society, is what is celebrated by Peckinpah in this film, and the theme is underscored by 
the cowboy character who says to Doc and Carol after learning they are married, “That's the 
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 trouble with this world: there's no dang morals. Kids figure if they ain't living together [without 
being wed], they ain't living.” As Bliss notes in ​Justified Lives ​, “Occasionally, Peckinpah will 
even go so far as to insert into his films special figures who act as redeemers for the protagonists. 
Certainly, ​The Getaway​'s Cowboy, who rescues Doc and Carol from the miasma of murder and 
deceit in which they have become involved, qualifies in this respect” (14). The cowboy, in other 
words, tells us through his approval of Doc and Carol that they were morally justified to do what 
they did and that their cause was worthy. 
 
Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ (1974): 
Like ​The Getaway​, which was released only a couple of years earlier, Peckinpah's ​Bring 
Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ is a work of social critique aimed specifically at the relationship 
between power, money, and corruption (in both the economic sense and with regard to the 
“corruption” of man's psyche, autonomy, and his ability to ​be​), and it features cars and travel as 
metaphors. The two films are similar in yet another way: while Bennie (Warren Oates), ​Alfredo 
Garcia ​'s protagonist, does not survive to succeed in his quest, it is because he lacks – or, more 
precisely loses – what Doc and Carol have, i.e. a traditional familial bond. Both films, then, 
celebrate conservative notions of romance and love, and Bennie is gunned down at the 
conclusion of ​Alfredo Garcia ​ precisely because he comes to embody everything the villains in 
the film are and he is supposed to oppose: bloodlust, greed, and so forth; that is, he becomes 
antisocial in the traditional sense whereas Doc and Carol must battle certain societal 
representatives and institutions because those people and institutions are corrupt and make 
“healthy” relationships, etc. impossible. In this way, being two sides of the same coin, both ​The 
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 Getaway​ and ​Alfredo Garcia ​ might be seen as critiques of '70s-era politics: if corporations and 
businessmen exploit workers, for example, and the American government, which is supposed to 
protect our interests, is sending drafted troops to kill and die in Vietnam, how could an honest, 
hardworking person hope to survive, either psychologically or even literally? These films, like 
many others of the time, interrogated the actual functions of power in this country, and they 
examined the alienating effects of power's practices: how does one behave morally or ethically 
(and what do those terms even mean anymore?) in the shadow of the Kent State Massacre, 
Vietnam, Watergate, and numerous political assassinations? Bennie, in ​Alfredo Garcia ​, is an 
example of what can happen when one loses the desire or does not have the ability to answer 
such a question. 
In his book ​Justified Lives ​, Michael Bliss claims that Bennie is “delivered from 
corruption” through violence, though he pays the ultimate price for his freedom (13). I, however, 
would argue that Bennie never earns his freedom unless we are willing to take the view that 
death is a desirable form of liberation; instead, Bennie is served with justice for the moral crimes 
he commits through the course of ​Alfredo Garcia ​. Regardless, what is clear is that violence – 
both literal and symbolic – is at the heart of this film. Because Peckinpah got his start in 
Westerns, it is not surprising that the function and meaning of violence in his road movies is 
similar to the function and meaning of violence in his (and others') Westerns. As James Kendrick 
notes in ​Film Violence: History, Ideology, Genre ​,  “In the traditional or classic western […], 
violence is the chief means by which good and evil are distinguished. While the old adage 
suggests that the white hat denotes 'good' and the black hat denotes 'evil', the principal factor in 
distinguishing between the two is arguably ​restraint​, particularly in the use of violence” (72). Of 
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 course, this convention was challenged and subverted in many Westerns beginning in the 1960s 
and '70s, but it held and holds true as a rule of thumb, and, as Kendrick suggests, this distinction 
establishes a Western's villain as a “figure of excess” who deploys “violence to satisfy his own 
desires” (72-3). While a “hero” might occasionally slip up in a moment of rage, what is notable 
about Bennie in ​Alfredo Garcia ​ is how completely he, as a result of a psychic break (the murder 
of his girlfriend, which represents the impossibility of him realizing the familial dream), loses all 
control and becomes incapable of exercising restraint in the use of violence. In turn, he becomes 
as villainous, and as much of threat to Peckinpah's romanticized utopian society of familial love, 
as the film's antagonists: El Jefe (Emilio Fernández), the man who has put a bounty on Alfredo 
Garcia's head after the latter impregnates El Jefe's daughter; Quill (Gig Young) and Sappensly 
(Robert Webber), El Jefe's professional goons, who attempt to get Bennie to do their dirty work; 
and the bikers who nearly rape Bennie's girlfriend, Elita (Isela Vega). 
In ​If They Move … Kill 'Em! ​, David Weddle, quoting Paul Seydor, correctly identifies the 
theme of not only this film but many of Peckinpah's other works: all of the money in the world is 
not worth the cost of one's soul. As Weddle notes, “This would be the dominating theme of ​The 
Wild Bunch ​, ​Pat Garrett and Billy the Kid ​, and ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ as well – a 
point missed by many reviewers who labeled Peckinpah a nihilist” (204). Indeed, it is Bennie's 
desire to ​have​ – that is, to claim the bounty El Jefe has placed on Garcia's head – that literally 
prohibits him from ​being ​, as both he and his romantic interest are exterminated in the process, 
and Bennie's death is the necessary result of his shortcomings. But Peckinpah presents Bennie as 
a relatively sympathetic figure, as he, like Doc in ​The Getaway​, is battling forces that are 
fundamentally evil and supremely powerful. Even if Bennie loses his way, he is only partly to 
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 blame, as the proverbial deck is stacked against him and life has dealt him a particularly bad 
hand. 
The opening shot of ​Alfredo Garcia ​ is vintage Peckinpah: a black and white still image 
(in some ways reminiscent of the opening of ​Straw Dogs ​) of some ducks freely floating in the 
water (and the animals here evoke the opening of ​The Getaway​, ​The Ballad of Cable Hogue ​, and 
The Wild Bunch ​, and they serve to establish the juxtaposition between “free” animals and the 
control exercised over would-be free humans by corrupt and exploitative agents of power who 
are motivated by money). This shot is next unfrozen and transitions to color, suggesting birth as 
the world of ​Alfredo Garcia ​ comes to life. This notion of birth – and, by extension, its inevitable 
conclusion in death – is further emphasized as the next figure we see is that of a pregnant 
woman, El Jefe's daughter, who is lying on the shore. Quickly, another woman and two men 
approach the pregnant woman and say that her father wants to see her immediately. Like ​The 
Getaway​, the initial pastoral images are abruptly and somewhat violently replaced by ones that 
introduce the presence of power, domination, and order, i.e. “civilizing” elements. Further, as the 
pregnant woman is escorted into El Jefe's chambers, heavy doors clank closed behind her – these 
doors are reminiscent of the prison gates from ​The Getaway​ and represent captivity and control, 
the loss of autonomy and the freedom to ​be​. 
An angry El Jefe demands to know who the baby's father is, but the woman will not tell 
him; she behaves defiantly, refusing to respect El Jefe's power, and his goons rip the top of her 
dress, a threat of further violence. Still, the woman is silent. Further infuriated by this 
insubordination and disobedience, El Jefe orders his goons to break the woman's arm, which they 
do, and she finally gives El Jefe what he is after: a man named Alfredo Garcia is the one who 
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 impregnated her. With confidence and authority reminiscent of Benyon in ​The Getaway​, El Jefe 
puts a $1,000,000 bounty on Garcia's head. This act sets the film's action into motion, and we see 
a convoy of vehicles leaving El Jefe's Mexican compound, and these shots are intercut with ones 
of an airplane flying and then landing, and we then see El Jefe's goons checking into hotels and, 
essentially, beginning their search for Garcia. Two of these henchmen, Quill and Sappensly, who 
are American, enter a seedy bar where Bennie, a drunkard, works as a piano player and singer. In 
a clever bit of characterization, Bennie is wearing sunglasses (even though it is nighttime and he 
is indoors), suggesting he is blind to reality. In other words, he does not understand that violence 
begets violence and is a force that corrupts man's soul and his ability to live harmoniously with 
others: Bennie's violent acts will eventually lead to Elita's murder and his own death. Further, 
Garcia is being pursued for what someone of a puritanical bent would dub sexual transgressions, 
i.e. he had sex out of wedlock. In this way, while he is not a major character in the film with 
regard to screen time, he represents the wild and the free, the force of nature that needs to be 
tamed by man. Bennie, too, is a kind of outlaw, and his job and lifestyle are antithetical to 
conservative societal conventions; when he begins wantonly killing others, he seals his own fate: 
for the sake of society he must be stamped out. 
Bennie tells Quill and Sappensly that he knows Garcia and that he will bring him in alive; 
the goons, however, insist that bringing in Garcia dead is fine, as they know all they need is his 
head. Significantly, the henchmen do not tell Bennie just how significant El Jefe's reward is; as 
far as Bennie is concerned, he is entitled to a small pittance for his help. Also worth noting here 
is the piece of foreshadowing provided by Peckinpah. As Michael Bliss observes in ​Justified 
Lives​, “[T]he sound of squealing tires is heard when Sappensly first shows Alfredo's picture to 
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 Bennie” [and the] “connection between the pursuit of the head and death by automobile [is 
made] obvious” (257). At this juncture, Bennie has no way to know where his journey will take 
him or what the price will be for his actions, but ultimately he does not care: the money is all he 
wants, and all of his decisions from this point forward are made with the reward in mind. 
After Bennie leaves the bar, he tracks down Elita, a woman with whom both Bennie and 
Garcia are/were sleeping (as a prostitute, she is another representative of deviance), and she tells 
Bennie that Garcia recently died in a car wreck. Bennie visits Quill and Sappensly to tell them he 
knows how to find Garcia, though he does not mention the man is already dead. Exercising their 
power, the men demand to take Bennie's photo for which he must remove his glasses (to 
underscore the significance of this, it is worth noting that Bennie even sleeps with his glasses on, 
only removing them for sex), which again represents his free, abnormal, outsider status. It is a 
small act, but it is the first in a series that aim to civilize or tame him, and much of this film is 
really about how he reacts to the increasing challenges presented to and demands placed on him. 
The goons say they will give Bennie $1,000 for accurate information on Garcia's whereabouts, a 
figure that represents just 1/1000 ​th​ of what they stand to earn, but Bennie counters by demanding 
$10,000, which he cannot know is still a relatively small amount (one percent of the total 
bounty). Quill and Sappensly, with their suits and exclusive knowledge, wield great power over 
Bennie and use it to exploit him, especially with regard to his time and labor, just as Benyon 
does with Doc in ​The Getaway​. As Stephen Prince notes in ​Savage Cinema ​, “Benny's quest to 
find and mutilate Alfredo's corpse forms Peckinpah's most extreme statement on the corrupting 
influence of money. Peckinpah described the theme of this film as a grim one, the darkness of 
which was intended to strike a cautionary moral tone” (145). It is fitting that this “statement” is 
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 made in this particular genre and at this particular time in history: the presence of the road in this 
film ultimately suggests that we cannot run – or, more appropriately, drive – away from our 
responsibilities and we will, or should, be held accountable for our actions, i.e. Bennie is 
corrupted by money and must pay the price. Bennie is not presented as a hero and he is not 
entirely sympathetic as a character; he seems desperate and confused, though in his defense, he is 
being manipulated by men who are much more powerful and intelligent than he is, a dynamic 
familiar to many viewers who are exploited by their bosses, for example, or lied to by elected 
officials. Like Doc, Bennie is but a pawn, and his actions reflect his frustration regarding his 
condition, but he does not have a clear vision of an alternative mode of being. 
To further emphasize Bennie's level of debauchment, Peckinpah shows him and Elita in 
bed the next morning: Bennie pours liquor onto his crotch to kill the crabs she has given him. 
This act illustrates not only Elita's promiscuity but also, and more important, Bennie's inability or 
unwillingness to exercise good judgement. All of this, though, can be forgiven – with regard to 
the moral laws Peckinpah establishes – because the two have genuine affection for one another. 
Once on the road in search of Garcia, for example, the two act as a unit – again, we have a 
parallel with ​The Getaway​ – and even agree to be married. This act affirms the significance of 
the family unit in Peckinpah's world, a rather stark deviation from other road movies of the era in 
which individuality and self-reliance were represented as supreme qualities. Somewhat 
ironically, and perhaps even disingenuously, Bennie tells Elita, “Hell, I've never been any place I 
want to go back to, that's for damn sure.” While commitment and marriage would surely be a 
step in a new direction for this character, it is also a sort of selfless sacrifice: the stability a 
marriage would provide, for example, comes at a price in terms of one's freedom. Regardless, 
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 this idea of, as Bennie says, “go[ing] someplace new” is at home in this genre, as road movies 
typically celebrate movement, which the road facilitates, and reject stagnation or what is behind 
(in the rearview mirror). Bennie's flaw, though, is that he does not see movement in terms of 
forward and reverse: he tells Elita, “This time I'm moving up.” Significantly, the word “up” here 
invokes the idea of ascending to power, as in climbing the corporate ladder. And, as we see later 
in the film, this is precisely what Bennie tries to do, and it is ultimately the cause of his undoing; 
when he adopts the ruthlessness of Quill and Sappensly, the suits higher “up” who manipulate 
and exploit Bennie, he meets his end. It is Bennie's desire to ​have​, in other words, and his loss of 
compassion and empathy that guarantees he will fail. 
While Bennie's car and the road on which it travels represent the way to a new life, which 
he plans to fund with his $10,000 reward, there are plenty of obstacles along the way. First, Quill 
and Sappensly (and some of their hired goons) are following the couple, waiting to cut out 
Bennie once he leads them to Garcia. Additionally, the inconvenience of a flat tire early on in 
their journey to find Garcia suggests their quest will not be a smooth one. The most significant 
difficulty they encounter, however, is a pair of bikers who appear at the couple's rural campsite 
one evening. 
[A brief but worthwhile detour: Peckinpah cast “outlaw” country artist Kris Kristofferson 
and Kristofferson's keyboardist, Donnie Fritts, to play these menacing bikers. Their motorcycles, 
as miniature steel horses evocative of the villains' mounts in Westerns, represent real danger and 
rebellion (they make cars seem domestic and safe by comparison), and the bikers' long hair and 
beards help to establish them as genuinely anti-establishment and thus unpredictable and 
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 unintelligible. Significantly, as Michael Streissguth notes in ​Outlaw: Waylon, Willie, Kris, and 
the Renegades of Nashville ​, 
Kristofferson's songs […] explored sensual love and desperate negotiations with 
personal devils in a rambling ballad style that sharply contrasted with the strictly 
tempered verse that had dominated country music for decades. He engendered a 
freedom of expression in Nashville's music business, and, in his wake, other 
freedoms emerged. (2) 
Kristofferson as a musician and actor, then, brings something to this biker character that others 
would not, namely a past and spirit of rebellion. Kristofferson would have a respectable film 
career of his own, of course, and he appears in three of Peckinpah's films, but this is arguably his 
most sinister role, the one that most clearly, if exaggerated, reflected the man's real 
rebelliousness. To further illustrate Kristofferson's cultural significance, it is worth noting that 
Martin Scorsese included a reference to him in his film ​Taxi Driver ​ (1976). In one scene, Betsy 
(Cybill Shepherd) tells Travis Bickel (Robert De Niro) that he is a paradox, citing Kristofferson's 
song “The Pilgrim—Chapter 33”: “He's a prophet and a pusher. Partly truth, partly fiction. A 
walking contradiction.” While these lines do apply to Bickel, they more accurately describe 
nearly all of Peckinpah's protagonists, and it makes sense that the director would identify and 
seek an association with Kristofferson.] 
The bikers' presence is immediately unnerving, and Bennie and Elita are clearly 
uncomfortable. Bennie introduces Elita as his wife, perhaps thinking that the bikers will have 
mercy on her or see her as “belonging” to Bennie, but of course the bikers are transgressors; the 
institution of marriage, along with all institutions, is meaningless (let alone sacred). 
147 
 Kristofferson's character, Paco, touches Elita's hair and, despite Bennie's attempt at an objection, 
he leads her away with the help of his partner, who holds a gun on Bennie. Paco cuts off Elita's 
top with a switchblade and appears to be preparing to rape her, but she slaps him repeatedly 
(which is more than Bennie did in her defense). Dejected, Paco walks silently over to a rock and 
sits down; she goes over to him, kneels, he touches her hair again, and she moves in to kiss him. 
Elita appears to be offering herself to Paco here, perhaps in an attempt to secure her safety and 
release. This is reminiscent of both Amy in ​Straw Dogs ​ and Carol in ​The Getaway​. Meanwhile, 
Bennie knocks out the second biker with a frying pan, takes his gun, and kills Paco, but not 
before he sees Paco and Elita embracing. In ​Peckinpah: A Portrait in Montage ​, Garner Simmons 
notes that Elita is the most powerful character in this scene and argues that she does not need 
Bennie to save her. He writes, “When Paco strips her to the waist, she makes it very clear that he 
will never be able to dominate her, slapping his face twice. When he slaps her back, she defiantly 
takes it without tears, thereby destroying the masculine fantasy that he can sexually overpower 
her” (198). Further, when Elita turns the tables on Paco and makes advances of her own, she is 
doing so in an effort to essentially distract him from going after Bennie. As Simmons also notes, 
Elita has resolved her dilemma without Bennie's help, seeming to make “his rescue effort 
superfluous. [But] it makes Peckinpah's point: in killing Paco and his partner, Bennie is not 
rescuing Elita but ​himself​” (198). Bennie's priority, in other words, is the $10,000 he is after and 
not the woman to whom, only hours earlier, he promised to be married. Elita's near-rape is a 
warning to Bennie, one he fails to heed. As Neil Fulwood writes in ​The Films of Sam Peckinpah ​, 
“Like Raskolnikov in Dostoyevsky's ​Crime and Punishment​, stricken with guilt even before he 
commits his crime, Bennie finds there is a price to be paid just for entertaining the notion of 
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 wrongdoing, let alone carrying it out” (103). Prior to his encounter with the bikers, Bennie has 
not yet killed anyone or found Garcia's head; if he wanted to turn back at this juncture, he could. 
His refusal to consider the danger he is subjecting himself and Elita to, however, which could not 
have been made more clear than it was during their encounter with the bikers, demonstrates how 
narrow his focus is: the money ( ​having ​) is everything. 
Back in the car, Elita is worried about desecrating Garcia's grave and, generally, seems to 
be having second thoughts about her arrangement with Bennie; though he ultimately saved her 
from Paco, or at least appeared to, his masculinity has been challenged and he experiences 
increasing a-morality with regard to what he is willing to do to earn the $10,000 bounty, and this 
makes him appear to be unfit as a potential husband. Bennie, however, is insistent, and Elita says 
she will take him to the cemetery but will leave him after that. Her encounter with the bikers, and 
Bennie's behavior in that context, has clearly rattled and changed her. In other words, while both 
Doc in ​The Getaway​ and Bennie here depend on their significant others to help them confront 
their capitalistic antagonists, Bennie acts relatively tentatively and cowardly. Even though Elita 
later appears to have a change of heart, when Bennie tells her he loves her after finding her 
crying in the shower, his character flaws will prove to be literally fatal. In ​Savage Cinema ​, 
Stephen Prince, who labels ​Alfredo Garcia ​ “a bleakly compelling work” (197), makes an 
interestingly observation about the way this shower scene is shot. He writes, Peckinpah films 
Bennie's declaration of love “with a wide-angle lens that distorts Bennie's face. The shot is, 
furthermore, a subjective composition representing Elita's view of Benny” (148). Prince 
continues, “Peckinpah was consistent in his method of presentation [as Venner is shot in a 
similar way when he is raping Amy in ​Straw Dogs ​]. The subjective imagery emphasizes the 
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 woman's perspective on this male condition. The iconography visualizes these deformations of 
male psychology and emotion” (148). In short, both Amy and Elita are able to see these men for 
the monsters they are: as villains who attempt to destroy or negate the beauty of these women 
(149). 
When the couple arrives in the village where Garcia is buried, Elita lies to Bennie and 
tells him, after asking the locals, that Garcia is not there. Her act, while fundamentally deceptive, 
is one that is intended to protect their union: while she is opposed to digging up Garcia's corpse, 
more importantly she knows Bennie is not up to the task of claiming his reward since Quill and 
Sappensly are on their trail and represent a challenge Bennie has not demonstrated he can 
overcome. Bennie, however, orders Elita to take him to the cemetery where, incidentally, a 
funeral for a small child is taking place. The dead child here arguably represents the death of the 
couple's future: they will never be a proper couple and will never have children of their own, as 
Bennie, unlike Doc, does not have the ability to be a true partner.  
The next day, however, Bennie grabs his machete and heads back to the cemetery. Elita 
follows and, naturally, is disturbed by the mania exhibited by Bennie when he finds Garcia's 
grave and begins digging frantically. This unbecoming disrespect is too much for Elita to handle, 
and she walks away. Just as Bennie is about to decapitate Garcia's corpse, he is hit in the head 
with and knocked out by a shovel wielded by someone off screen. When Bennie regains 
consciousness, he is half-buried in the grave – Elita's dead body is there with him but Garcia's 
head is not. Once again, Bennie's incompetent behavior has resulted in disaster; however, this 
episode inspires a radical shift in his psychological state, and he yells at Elita's corpse, 
nonsensically accusing her of wanting and choosing to stay with Garcia, her former lover. In an 
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 ultimate act of betrayal and failure, Bennie unceremoniously leaves Elita's body there; his 
commitment to her, it seems, was always disingenuous. 
At this point in the film, with Elita now out of his way, Bennie's preoccupation with his 
reward money becomes all-consuming. He hits the road, determined to find Garcia's head, and 
says to himself, I know they are “up there.” Of course, he means that he is certain the men who 
have his prize are ahead of him on the road, but his use of the word “up” once again foreshadows 
his inevitable fall: in his attempt to climb the economic ladder by disposing of those who exist on 
its higher rungs, he will be knocked entirely off. His adoption of the ruthless, exploitative 
behavior of those figures who represent wealth and power is an affront to the version of morality 
Peckinpah champions in this and other films. First, though, Bennie finds the men who have 
Garcia's head as they are stopped because of a damaged tire, and Bennie kills the men during a 
shoot-out and retrieves Garcia's head, which is in a fly-covered sack. Again demonstrating his 
lack of regard for the dead, Bennie violently throws the head into the car. Further, his ignorance 
and indifference with regard to Garcia's supposed crime is demonstrated when Bennie asks the 
head, “What's so special about you, anyway?” 
During a tense confrontation between Bennie and some villagers who are offended by the 
grave robbery, Quill and Sappensly, who have been following Bennie, arrive; Quill, who uses an 
assault weapon to execute everyone but Bennie and an elderly villager, is shot and killed in the 
skirmish. The obsessed Bennie, however, unsympathetically asks Sappensly, “Do I get paid?” 
Offended, Sappensly pulls out a gun but is killed by Bennie, who retrieves Garcia's head and 
steals the goons' yellow station wagon. Bennie, who converses with the head, has clearly become 
psychotic: he mutters incoherently, talks to a photo of Elita, and has lost any ability he once 
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 might have had to prioritize or discern right from wrong. After confronting Max, Quill and 
Sappensly's former boss, demanding to know how much the head is really worth and why it is 
wanted, he kills Max and everyone in the room, takes his promised $10,000, and leaves with 
Garcia's head. With nothing left to lose and greed and anger motivating all of his increasingly 
irrational actions, Bennie is determined to go straight to El Jefe. 
When Bennie arrives at El Jefe's compound, a baptism is taking place. Contrasting the 
dead baby from earlier in the film, this newborn is a mockery of not only Bennie's failure to 
protect Elita and inability to ensure their future together, but it also represents potential, of which 
Bennie has none. He kills senselessly, neither honoring the beauty of life nor respecting the 
finality of death. The baby here is innocent and pure; Bennie, on the other hand, has been totally 
corrupted in his pursuit of the $10,000. El Jefe, by comparison, has apparently gotten over his 
initial anger. When Bennie approaches him with Garcia's head, El Jefe, who is gushing over his 
new grandson, says, “Take [the money] and go. I have everything that I want. I have my 
grandson.” Money, it is suggested here, has relatively little value when compared to human life, 
a fact that Bennie could not and cannot recognize. After opening the case containing the full 
reward, Bennie fully snaps. He says, “Sixteen people are dead because of [Garcia].” This, of 
course, is not entirely true, as Garcia himself did not kill anyone; his “crime” was fathering the 
baby that is now making El Jefe so happy. It is far more accurate to say that sixteen people are 
dead because of Bennie, who at this moment begins shooting everyone in El Jefe's compound, 
senselessly making a tragic situation even more so. Bennie kills everyone inside except for El 
Jefe's daughter (and her new son), who rejoices in the death of her domineering father. In fact, 
she ordered Bennie to kill El Jefe, whose death is a form of liberation for her, and this is 
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 arguably Bennie's only, at least relatively speaking, decent act. However, he has already caused 
too much pain and has transgressed beyond the point of redemption. As Bennie leaves with the 
$1,000,000 and Garcia's head, he notably leaves behind the basket in which he had been carrying 
the head. This basket was the one Elita brought to her picnic with Bennie when the bikers 
attacked them. Leaving this item behind is a symbolic act that represents once again the 
insincerity of Bennie's commitment to Elita, and he is gunned down by El Jefe's guards as he 
attempts to drive out of the compound (some critics have suggested this is a nod to ​Bonnie and 
Clyde​, a film that influenced Peckinpah), paying the ultimate price for his failures. In ​Peckinpah: 
A Portrait in Montage ​, Simmons notes, “The [film's] original script had Bennie winning the 
[climactic] shoot-out and getting away with the million dollar reward. Earlier that week, 
Peckinpah had come to the realization that Bennie had to die if he took the money” (205). Garner 
Simmons, in “The Deadly Companions Revisited” from ​Peckinpah Today ​, makes a similar point: 
in “​Alfredo Garcia ​, the personal and emotional price that Bennie must pay for delivering the 
severed head leaves him with nowhere to go. It is no surprise that Peckinpah would end the [...] 
film with Bennie's death, essentially an existential choice” (21). In other words, because Bennie 
does not complete the process of individuation – that is, he never graduates from the desire to 
have​ to the ability to ​be​ – he is revealed to be a villain and must cease to be. Some critics, such 
as Bernard Dukore, have argued that Bennie appears to choose this fate, i.e. his execution and 
death, as a way to atone for his transgressions. In ​Sam Peckinpah's Feature Films ​ Dukore writes, 
“'Come on, Al, we're going home,' [Bennie] tells the decapitated head as he takes it and the 
money. He is indeed going home, but the home to which he leaves has a location he does not 
fully comprehend. It is to Garcia's home, death” (51). While Bennie may not “fully comprehend” 
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 his destination, the ambiguity in this line leaves open the possibility that his conscience does not 
allow him to go on living as if he had not committed the various atrocities for which he is guilty. 
Regardless, what is clear is that in the world Peckinpah creates in his road movies, success and 
individuation are linked to relatively healthy romantic relationships, preferably ones that end in 
marriage. Selflessness, then, the antithesis of ​having ​, is only practiced when one enters into an 
honest partnership with another, unlike the corrupt, exploitative authority figures Peckinpah's 
protagonists oppose. Traditional romantic couples, in other words, can survive whereas 
Peckinpah's world is inhospitable to singles, who are presented as unacceptably transgressive; 
Bennie fails because he is unable to avoid temptation and is corrupted, making a relationship 
with Elita impossible. 
 
Conclusion: 
Sam Peckinpah's cycle of road movies is somewhat anachronistic, as these films contain 
themes more appropriate to the Westerns of the 1960s than road movies of the early '70s, and it 
is remarkable how accurately Will Wright's description, in ​Sixguns & Society: A Structural Study 
of the Western, ​ of the themes and structures of '60s Westerns applies to those in Peckinpah's road 
movies. Wright argues that the “transitional theme [found in many Westerns from the '60s] is 
almost a direct inversion of the classical [Western] plot” (74). In these films, he continues: 
The hero is inside society at the start and outside society at the end. He still has 
his exceptional strength and special status; but the society, which was weak and 
vulnerable in the classical story, is now firmly established and, because of its size, 
stronger than the hero or the villains. Rather than being forced into fighting 
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 against the villains for society, the hero is forced to fight against society, which is 
virtually identified with the villains of the classical story. Finally, the woman 
whom the hero loves no longer serves inevitably to reconcile him with society; 
instead, she joins him in his fight and his separation from society. (74-5) 
As I have discussed, Peckinpah's road movies pit a male protagonist with a female accomplice 
against corrupt and powerful representatives of society. This model is most closely followed in 
The Getaway​, in which Benyon has considerable influence over the parole board and uses his 
power to manipulate Doc and Carol, and in ​Convoy​, in which the truckers are harassed by police 
and exploited by a politician; in both cases, the leading men are able to escape with the help of 
their romantic partners. In ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​, however, Peckinpah presents 
the result of a would-be hero losing his female companion: because Bennie's judgment is 
clouded by his obsession to ​have​ rather than ​be​ – and in this way his values are the same of those 
celebrated by a capitalist, consumerist society – Elita is killed, and he ultimately fails to escape 
from society's corrupting influence. 
The key difference between the themes of Peckinpah's road movies and those of others of 
the early '70s is Peckinpah's emphasis on romantic, traditional/conservative ideas about familial 
love (like those in earlier Westerns). ​Easy Rider ​, ​Vanishing Point​, ​Two-Lane Blacktop ​, ​Five 
Easy Pieces ​, etc. are, for example, far more interesting in how they depict individualist 
protagonists (usually a man or men without love interests) who must go it alone, so to speak; 
further, these films often feature characters who fail, who are unable to overcome the tensions 
between them and the society they find oppressive. In ​Easy Rider ​ and ​Vanishing Point​, for 
example, the protagonists die, though these deaths are not the result of any moral shortcomings 
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 as is the case with Bennie in ​Garcia ​, and these failures are provocative in the way they represent 
frustration and uncertainty with regard to the question of just how one can successfully oppose a 
society that does not have the average individual's best interests in mind (these films appear to 
answer that one can't). Peckinpah, however, is not as daring (but he does, in a rebellious fashion 
that is in its way appropriate for the road movie genre, stay true to his ideals), and his road 
movies suggest that escape is possible but only if one experiences individuation through a 
rejection of the capitalistic structure (i.e. they must choose ​being ​ over ​having ​) with the help of a 
like-minded romantic companion with whom he can retreat to some pastoral Eden. In some 
ways, then, Peckinpah's road movies are re-imaginings of The Garden story in Genesis, and they 
feature the same traditional, conservative moral themes; that is, they warn against temptation and 
corruption while celebrating romantic unions. 
In terms of Peckinpah's technical proficiency, his road movies are hit and miss. The 
sonic-visual montage that opens ​The Getaway​ is masterful, for example, and its representation of 
men, machines, confinement, and movement effectively invokes and critiques Ford and Taylor 
and their obsession with efficiency and profit, ideas that can easily lead to the dehumanization 
and exploitation of people. Additionally, ​Garcia ​ features some interesting use of slow-motion. 
As Prince notes in ​Savage Cinema ​, Peckinpah was at this time still using the techniques – such 
as multi-camera filming, montage, and slow-motion – he had learned from studying films like 
Kurosawa's ​Seven Samurai​: “For the scene in ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ where the 
professional killers Quill and Sappensly massacre a Mexican family, Peckinpah used five 
cameras, two of which were running at high speed to produce slow motion” (52). And, when the 
two thugs in ​Garcia ​ lose control of their car and skid off the road, Peckinpah cleverly 
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 manipulates viewers' emotions by intercutting slow-motion and regular speed shots to produce 
what Prince calls a “perceptual shock” (65). However, ​Convoy​ is sloppy on nearly every level: 
the writing is poor, the acting is uninspired, the use of slow-motion is ineffective, and so on. 
Peckinpah's decision to venture into the road movie genre was a curious one. On the one 
hand, both ​The Getaway​ and ​Convoy​ were clearly attempts to capitalize on the success of other 
films in this vein (1968's ​Bullitt ​, for example) and a country novelty song; on the other, ​Alfredo 
Garcia ​ is a “Peckinpah film” if there ever was one, and he claimed it is the most fully realized of 
all his films. Regardless, when compared to other films in the genre from the same period, 
Peckinpah's road movies, mostly due to their relatively banal moralizing, do not quite stack up. 
The road, as Peckinpah presents it, symbolizes the path toward a better future; the road, as Monte 
Hellman and Dennis Hopper present it, however, symbolizes uncertainty and sometimes horror. 
The moral rules in Peckinpah's universe are often clear (as are the consequences for morally 
transgressive behavior); morality in the more daring road films of the period is fluid or even 
unknowable. Peckinpah's protagonists are heroes, though often reluctant ones (and when they are 
not, such as in Bennie's case, their deaths are deserved); the leads in ​Easy Rider ​and ​Vanishing 
Point​, on the other hand, are victims who cannot or will not conform and, in turn, pay the 
ultimate price. Somewhat poetically, Peckinpah's last detour into the road movie genre would, 
for all intents and purposes, mark the end of the road for him with regard to being viewed as a 
competent and respected filmmaker. His inability to continue the thematic and technical 
innovation he had come to be known for when venturing into a genre that was so hospitable to 
such inventiveness, as it was being radically reinvented in the late 1960s through the mid-'70s, 
unfortunately signaled Peckinpah's decline. That said, while Peckinpah clearly sought to cash in 
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 with his road movies, he did not sell out; these films reflect the same, if outdated, themes 
contained in his other work, and in this way were among the most rebellious road movies of all. 
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 Aestheticized Violence in Sam Peckinpah's Final Films: His Influences and Influence and 
the Unity of Vision and Technique in His Oeuvre 
 
Preface: 
If Sam Peckinpah is remembered for just one thing it is undoubtedly the representation of 
violence in his many films. Some criticize this violence for being excessive or even gratuitous ; 9
the way it is presented or stylized, however, is what continues to impress and inspire many 
audiences and artists. While it is true that Peckinpah did not exactly invent any of the techniques 
he used--filmmakers as diverse as Akira Kurosawa and Arthur Penn inspired Peckinpah’s brand 
of aestheticized violence--he was able to achieve remarkable things with regard to the depictions 
of screen violence, and his influence on contemporary directors like John Woo and, to some 
extent, Quentin Tarantino is obvious. If nothing else, Peckinpah (and Penn) changed the critical 
conversation in America and elsewhere about screen violence, in some ways pulling ‘violent 
films’ out of the ‘gutter’ of exploitation cinema and thereby establishing another medium (or 
even subgenres) in which social and political problems and questions could be more or less 
seriously examined and critiqued. 
In order to more coherently examine Peckinpah’s influences (specifically, ​how​ they 
influenced his work) and, in turn, the influence he had on others, this chapter is organized into 
several sections. One section, for example, seeks to establish some understanding of what we 
9 ​I’ve cited critics on this point in previous chapters, but it’s worth noting here that charges of gratuitous violence 
are not necessarily critical or negative; Juan Rodriguez Flores, in “The Elegiac Violence in the films of Sam 
Peckinpah,” for example, writes that Peckinpah’s use of violence was both “gratuitous and realistic.” In some ways, 
then, this suggests that our reality outside of film is filled with violence on a scale​ ​we might not be comfortable 
acknowledging. Can we, somewhat ironically, passively accept what is presented to us via the evening news but be 
offended by “realistic” representations of violence in film and other fictional media? 
159 
 might mean when we refer to “violence” ; further, this section discusses the relationship between 
violence and what will be called “screen violence,” i.e. cinematic depictions of  aestheticized, 
stylized violence. Another and closely related section investigates the appeal of screen violence. 
Specifically, I attempt to answer the following question: if violence represents an existential 
threat, why might audiences be drawn to representations--and cinematic ones, in particular--of it? 
I examine here how screen violence affects us as viewers and critics. What does it communicate 
and how? Why do our responses to screen violence vary so dramatically? After this foundational 
discussion, the chapter moves to an examination of Peckinpah’s predecessors, mostly notably 
Akira Kurosawa, focusing on technical innovation (the use of multiple cameras filming at 
different speeds, the use of asynchronous sound and visuals, etc.) and the representation of 
violence to build a narrative and, perhaps more importantly, as a critical tool.  
The bigger point I make here is that there is no one universally accepted definition of 
“violence.” What’s more, there are examples of instances in which “real violence” (e.g. football, 
boxing, and certainly the mixed martial arts) does not alienate viewers, as there are examples of 
instances in which simulated or somehow inauthentic violence (e.g. professional wrestling) 
arouses viewers. Indeed, both the NFL and the UFC are incredibly popular. What constitutes 
violence is a question that is nearly as difficult to answer as the question of why both real and 
simulated violence appeal to many people. 
Generally speaking, though, violence can be defined for our purposes here in two ways: 
1) a behavior or action intended to cause physical harm to a person or damage to an object and 2) 
a behavior or action that in some way inflicts psychological and/or other damage or injury to a 
person or group via infringement, denial, or manipulation. The first definition is the most 
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 germane with regard to the purposes of this chapter, though, as we are principally concerned 
with cinematic depictions of simulated physical violence, i.e. when a character is shown to be 
purposefully harming another. This is what is meant here by the term “screen violence.” 
“Aestheticized violence,” in turn, refers to ​how​ screen violence is depicted, i.e. how the 
violence is filmed, edited and stylized, otherwise mediated, and ultimately presented to 
audiences. Through a series of technical choices, a filmmaker depicts violence in a certain way 
and for specific purposes, though these reasons may vary from a desire to simply make the 
violence visually appealing or interesting or novel (e.g. the way Quentin Tarantino frequently 
uses it) to attempts to use the specific representation of violence--as opposed to violence in and 
of itself--to, via semiotics, comment on or even critique the function of violence and the presence 
of other issues within society. Aestheticized violence is not limited to cinema, of course; all 
representations of or even discussions about violence (if one thinks about how violent acts are 
discussed in the media or news, for example) can be crafted to have an effect beyond the strict 
communication of facts. Indeed, the way violence is presented to an audience necessarily says 
something about that violence, implicitly or explicitly. 
The question of choice when it comes to the consumption of media and, specifically, 
screen violence is a fascinating one: why is it appealing and why do some of us seek out and 
enjoy representations of violence? 
 
Introduction: 
Of course, filmmakers evolve throughout their careers; changes do not only happen from 
generation to generation. As such, one of the primary questions of this chapter is this: in what 
161 
 ways, especially with regard to his use of aestheticized violence, did--or, perhaps, 
didn’t--Peckinpah change over the course of his storied career? In other words, how did he 
present violence and was his attitude towards it seemingly consistent? Further, is the violence 
present in his final films used for a purpose beyond titillation or is it used gratuitously, as some 
aforementioned critics have charged? Was he willing and able to develop the strategic and 
purposeful use of screen violence, such as that in ​The Wild Bunch ​ and ​Straw Dogs ​, or did he 
come to employ it for its own sake (and, if so, why?) in an effort to exploit its appeal to titillate 
viewers? 
The answer to these questions is complex. While the screen violence in ​The Killer Elite ​, 
for example, is banal and arguably boring (due in part to Peckinpah’s lack of focus with regard to 
the major themes that inspired his masterpieces), his form/technique was excellent and effective 
in ​Cross of Iron​. With this film, Peckinpah appears recommitted to exploring questions around 
the effect on average people of corrupt power, and for him the most important effects are the loss 
of autonomy and both literal and figurative violence; appropriately, his use of aestheticized 
violence in this film permits him to communicate this to audiences on several levels. For various 
reasons, ​The Osterman Weekend ​, like ​The Killer Elite ​, is a relatively failure. While Peckinpah 
returns here, at least somewhat, to the aforementioned themes, screen violence simply is not as 
necessary to the telling of his story, and in turn its use seems gratuitous and even silly. 
While I do not think Peckinpah intended this, his final film can be viewed in a very 
general way as an appropriate segue to the ‘ultra violent’ films of the 1980s and beyond in that it, 
as in the movies that followed, incorporated violence in a more exploitative manner, i.e. the 
screen violence is not employed as a technique in an effort to critique social violence and corrupt 
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 power (even many of the exploitation films of previous decades used violence in a critical way to 
comment on contemporary social issues). There are, of course, plenty of exceptions to this; 
however, ​The Osterman Weekend ​ strikes me as Peckinpah’s weakest film, and this is due in no 
small part to how he used screen violence in it. Clearly, though, his concerns (principally, the 
violent effects of corrupt power on individual autonomy and processes of individuation) 
remained constant throughout his career, and he was committed until the end to using 
aestheticized violence, more or less, to critique the problems he identified. 
Screen violence has always been a controversial subject, and there have always been 
critics who reacted passionately to it and, in many cases, with undue alarm. In his 1967 essay 
“Movies to Kill People By” (anthologized in ​Screening Violence ​), for example, Bosley Crowther 
wrote: 
Something is happening in the movies that has me alarmed and disturbed. 
Moviemakers and moviegoers are agreeing that killing is fun. Not just 
old-fashioned, outright killing, either, the kind that is quickly and cleanly done by 
honorable law enforcers or acceptable competitors in crime. This is killing of a 
gross and bloody nature, often massive and excessive, done by characters whose 
murderous motivations are morbid, degenerate, and cold. This is killing of the sort 
that social misfits and sexual perverts are most likely to do. And the eerie thing is 
that moviegoers are gleefully lapping it up. (51) 
If he felt this way about the relatively tame ​The Dirty Dozen ​, how would Crowther have reacted 
to ​Saw​, ​Hostel​, or pretty much any other contemporary horror movie? And, despite how 
laughable his critique seems now, how different is what he said in the ‘60s when compared to 
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 what some critics say about movies today? Violence has virtually always been present in cinema, 
and some people have always found screen violence offensive. Is there such a thing as a 
difference between acceptable and appropriate screen violence and what some might call 
unacceptable or inappropriate? 
The point is that, although it is incredibly difficult to precisely define, ‘screen violence’ is 
neither inherently good nor bad; instead, it is a tool, and it can be used in different ways for 
different purposes. Peckinpah’s legacy when it comes to technique is that he took what 
Kurosawa and others began and brought a certain ‘evolved’ brand of aestheticized violence to 
modern American audiences, who in some cases saw this screen violence as excessive, 
gratuitous, and new even though it was none of those things. And, while I have been critical of 
The Osterman Weekend ​, for example, that is principally because it does not live up, in terms of 
substance and execution, to Peckinpah’s earlier work; that film’s violence makes it less effective 
but this does not mean he was suggesting through its use that, as Crowther would say, “killing is 
fun.” 
Some contemporary critics have drawn a sharp distinction between the artful violence of 
1970s cinema and the ‘ultra violent’ exploitative films of the ‘80s and beyond. Stephen Prince, 
for example, argues that Peckinpah's legacy has been hijacked by postmodern filmmakers who 
employ his aesthetic techniques for the purposes of vicarious excitement [and, thus, renders them 
superficial]” (qtd. in Kendrick 29). While I have said similar things, I am also simultaneously 
aware of the dangers of this type of reactionism; is it a fair criticism or are we being nostalgic or 
sentimental? Further, if enough exceptions to the rule can be found, has the rule outlived its 
usefulness? James Kendrick, in ​Film Violence: History, Ideology, Genre ​, writes beautifully 
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 about the ways in which Peckinpah forever changed long-standing genre conventions with regard 
to structure, for example, and I am comfortable granting the benefit of the doubt to modern 
filmmakers who are making movies in their own ways, challenging conventions (e.g. with regard 
to how screen violence is used) many of us once held as sacred while repurposing the slow 
motion and montage techniques, for example, that Peckinpah and others developed. 
There is no consensus with regard to the answer to the fundamental question of why 
screen violence is appealing. Many critics are strongly skeptical of Peckinpah’s own claims 
about the catharsis value of aestheticized violence, but there is some agreement about its 
function. James Kendrick argues, for example, that the presentation of violence “is a way of 
talking about other subjects that often get repressed--uncomfortable social and cultural issues 
such as gender, race, economic disparity, criminality, the perceived dissolution of the public 
sphere, generational issues, morality, the powerful role of media institutions (3). And, despite the 
fact that “media scholars and the general public are generally talking about different things” 
when discussing screen violence (Kendrick 3), J. Hoberman suggests in “A Test for the 
Individual Viewer” from ​Why We Watch ​ that, generally, “it is also possible that a discussion of 
the violence [in cinema] is a way to talk about something else” (118). Indeed, the way viewers 
respond to screen violence is important in terms of reflecting how they see themselves in relation 
to both the acceptability of mediated violence and the social issues it represents. As Jeffrey 
Goldstein says in his essay “Why We Watch,” viewers of ​Bonnie and Clyde ​ (and the same can 
be said about virtually any violent film) “defined themselves by their responses to screen 
excesses. The violence of the film became a subject of conversation and social posturing, the 
purposes served by our public responses to all forms of entertainment” (216). More importantly, 
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 though, screen violence can provide opportunities for reflection on both philosophical and 
socio-political issues. Perhaps especially when it is aestheticized in order to avoid unnecessary 
and unproductive alienation, violent images, as Vivian C. Sobchack argues in “The Violent 
Dance: A Personal Memoir of Death in the Movies” from ​Screening Violence ​, allow “us to find 
some brief respite from our fears. The moment of death can be prolonged cinematically (through 
editing, slow motion, extreme close-ups, etc.) so that we are made to see form and order where 
none seems to exist in real life” (118). Sobchack continues, “The movement of the human body 
toward nonbeing is underlined, emphasized, dramatized and we all become Olympic participants 
of Olympian grace. We can also see ourselves on the fringes of the frame, falling by the wayside, 
but falling in the movies” (118). 
Viewers will always experience and respond differently to screen violence. Despite a 
filmmaker’s best attempt to convey or critique certain ideas through its employment, (s)he only 
has so much control. As Prince writes in “Graphic Violence in the Cinema: Origins, Aesthetic 
Design, and Social Effects” from ​Screening Violence ​, “Viewer reactions to screen violence are 
volatile, and filmmakers cannot reliably control these responses, that is, they cannot craft their 
scenes so as to eliminate the variant reactions” (32). But through careful aestheticization, 
filmmakers can increase the possibility of positive--or at least non-alienating--responses. Beyond 
this, though, and despite the challenges inherent in using violence to convey meaning, there is 
little doubt that violence will always have a place in the cinema beyond mere spectacle. As John 
Bailey rightly states in “Bang Bang Bang Bang, Ad Nauseum,” “Because we live and work in 
such a violent society, it is natural that our films reflect and explore this violence. But often we 
only explore it deep enough to wallow in its muck. This is where the question of a demarcation 
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 arises” (81). He continues by asking what the difference between exploration and exploitation 
with regard to screen violence really is and, as important, who decides? This is a question I have 
struggled with throughout this chapter. Within the context of Peckinpah’s oeuvre, though, I have 
done my best to describe the differences between exploration and exploitation in his work. On 
the whole, Peckinpah’s brand of aestheticized violence, as we see this to varying degrees up 
through his final three films, works in service of his themes, namely a celebration of individual 
autonomy and a critique of corrupt power. Peckinpah believed that exposing audiences to 
‘realistic’ aestheticized violence was a way to shake them from a state of complacency and 
desensitization that was the result of “decades of painless, bloodless movie killings” (Prince 176) 
and, in turn, get them to oppose the Vietnam War, for example, by recognizing just how brutal 
and devastating violence is. Or, as John Bailey, puts it: “Experiencing violence and death in our 
art is a very real way of affirming our life” (83). Peckinpah, writing to a viewer who was critical 
of the violence in ​The Wild Bunch ​, put it this way: “I am sorry you did not enjoy ​The Wild 
Bunch ​. Perhaps some of its vulgarity and violence will remain with the people who will see it 
and they will understand better the nature of the continuing plague that infects our country” (qtd. 
in Prince 178). 
 
Why Is Screen Violence Appealing and What Does It Do?: 
As James Kendrick explains in ​Film Violence: History, Ideology, Genre ​, each film “uses 
violence differently--aesthetically, ideologically, and generically--which is precisely why 
violence ​ is such a tricky concept” (2). The violence in ​The Passion of the Christ​, Kendrick 
argues, is qualitatively different, for example, than the violence in a film like ​Armageddon ​, 
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 which he says is “designed purely to excite and thrill” (2). Screen violence that is obviously 
fantastic and escapist in nature, however, is not the brand of violence that can truly affect most 
viewers in a visceral way; it is more remarkable that extreme screen violence that is depicted 
hyper-realistically has relatively wide appeal. The fact that the “torture porn” or “splatter film” 
genre--which was popularized in the 1960s by Herschell Gordon Lewis and evolved into 
something altogether more gruesome with works such as ​I Spit on Your Grave​ (1978) and 
Cannibal Holocaust​ (1980) and that reemerged with a vengeance in the 2000s with ​Saw​ (2004) 
and ​Hostel​ (2005)--has remained popular says something about us, certainly, but the question of 
what that is continues to confound. (Arguably, this genre’s roots can be traced back to the Edison 
film company’s 1903 release, ​Electrocuting an Elephant ​, which captured the real electrocution 
of Topsy, a three-ton Coney Island elephant, and was released to be viewed via kinetoscope.) 
In an attempt to understand which forms of screen violence are and are not, in fact, 
appealing to viewers and why, Clark McCauley, a social psychologist and author of “When 
Screen Violence Is Not Attractive” from ​Why We Watch ​, conducted an experiment of sorts using 
undergraduate students. In his experiment, McCauley, along with his colleagues Haidt and 
Rozin, showed viewers three videos: one in which a live monkey was hammered unconscious 
and had its brains served on plates, one in which steers had their throats cut in a slaughterhouse, 
and another in which a child had her face pulled away from her skull during a surgery. What is 
interesting is that the nature of the violence in these videos varied; the violence in the monkey 
video probably seems unnecessary and ‘gross’ to us whereas animal slaughter (for purposes of 
food production) and surgery are routine and, at least in the case of surgery, necessary, though 
we do not often volunteer to witness such processes. Nevertheless, McCauley concludes that 
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 depictions of these kinds of violence “do not have much commercial appeal” (145). Indeed, 
McCauley notes that “[o]nly about 10 percent of students watched these films all the way to the 
end, and even these few rated the films as somewhat disturbing and disgusting”; he is further 
compelled to wonder why, given the popularity of violent media, the violence in his three films 
is not as popular as Hollywood’s (145). 
The answer to his question is relatively simple: “dramatic distance” or “framing violence 
as fiction” is key “if screen violence is to be attractive” (144). This concept is one I refer to in 
this chapter and elsewhere as ​aestheticized violence ​. In other words, it is apparently incredibly 
important, if a significant number of viewers are to ‘enjoy’ or make meaning of screen violence, 
for the violence depicted to be stylized (through camera work, editing, music, etc.) in such a way 
that viewers understand that what they are seeing is not real. Significantly, McCauley more or 
less rejects the catharsis argument that Peckinpah, among others, makes to justify his use of 
violence and to explain its appeal; further, he dismisses the notion that the attractiveness of 
horror films in particular is in their appeal to our curiosity (149-50). In McCauley’s words: “But 
in any case, catharsis theory does not suggest why the three disgusting films are unappealing. [...] 
If horror films appeal by eliciting and purging negative emotions, such as fear and disgust, then 
the three disgust films should likewise appeal” (153). He continues: 
The curiosity-fascination theory of horror’s appeal is likewise unhelpful. The 
content of the three films is certainly anomalous, at least in the sense that few of 
our subjects had ever seen in everyday life anything like what they saw on-screen. 
Subjects should have been fascinated to see something so unusual and curious to 
see the end of these films. All three films were norm breaking in the descriptive 
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 sense of making public on-screen what is usually private, and the monkey 
epicures, at least, were breaking a moral norm, against eating a live animal. 
Despite all this foundation for curiosity and fascination, the disgust films were not 
generally appealing. (153-4) 
Again, McCauley’s explanation for why his three “disgust films” failed to appeal to viewers and, 
in turn, his theory about what kinds of screen violence are attractive come back to 
aestheticization and narrative, precisely the things his films lacked but what Hollywood does 
incredibly well. He writes, “Our films had the kind of sound typical of inexpensive documentary 
productions: no music, no special effects, and dialogue or voice-over without the vibrancy and 
diction that trained actors produce with the help of a good sound lab. It seemed possible that 
unappealing sound tracks made our films unappealing” (155). And, as he notes when discussing 
Cohen, music can make a film feel more real, in the sense that it can help manipulate a viewer’s 
emotions, “but the very presence of the music contradicts reality” (qtd. in McCauley 156). “The 
same,” McCauley reasons, “can be said of film sound effects, which long ago left fidelity behind 
in favor of surrealism. Gunshots, auto wrecks, and footfalls in the hallway are represented in film 
sound as ideal types, more vivid than the reality they signal” (156). Regardless of how much 
viewers claim to be attracted to ‘realistic’ violence, real violence (on the news or in documentary 
films) can be disturbing because, in part, it lacks the aesthetic distance that affords viewers a 
sense of safety or distance, though we do not see massive outrage or protests against the evening 
news like we do when Tarantino releases a new film. As McCauley concludes, “The answer to 
the question with which we began may after all be as simple as the difference between fact and 
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 fiction: these three films were disgusting rather than enjoyable because they were loaded with 
cues for reality and were lacking the frame of dramatic fiction” (161). 
While McCauley’s work helps us to understand why a certain type of violence is 
attractive--or, more precisely, why a certain type is unattractive (though, it remains an open 
question with regard to where the demarcation line is)--it does not necessary explain why other 
types of violence are appealing. Clearly, aestheticization can prevent us from being genuinely 
disturbed (perhaps this explains why viewers can enjoy something like professional wrestling, as 
we know the violence committed by the participants is not ‘real’), but why do many viewers 
actively seek out representations of violence? This, of course, is a different question than the one 
about why some humans were/are attracted to real violence such as ‘blood sports’ like 
gladiatorial combat or MMA, but screen violence, and dramatic--as opposed to 
documentary--violence in particular, is what is most relevant here. 
McCauley established that aestheticization is necessary if screen violence is to attract and 
not repulse viewers, but he is not able to satisfactorily answer the question of why screen 
violence can appeal to viewers. In other words, what makes screen violence appealing, especially 
if we dismiss the catharsis theory? Surely there is something about aestheticized ​violence ​ in 
particular that has power. In “Why We Watch,” Jeffrey Goldstein begins his discussion by 
reminding readers that violent imagery or screen violence “is not a single entity” (212). 
Paraphrasing Maurice Bloch, Goldstein argues that “it would be a mistake to regard all displays 
of violence as stemming from the same source or serving the same purposes” (212). Further, he 
notes that what a society regards as “violent,” particularly with regard to representations of 
violence in popular media, “changes from time to time and across media” and that “[m]ost 
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 popular entertainments are devoid of violent images” (213). Goldstein, like McCauley, concludes 
that both aestheticization and context matter a great deal if screen violence is to appeal to, rather 
than alienate, viewers. When discussing the viewer’s need for a sense of safety, Goldstein argues 
that “violent imagery must carry cues to its unreality or it will lose its appeal” (221) and writes:  
Images of carnage on the nightly news are far more disturbing than exploding 
bodies in a war film or the worst images from Mortal Kombat. Without 
background music, awareness of the camera, exaggerated special effects, or film 
editing, images of violence are unattractive to both males and females, according 
to McCauley’s experiments. In the Scandinavian study cited by Joanne Cantor, 
preschool children typically showed facial expressions of joy while watching 
cartoon violence but showed negative emotions while watching realistic physical 
violence.” (220) 
While it is useful to review Goldstein’s ideas, as they corroborate McCauley’s study, he too, at 
least here, only speaks to the alienating potential of screen violence; he does not offer an 
explanation for why it appeals to many viewers. Why do people seek out and apparently enjoy 
enjoy screen violence? 
In his introduction to ​Why We Watch: The Attractions of Violent Entertainment ​, 
Goldstein is a bit more direct when it comes to proposing possible answers to the above question. 
Specifically, citing a need for a discussion about the reception and appeal of violent 
entertainment--he says, “[p]oliticians and others who debate violent entertainment focus only on 
its ​production ​ [and effects] while ignoring its public ​reception ​” (1)--Goldstein suggests that 
while the “suspension of disbelief, the eagerness to pretend, may be a requirement for the 
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 enjoyment of violent entertainment,” it “is also a source of pleasure in itself” (3). Noting that 
fantasy and escapism seem to be inherently enjoyable, he wonders if violence might perhaps 
“add something further to the attractiveness of stories, legends, [and] rituals” (3). While 
Goldstein seems tentative here, surely violence adds “something further” in the form of 
intensifying dramas, cinematic ones and otherwise. While many films feature conflicts that are 
resolved through nonviolent means, audiences (if box office numbers are any indication) 
undeniably flock to theaters to see representations of violent conflicts. Some screen violence is 
obviously gratuitous, however we might define that term, but violence can be and has been used 
in films to intensify narratives, i.e. to raise the stakes, such as in Peckinpah’s ​Straw Dogs ​ (1971), 
by exploring and even exploiting matters of life and death. Further, as Goldstein notes, violence 
can also be used “stylistically to convey countercultural sentiments” (4), which is how Peckinpah 
used it in ​The Wild Bunch ​ (1969) and ​The Getaway​ (1972), for example. The conclusion of 
Dennis Hopper’s ​Easy Rider ​ (1969), when Wyatt and Billy are attacked because of the threat 
they represent to society, is another instance of this function of violence. 
And this is perhaps the most compelling explanation of why screen violence is attractive: 
as Goldstein writes, “[F]or many, it may not be the violence per se but other satisfactions that are 
its main attractants. For the majority of consumers of violent imagery, the violence is a means to 
an end, an acceptable device valued more for what it does than for what it is” (213). In other 
words, screen violence in and of itself is not necessarily what appeals to many viewers, though 
obviously some are motivated by a desire to see representations of violence regardless of its 
function; rather, as was suggested earlier by McCauley, the context of the violence within a 
narrative matters a great deal. Certainly, again, morbid curiosity also motivates some filmgoers, 
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 but, as Goldstein says of the research and analysis included in ​Why We Watch ​, the appeal of 
“violent entertainment may have less to do with our ‘violent nature’ and more to do with 
old-fashioned virtues of morality and justice” (215). Perhaps no film genre reflects this better 
than the Western, which especially before anti- and revisionist Westerns came along, almost 
always represented violence as a means to an end and as a necessary ‘evil.’ Indeed, who was 
performing the violence and how it was performed mattered a great deal, and the implication--if 
not an outright declaration--was that there is ‘good’ violence and ‘bad’ violence or that it could 
be used justly and unjustly. 
As Goldstein and others demonstrate, how violence is represented and how it functions 
within a narrative have a tremendous effect on viewers, especially with regard to the appeal or 
tolerability of this violence. Viewers can stomach or even enjoy screen violence that is a) clearly 
unreal and stylized (i.e. aestheticized) through music and editing and is exaggerated or distorted, 
b) helps to create a compelling fantasy, and c) leads to a relatively predictable outcome in which 
the resolution is just and, in some cases, social order is restored. While some films that subvert 
these qualities can still be enjoyable and effective, they seem to be so because of factors other 
than the inclusion of violence, e.g. their themes are socially or politically profound and timely. 
Though Goldstein admits that our attraction to screen violence might be “an outcome of 
the “civilizing process,” i.e. “a way to fill the void left by diminished opportunities to experience 
the real thing” (217), he concludes that “the best evidence is that the audience is disturbed and 
disgusted by scenes of violence but continues to watch it anyway” (215). In short, it is quite 
possible that some are not so much attracted to screen violence as we, generally, are tolerant of it 
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 as a narrative tool; in other words, we recognize that violence is a reality of life and that its 
presence in society potentially represents both problems and solutions. 
Yet another possibility with regard to the appeal of screen violence is the pure spectacle it 
provides, which in some cases makes the requisite unreality--and the safe distance it creates for 
viewers--even more clear. In terms of genre, action movies are probably the best example of this. 
The violence in a film like Simon West’s ​Con Air ​ (1997), for example, is so over the top that it is 
almost ridiculous to even call it violence, as it is clearly not meant to be realistic; partly because 
of the film’s premise and plot, the violence (between characters) and destruction in the movie are 
obviously fantastic and absurd. In turn, as opposed to being disturbed by the on-screen violence, 
viewers can focus on and appreciate the spectacle created for them. Similarly, viewers can 
appreciate just how this spectacle is staged and aestheticized. The word “art” is not often used to 
describe blockbuster action movies in particular, with their grandiose explosions and often 
mindless dialogue, but the crafting and presentation of screen violence in these films are often 
remarkably impressive, especially in the age of advanced CGI. Surely this type of spectacle is 
attractive to many viewers. 
As a brief aside: Guy Debord, in ​The Society of the Spectacle ​ (1967), was critical of what 
he called the “spectacle” and its power a) to distract people from legitimate political and social 
concerns and b) to facilitate commodification, but I am not necessarily using his precise 
definition of the term here. However, as he writes, the “concept of ‘the spectacle’ interrelates and 
explains a wide range of seemingly unconnected phenomena” (9). While Debord’s theories about 
the power and effect of the spectacle might seem unconnected to a discussion about the appeal of 
screen violence, they arguably intersect vis-a-vis his assertion that “a critique that grasps the 
175 
 spectacle’s essential character reveals it to be a visible ​negation ​ of life--a negation that has taken 
on a ​visible form ​” (9). Again, Debord’s use of “negation” here more closely refers to the 
dehumanizing effects of commodification, but it is interesting that the spectacle of screen 
violence includes representations of death, another form of negation. While Debord might 
suggest we are distracted by screen violence more than it actively appeals to us, though these two 
concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive, I, as others have, would argue that the act of 
viewing screen violence might in fact have actual psychological benefits. Reminding ourselves 
yet again that “screen violence” is a clunky, catch-all term and that films vary wildly in their 
representations of violence and that filmmakers use these representations for different purposes, 
watching violent films might allow viewers to safely explore or experience what Freud calls the 
“death drive” or todestriebe. Some violent films, moreover, can facilitate discussion and thought 
about the relationship between life and death, a topic that is often considered taboo in our 
society. As Debord writes, “The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation 
between people that is mediated by images” (7). If the spectacle has the power and potential to 
inspire negative and destructive relationships between people, could it not also facilitate growth 
and development, somewhat ironically through the presentation of aestheticized violence? 
To return: while it is dangerous to use the one term “screen violence” to discuss various 
types of violent images that are created for different purposes, the points above about 
aestheticization generally hold: viewers are usually disturbed by screen violence that is not 
aestheticized and is without genuine narrative purpose. And, as Stephen Prince writes in 
“Graphic Violence in the Cinema: Origins, Aesthetic Design, and Social Effects,” the medium of 
film “inevitably ​aestheticizes ​ violence. The arousal and expression in cinema of ‘negative’ 
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 emotions--fear, anxiety, pain--typically occur as part of a pleasure-inducing aesthetic 
experience” (27). In other words, the use of screen violence is one effective way for filmmakers 
to create the pleasure many viewers seek; by first arousing those negative emotions, relief and 
pleasure can be provided via the elimination, through aestheticized violence, of those negative 
emotions. So, not only are viewers pleased by the “positive” emotions evoked through a film’s 
narrative, but the screen violence itself, if presented in such a way that it does not excessively 
disturb, can be attractive for its spectacularity. This theory does not explain the type of violence 
in a film like ​Straw Dogs ​, for example, which is genuinely disturbing (and intended to be so), but 
it is nonetheless useful when trying to understand the use and appeal of screen violence in a 
general way. 
With regard to a film like ​Straw Dogs ​ and its depiction of violence, the word “appeal” is 
not particularly appropriate; indeed, though Peckinpah certainly uses violence in that film, as I 
have discussed elsewhere, it is safe to say his goal was not to ‘entertain’ viewers with it. Instead, 
the purpose of the screen violence in that film was to disturb, and its function was to emphasize 
the likewise disturbing theme. The violence is necessary in that it allows Peckinpah to comment 
on issues of barbarism, brutality, and savagery. Indeed, ​Straw Dogs ​ is in many ways a film about 
violence; specifically, it is arguably about what violence does to us (psychologically and 
emotionally) and what either rejecting or embracing it says about us as supposedly civilized 
people. Peckinpah, throughout his filmography, was critical of violence, though many have 
argued that he glorified it through aestheticization. There are few examples in film of violence 
that is more aestheticized than that in ​Straw Dogs ​, yet it is obvious that Peckinpah was saying in 
this film specifically that violence is psychologically devastating and that, as a civilization, we 
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 have the potential and opportunity to resolve conflicts by other means. What is more, this theme 
probably would not have been as clear or effective if brutal, aestheticized violence, the sort that 
affects viewers on both conscious and unconscious levels, had not been used. This film is a great 
example of one that depicts violence not in order to entertain but to inform or instruct, and that is 
where its ‘appeal’ lies. 
Of course, a filmmaker only has so much control over any given viewer’s reaction to 
screen violence. McCauley’s work, as explained above, gives us a sense of how many--or even 
most--people respond to extreme, un-aestheticized violence, but there were outliers in his study, 
viewers who were not nearly as disturbed as the others were. These people are not necessarily 
sociopaths, of course. As Martin Scorsese says of the power of aestheticized screen violence: 
And you can’t stop people from getting an exhilaration from violence, because 
that’s human, very much the same way as you get an exhilaration from the 
violence in ​The Wild Bunch ​. But the exhilaration of the violence at the end of ​The 
Wild Bunch ​ and the violence that’s in ​Taxi Driver ​--because it’s shot a certain 
way, and I know how it’s shot, because I shot it and I designed it--is also in the 
creation of that scene in the editing, in the camera moves, in the use of music, and 
the use of sound effects, and in the movement within the frame of the characters. 
… And that’s where the exhilaration comes in. (qtd. in Prince 27 [from “Graphic 
Violence in the Cinema”]) 
Scorsese’s choice of the word “exhilaration” here is germane: while the violence itself might be 
disturbing, the way in which it is “designed,” as he says, can create in viewers a tremendous 
feeling of suspense or anxiety, which can help a filmmaker convey specific ideas to viewers. 
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 While not all filmmakers who employ violence are commenting on violence as a social 
phenomenon, some certainly do; Peckinpah, for example, at least claimed to belong to the latter 
camp. In other words, representations of violence on the screen can at the very least engage 
viewers on a visceral level, and screen violence can further be used to critique or otherwise 
comment on ‘real world’ violence. We must conclude, however, that films which include truly 
horrifying or relentlessly nauseating depictions of violence represent but a tiny fraction of 
so-called “violent films,” let alone all of cinema as a whole; what is more, even those films that 
do contain disturbing or highly aestheticized violence more often than not, it seems, have an 
agenda apart from mere titillation. 
One final point must be made regarding our relationship with screen violence: viewers’ 
attitudes and tastes obviously change over time, i.e. what audiences at one time or in one 
generation largely find to be morally depraved might be considered relatively mundane just 
several years later. The response to Peckinpah’s ​The Wild Bunch ​ is a perfect example of this. As 
Stephen Prince notes in the introduction (“Graphic Violence in the Cinema: Origins, Aesthetic 
Design, and Social Effects”) to ​Screening Violence ​, preview audiences in 1969 by and large 
abhorred the film. As Prince writes, “Sixty percent of those viewers who turned in [review] cards 
rated the film unfavorably. Only 20 percent rated the film as excellent or outstanding, and these 
tended to be viewers in the 17-25 age group” (25). Some viewers commented that the film was 
“a product of our sick society” and described it as “[n]auseating, unending, [and] offensive” (25). 
One viewer remarked that it was the “kind of picture [mass murderer] Charles Whitman would 
have enjoyed” (25). While Peckinpah most certainly did not create ​The Wild Bunch ​ solely to 
disturb viewers, many at the time only saw the film’s violence; they seemingly were not able to 
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 look beyond it. Of course, this film is now considered a classic and presently occupies a spot on 
many esteemed “top 100” lists (e.g. BFI, Sight & Sound, etc.). Temporal distance and changing 
tastes certainly account, at least partly, for this shift, but the fact that film audiences are 
undoubtedly more sophisticated now--and I mean this in terms of we have come to understand 
the language of cinema--must also be considered. Prince, for example, argues that filmmakers 
“who wish to use graphic violence to offer a counterviolence message--that is, to use violence in 
a way that undercuts its potential for arousing excitatory responses in viewers--may be working 
in the wrong medium” (29). He goes on to suggest that the medium of film inherently promises 
“sensory pleasures,” but Prince seems to think little of viewers’ intelligence and their ability to 
evolve. While the preview audiences for ​The Wild Bunch ​ had a strong negative reaction, to be 
sure, there is little chance that an audience would react similarly if that film was released for the 
first time today. This suggests that on some level viewers, individually and collectively, grow 
more sophisticated with regard to their ability to interpret, understand, and even appreciate 
screen violence. 
 
Time and Influence: 
Screen violence is not even a relatively new phenomenon, of course. Perhaps one of the 
earliest and most iconic examples of it can be found in Edwin S. Porter’s ​The Great Train 
Robbery​ (1903), which contains plenty of roughhousing and gunplay and concludes with the 
bandits’ leader, played by Justus Barnes, aiming his pistol at the camera--and, thus, the film’s 
audience--and firing. Not only was the film wildly popular (notably, the violence it contains is 
decidedly more tame than what would years later disgust audiences, such as those that previewed 
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 The Wild Bunch ​) but it would also influence filmmakers for generations to come; for example, 
the final scene from Scorsese’s ​Goodfellas ​ (1990), in which Joe Pesci’s character fires at the 
camera/audience, is clearly an homage. 
As audiences become more sophisticated, filmmakers evolve--with regard to technique, 
subject matter, etc.--and push the envelope, so to speak. At times, however, and perhaps Penn’s 
Bonnie and Clyde ​ and Peckinpah’s ​The Wild Bunch ​ are prime examples of this, a filmmaker can, 
in the view of some, overstep or advance too quickly, thus alienating or offending viewers. 
Additionally, filmmakers, like artists from all mediums, learn and borrow from their 
predecessors. As filmmakers began borrowing from Penn and Peckinpah with regard to their 
brand of aestheticized screen violence, such images eventually became largely accepted and 
viewed as ‘normal’ (or at least not nearly as disturbing or offensive as they were once 
considered). So-called ‘splatter films,’ for example, like ​Saw​ and ​Hostel​, certainly could not 
have existed even 50 years ago, for instance, and not just because special effects were not yet 
advanced enough but because audiences would not have tolerated their realism before being 
primed. Further, while the ‘gore’ in Herschell Gordon Lewis’ exploitation films of the 1960s and 
‘70s is laughable when viewed through a 21st century lens, it was what was acceptable--to an 
extent--then. In other words, it was a step in a particular direction as opposed to a giant leap. 
The point here is that artistic evolution and innovation are largely due to the influence of 
preceding artists, and this process is what ultimately affects audiences’ tastes and expectations 
and contributes to their maturation as filmgoers. In the interest of space, and because 
Peckinpah’s maturation vis-a-vis screen violence is the principle concern of this chapter, I would 
like to just briefly touch on some specific examples of Peckinpah’s influences and influence. 
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 Namely, I will argue that Akira Kurosawa is, stylistically, his main influence while Quentin 
Tarantino is probably the one filmmaker who took Peckinpah’s brand of screen violence and 
made something, while in ways lacking and imperfect, wholly new with it, for better or worse. 
Obviously, Peckinpah influenced many others--e.g. John Woo, Martin Scorsese, and generally 
the action films of the 1980s and ‘90s--as he was influenced by more artists than Kurosawa, but 
the limited scope here is necessary. 
As Paul Schrader remarks in his essay “Slow, Fast, and Reverse Motion” for ​Film 
Comment​, “In the realm of action sequences, slow motion first moves into poetry in 
[Kurosawa's] ​Seven Samurai​” (54). He continues, “From there it's a short sprint to the moment 
when the toy really becomes a tool, in ​Bonnie and Clyde ​ (67) and ​The Wild Bunch ​ (69)” (54). 
Schrader also notes: 
For ​The Wild Bunch ​, Sam Peckinpah used six cameras to shoot the scene in which 
the bridge is blown up. By using multiple cameras, all filming at different speeds, 
with different lenses and frame sizes, Peckinpah found a way to extend time 
enormously. Nobody had done it quite that way before. Slow motion is employed 
wherever it's useful to extend time—for violent action, for sports, for 
pornography. Maybe that's why the masterful use of slow motion in the massacre 
at the end of ​The Wild Bunch ​ was referred to by critics as the pornography of 
violence: there is something pornographic in extending time to revel in death. It 
takes Warren Oates and Ben Johnson a while to fall after they're shot. Peckinpah's 
use of slow motion isn't manipulative—it's authentically lyrical and morally 
complex. (54) 
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 Stephen Prince, in “The Aesthetic of Slow-Motion Violence in the Films of Sam Peckinpah” 
from ​Screening Violence ​, concurs: “The most important influence [on Peckinpah] is the work of 
Akira Kurosawa because it was Kurosawa who first showed filmmakers how to intercut 
slow-motion and normal-speed footage in scenes of violence” (178). 
Of course, Peckinpah did not develop this technique on his own; the 
influence--specifically in terms of aestheticized death/violence--of a filmmaker like Kurosawa 
was profound and cannot be understated. As James Kendrick notes in ​Film Violence: History, 
Ideology, Genre​, samurai films (or “chanbara”) in Japan emphasized “characters whose 
fundamental trait is an almost supernatural ability to kill, sometimes dozens of opponents at a 
time” (53). Kurosawa, Kendrick continues, “was one of the primary innovators in using 
slow-motion to enhance the effect of [this type of ‘extreme’] violent action, particularly in 
depicting death” (53). The Japanese filmmaker, and particularly in ​Seven Samurai​, was a 
critically important figure in the development of the type of aestheticized violence that would 
become Peckinpah’s trademark (53). Yet, again, evolution is the key; while Peckinpah’s brand of 
screen violence is undoubtedly indebted to someone like Kurosawa, the former did not merely 
reproduce what he had seen earlier. Peckinpah, through the use of even more cameras, additional 
filming speeds, and intense sound design (see ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ and even the 
bulldozer scene in ​Junior Bonner ​, for example, during which Peckinpah used four cameras, two 
shooting at high speed, to create the slow motion effect), was arguably able to build on what 
Kurosawa had done. Changing perspectives and employing asynchronous audio, especially in a 
film like ​Straw Dogs ​ and its infamous rape scene, which I discussed in great detail in a previous 
chapter, were yet other techniques Peckinpah employed in an effort to make his violence more 
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 effective. Additionally, as Prince observes, Kurosawa also experimented with “temporal 
non-synchrony of image and sound” which “accentuates the contrast of footage shot at differing 
camera speeds. The normal-speed sound emphasizes the otherness of the slow-motion image” 
(182). The influence here can clearly be found in the opening shoot-out from ​The Wild Bunch ​. 
Significantly, both Peckinpah and Kurosawa used violence in what I would consider to be an 
effective or purposeful way, i.e. violence is central to their stories and the worlds their characters 
inhabit; conversely, someone like Tarantino (and, to a much lesser extent, Woo) has been 
criticized for incorporating gratuitous violence seemingly for its own sake. 
While Woo, as Christopher Sharrett observes in his introduction to ​Mythologies of 
Violence in Postmodern Media ​, who has been labeled as a “master of screen violence,” creates a 
narrative in ​Hard Target​ that “may be a summary of the neoconservative, late capitalist 
environment, with its tale of the poor being literally hunted down by the rich” and whose 
“moralism and humanism stand at the center of his ironic and critical action films” (17), thus 
making violence serve an important thematic purpose, Tarantino’s films, particularly the early 
ones (e.g. ​Reservoir Dogs ​ and ​Pulp Fiction ​), reflect a kind of nihilism and employ screen 
violence as a form of amusement.  Though Tarantino’s characters do inhabit violent worlds, like 10
Peckinpah’s protagonists  in ​The Wild Bunch ​ and ​Straw Dogs ​, he seems to choose these 
characters/worlds in order to exploit screen violence as opposed to commenting on it. In ​Film 
Violence: History, Ideology, Genre ​, James Kendrick, citing ​Variety​ executive editor Steven 
10 ​Tony Williams, in “Woo’s Most Dangerous Game: ​Hard Target​ and Neoconservative Violence” from 
Mythologies of Violence​, seems to agree that Woo is a more respectable descendent, writing, “Woo’s violent 
representations resemble more a modern dance, a ‘balletic’ recital, than the type of cynical stylistic approaches 
common to most examples of American action cinema” (400). He continues, “Though indebted to Western and 
Hong Kong cinematic traditions, Woo’s references are far removed from the superficial borrowing of recent 
directors like Quentin Tarantino” (400). 
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 Gaydos, notes that Tarantino's films are “comedic and self-referential” and his “stuff isn't really 
about anything.” He contrasts these works with those of Peckinpah and even Samuel Fuller, 
whose films were “very political” and “quite profound” (qtd. in Bygrave 21). It is safe to say that 
many critics feel Tarantino’s brand of violence is relatively unpurposeful, e.g. Bennie driving 
around with Garcia's decapitated head in ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ is not played for 
laughs, as it would be in a Tarantino film; instead, it is evidence of a psychotic break and is the 
result of this character’s fundamental misunderstanding of the effects of violence . A similar 11
charge could be made against Oliver Stone’s ​Natural Born Killers ​ despite what Stone says about 
his goal with that film. In other words, while someone like Tarantino is clearly inspired by 
Peckinpah and, of course, the grindhouse films of the ‘70s, it is perhaps most clear when looking 
at his films that aestheticized violence ceases to serve a message or theme, as it did for Kurosawa 
and Peckinpah, and instead becomes a film’s reason for being. 
 
Screen Violence and Peckinpah’s Final Films: 
The sad truth is that Sam Peckinpah’s final films largely lack the creativity, 
inventiveness, and courage of his earlier ones; not only is the subject matter, except for ​Cross of 
Iron​ (1977), more banal, but after 1974’s ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​ Peckinpah either 
decided to mostly abandon the innovative techniques he had earlier employed or was more 
aggressively controlled by the studios and executives that oversaw his work. In this last section, I 
would like to examine these final films (except for ​Convoy​, which I mention in a previous 
chapter) vis-a-vis Peckinpah’s use of aestheticized violence. The conclusion, unfortunately, must 
11 ​As Owen Gleiberman charges in his review of ​Django Unchained​, for example, that film is to some “a low-down 
orgy of flamboyant cruelty and violence,” and Gleiberman asks, earnestly, if the film is “attacking the cruelty or 
reveling in it.” 
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 be that instead of reflecting the filmmaker’s full realization of his abilities, they are for the most 
part unremarkable action films that by and large adhere to generic conventions without taking 
risks with regard to theme, aestheticization (especially when it comes to the use or presentation 
of violence), or general execution. 
 
Cross of Iron ​(1977): 
While not quite a masterpiece, 1977’s underrated ​Cross of Iron​ reflects Peckinpah’s core 
concerns and demonstrates his technical competency through and through. And, unlike ​The 
Killer Elite ​, which (perhaps along with ​Convoy​) is most out of place in his oeuvre, it continues in 
a meaningful way the psychological explorations started most clearly in ​The Wild Bunch ​, 
specifically a man’s attempt to find camaraderie and meaning in an absurd circumstance that is 
controlled by rich and powerful forces. Even more to the point of this chapter: ​Cross of Iron 
exhibits sophisticated editing techniques, set and staging decisions, and sound design that all 
help Peckinpah to facilitate this exploration. 
In short, ​Cross of Iron​ is about Sergeant Steiner (James Coburn), a German/Nazi platoon 
leader, who disdains Hitler, the Nazis, and nationalism but who fights in order to protect the men 
under his command. As one character, apparently echoing Steiner’s convictions, says: these 
soldiers are not fighting for ideals or for their nation/party but for their lives. Even after suffering 
a concussion and being told he can leave the war and return home, Steiner elects to rejoin his 
platoon, apparently because a) he does not know what else he would do with himself and b) he 
does not trust other leaders to keep his men safe. These are themes, of course, that Peckinpah 
began playing with nearly a decade earlier. And like some of Peckinpah’s earlier characters, 
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 Steiner, as Cordell Strug puts it, is “an exploration of how to live in this world: he has the skill 
that binds him to it, the disgust and hatred that sever him from it” (144). 
In addition to exploring Steiner’s need for meaning and purpose in an inherently violent 
and absurd context, Peckinpah also (and again) explores the tensions between members of 
different classes. Early in the film, Captain Stransky, a French aristocrat, joins Steiner’s outfit 
and makes it clear that he elected to come to the Russian front solely to earn the Iron Cross. His 
declaration strikes those (poor and unprivileged) men who must be there as patently stupid. To 
Stransky, the war is like a vacation: he can come and go as he pleases, and thus he is relatively 
safe. After abusing his power, making false claims regarding his right to an Iron Cross (he 
suggests he led a counterstrike when in reality he was not even on the battlefield), failing to 
coerce Steiner into backing up his story, and ordering troops to murder some of Steiner’s men, 
Stransky is led by Steiner to what we can only assume is his death. Earlier in the film, Steiner 
comments that the rich always survive, so it is significant that Steiner works to ensure that 
Stransky will not, as Steiner presumably sees him and his class, i.e. those with political and 
economic power, as responsible for the war and the soldiers’ lot (at one point, Steiner declares 
that he hates his military uniform and everything it represents). As different but insignificant as 
The Killer Elite ​ is in the context of Peckinpah’s other films, Steiner’s view here is similar to 
what Mac says and represents in that film. 
With regard to the use and presentation of aestheticized screen violence in this film, 
Peckinpah’s techniques are undoubtedly more sophisticated than they were in ​The Killer Elite ​, 
which features some slow motion but, even then, the resulting effect is ultimately lackluster. In 
Cross of Iron​, on the other hand, timely inserted slow motion, rapid cuts, montage, squibs and 
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 fake blood, copious amounts of dust, cacophonic explosions, soldiers’ cries, et cetera all serve to 
establish the chaos and brutality of war, and viewers in turn resent Stransky and his class for 
subjecting people like Steiner and his men, with whom we are clearly meant to identify, to this 
reality. Here the technique and style serves Peckinpah’s themes; the violence is neither 
pedestrian (as it is in ​The Killer Elite ​) nor glamorous, and the resulting spectacle motivates 
viewers to question the necessity of the type of real violence being represented on screen. 
The important point here is that with regard to McCauley’s study, Peckinpah’s screen 
violence in ​Cross of Iron​ is aestheticized enough to be clearly representational, even when it is 
‘disturbing’ or makes viewers uncomfortable; its purpose is to inspire reflection, not revulsion. 
In other words, the use of slow motion and blood that is obviously fake (and Peckinpah’s 
decision to avoid the use of gore), for example, allows viewers to recognize that the violence is 
crafted. By contrast, the violence in a film like ​The Killer Elite ​ is meant to be, for lack of a better 
word, entertaining; it is stylized in the way that martial arts films of the era presented violence: it 
is meant to thrill viewers as opposed to engaging them intellectually. As Prince writes in 
Screening Violence ​, “Changing camera positions, controlled lighting, montage editing, music, 
and special effects create significant aesthetic pleasure and emotional distance for viewers, who 
can use these cues as a means of insulating themselves from the depicted violence” (28), and 
there is much more of this type of aestheticization in ​Cross of Iron​ than in ​The Killer Elite ​, 
which might at the very least suggest Peckinpah was more personally invested in ​Cross ​ and its 
themes, even though ​Elite​ does still deal with camaraderie and isolation. Regardless, the bigger 
point is that this film does not exist merely as a vehicle for violence, as some films arguably do. 
As Prince notes, “In the culture of ultraviolence that now engulfs the medium, moviemakers 
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 operate in a kind of postmodern bubble, treating violence as an image and not as a social 
process” (33). For Peckinpah, though, screen violence was a tool that was still sharp during the 
crafting of ​Cross of Iron​; as Gerard Camy, in “Dawn and Dusk” from ​Peckinpah Today ​, writes 
about the film, here Peckinpah “explores the aspects of violence in its complete social dimension 
by diving into the inferno of World War II” and while “he denounces the individual competition 
that is constitutive of capitalism, he keeps entire faith in man” (164). To Peckinpah, for the most 
part, representing violence as “a social process” was critically important; treating it as ​just​ an 
image or spectacle serves no larger purpose. 
 
THE OSTERMAN WEEKEND​ (1983): 
As Peckinpah’s final film, ​The Osterman Weekend ​ is fitting: not only does it continue 
with some of the themes that occupied most of his earlier films (e.g. camaraderie, loyalty, 
corruption, power, individuation, etc.), but it also features some of the same shooting and editing 
techniques, especially with regard to aestheticized violence, that he had employed and developed 
throughout his career. (Somewhat appropriately, Peckinpah also battled with the film’s 
producers--as he had during the production of several other films--who significantly re-edited his 
cut of the movie.) This, however, is a relatively odd film to look at as his final achievement as it, 
similar to ​The Killer Elite ​, is more of a thriller than anything else; it is certainly far removed 
from Peckinpah’s Westerns both in style (genre) and substance. Not only is the film’s plot rather 
convoluted, but its use of screen violence is not particularly effective and demonstrates that there 
is not a clear line of evolution vis-a-vis technique throughout Peckinpah’s oeuvre. In other 
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 words, his swan song is hardly a crowning achievement and is definitely not representative of a 
fully realized vision. 
The Osterman Weekend ​’s plot centers around John Tanner (Rutger Hauer), the host of a 
talk show called ​Face to Face ​ on which the politically powerful are routinely taken to task, who 
is convinced by CIA director Danforth (Burt Lancaster) and agent Laurence Fassett (John Hurt) 
to get his college friends (played by Dennis Hopper, Craig T. Nelson, and Chris Sarandon), who 
Fassett alleges are part of KGB-allied spy group called Omega, to turn on one another. As 
Tanner gathers his friends at his house for a weekend reunion, it is revealed that Fassett is 
manipulating him in an effort to get revenge on Danforth, who had Fassett’s wife murdered. 
Eventually, Tanner, through some manipulation of his own, is able to rescue his wife, child, and 
dog from Fassett, who had kidnapped them. Though much of the film’s logic is questionable, the 
principal concern here is Peckinpah’s technique and how it does or does not aid in his attempt to 
convey certain themes. 
While ​The Osterman Weekend ​ is probably most appropriately categorized as a thriller, it 
does contain some action, i.e. screen violence, particularly after Fassett’s ruse becomes apparent 
to Tanner. Tanner’s wife shoots an agent with a bow and arrow, for example, and there is a fair 
amount of gunplay and even a ridiculous RV explosion. Unfortunately, none of this action is 
particularly well aestheticized--aside from Peckinpah’s characteristic use of slow motion and 
some sound that is manipulated--and is not used in any meaningful way to comment on the 
nature of violence in society (as we saw in ​Cross of Iron​, for example), though both Danforth 
and Fassett, who represent power or the elite, are quick to resort to assassination to achieve their 
personal goals and apparently see ordinary citizens as pawns in their game, as Fassett is watching 
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 a baseball game on television as he is orchestrating the dissolution of the Osterman group; the 
violence in ​The Osterman Weekend ​, however, is somehow more personal (it plays like a home 
invasion movie) and not as clearly indicative of systemic problems as it could be, and in this way 
its employment is less sophisticated and effective than we see in other Peckinpah films, namely 
The Wild Bunch ​, ​Straw Dogs ​, ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo Garcia ​, and ​Cross of Iron​. 
If anything, ​The Osterman Weekend ​ is ostensibly about the relationship between power 
and surveillance, and as a result even its relatively small amount of violence can be viewed as 
gratuitous since it is simply not necessary to employ in service of this theme. Even Gerard Camy, 
who praises the film in “Dawn and Dusk” from ​Peckinpah Today ​, admits that “Peckinpah was 
more interested in the relationships between the characters [in this film] than in the plot itself” 
(180). And because the plot clearly has issues, it is difficult to say anything more definitive 
regarding the film’s theme or argument other than that Peckinpah seems to suggest here that 
“society at large is nothing but a gigantic place of corruption and disorder, and his film is the 
mirror of cold, barbaric behavior” (Camy 179). Though, again, it is not necessary to use screen 
violence to communicate this, and its presence is at least part of the reason why some viewers 
see the film as absurd and incoherent. What’s more, the aestheticization of the screen violence 
that is used only serves to unnecessarily disorient viewers, though it is not close to reaching the 
level of severity of the “disgust films” from McCauley’s study; contrast this with the disorienting 
violence in ​Cross of Iron​ that serves a purpose with regard to that film’s theme, and it is not 
difficult to understand why ​The Osterman Weekend ​ was panned by most critics upon its release 
and has largely been forgotten by mainstream audiences. 
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 Conclusion 
 
While Peckinpah might never shake his reputation as “Bloody Sam,” one of my goals 
with this project was to better understand how he used screen violence and, ultimately, to argue 
that this violence was often carefully and purposefully crafted in service of his thematic 
concerns. In other words, while Peckinpah could be guilty of occasionally exploiting violence, 
more often than not this violence was employed to illustrate and argue against the savagery he 
saw as inherent in an ostensibly civilized society. Power, money, and corruption function to 
oppress Peckinpah’s protagonists, and he represented their only path to freedom--and, with it, 
individuation--as one of rebellion against and the total rejection of the economic systems that 
entrap them. For Peckinpah, the only way to escape, the only way to live a moral, virtuous life, is 
to defeat those who aim to hold you down and to take (through necessarily violent means) and 
use their capital to essentially buy your freedom. What’s more, Peckinpah argued that one can 
never be truly free within an established society; instead, his protagonists must create a new 
Eden outside of society where they are unburdened by regulations, control, manipulation, and so 
on. 
Cable Hogue, for example, created a utopia in the middle of the desert, where he thrives 
until he is struck down and killed by an automobile, a symbol of the very society and civilization 
he sought to escape. Further, Hogue finds himself unjustly punished by a wrathful, petty 
god--another representative of power in Peckinpah’s films who acts selfishly and violently. God, 
of course, is out of Hogue’s physical reach; Hogue does not have the ability to rebel against this 
power in the way other Peckinpah characters do: they can fight and then flee. For Hogue, there is 
no escape. 
192 
 Amy and David in ​Straw Dogs ​, on the other hand, must fight their antagonists, a mob of 
violent and depraved villagers who rape Amy and attempt to kill David. For this couple, violence 
is a necessary evil; the villagers are predators who will not listen to reason. And while the 
violence is necessary, Peckinpah shows it to be both physically and psychologically destructive: 
David fights and, in a way, wins, but he admits at the end of the film to being lost, as his violent 
rebellion has fundamentally shaken his own ideas about himself and what he believes in and 
stands for. Even in victory David loses, and the villagers are responsible for this corruption; his 
freedom is impossible within their society, and the only way for him to rediscover or reestablish 
his sense of self is to escape, though to where remains an open question. Regardless, what 
Peckinpah suggested in this film was that violence is ultimately dehumanizing (we see this in 
how he films Amy’s rape, for example, and in the aforementioned aftermath of the siege), a tool 
used by the powerful to control others, to maintain the desired form of order and obedience. But, 
again, Peckinpah’s uncomfortable truth was that the only way to overcome violence is through 
violence. Like we see in many Westerns, though, a protagonist can remain virtuous even if (s)he 
engages in violence as long as that violence is necessary and its use measured. 
Peckinpah’s road movies, particularly ​The Getaway​ and ​Bring Me the Head of Alfredo 
Garcia ​, continued to explore this theme. But unlike other existential road movies being made at 
the time ( ​Easy Rider ​ and ​Vanishing Point​, for example), Peckinpah kept insisting that his 
libertarian brand of freedom was possible. Doc and Carol rebel against and take from the 
powerful and corrupt figures around them so that they can essentially purchase their freedom in 
the form of an escape to Mexico, a country that Peckinpah often depicted as a contemporary 
Eden. These two characters, while presented as imperfect, nonetheless represent Peckinpah’s 
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 belief in the power and value of family, and their love for one another is what helps them 
survive. On the contrary, Bennie’s depraved actions in ​Garcia ​are what ensure his failure; the 
fact that he comes to embrace and embody the amoral, corrupt behavior to which he was initially 
opposed is what, in Peckinpah’s world, makes him unworthy of success and independence. 
Again, this is in stark contrast to the deaths of many protagonists from other road movies of the 
time who are cruelly and unjustly stamped out by the larger society; these characters cannot 
survive, in other words, and there is no possibility of escape for them. Peckinpah romantically 
saw escape and liberation as possible, but only if one behaves morally. 
The final chapter of this project took a closer look at the evolution, uses, and effects of 
aestheticized screen violence. Specifically, the “traditional” morality of earlier Westerns was a 
clear influence on Peckinpah; he often presented violent battles between good and evil, though 
he also explored the ambiguity and complexity of the anti-Western. The relationship between 
violence and morality, then, was his principle obsession, and he attempted to articulate his ideas 
about this relationship through the careful and sometimes artful manipulation of images and 
sounds. From a technical perspective, Peckinpah was arguably most directly influenced by Akira 
Kurosawa, who mastered the art of multi-camera filming, asynchronous sonic and visual editing, 
and the general aestheticization of screen violence. 
Certainly, Peckinpah’s body of work, like most artists who have long enough careers, is 
uneven. Some of his films, e.g. ​The Killer Elite ​, are banal in nearly every way imaginable. 
Whether this fluctuation in quality can be attributed to his drug abuse, infamously troubled 
relationship with producers and studio executives, failed artistic attempts, or some combination 
of these and other factors, there is also no denying that he left behind a legacy that continues to 
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 interest cinephiles and inspire filmmakers. Beyond his technical achievements, his thematic 
concerns remain relevant to this day. Neoliberal economic policies, corrupt lawmakers and 
business executives, and state-sanctioned violence (whether we think of the police or the 
military) continue to alienate and control ordinary people in explicit and insidious ways. But how 
to respond? This was the question Peckinpah attempted to answer over and over again in his 
work. Some of his ideas were naive and some were flatly unrealistic, but there is a love for 
humanity at the heart of most of his work, a love for man and the ideals of freedom and justice 
that, when we look beyond the blood and violence (or, more accurately, see them for what they 
are), can strike viewers as profoundly humane and empathetic. After all, as good of a filmmaker 
as Peckinpah could be, he was probably an even better poet. 
This project owes a debt of gratitude to both the Peckinpah scholars (usually supporters) 
and critics who have carefully studied and passionately debated his work for nearly 50 years 
now. I lost track of how many times throughout my research for this project that my thinking 
about the director shifted and changed, and I am grateful for the opportunity these writers 
provided me to grow as a student of film. Similarly, I am grateful to thinkers like Erich Fromm 
and Carl Jung, whose works allowed me to see Peckinpah’s films in ways I otherwise would not 
have. Their fiercely humanistic ideas have influenced not only how I think about the movies I 
discussed in this project but have also forever changed the way I think about the relationship 
between power or authority and our processes of individuation. While, like Peckinpah, I might 
not have the answer with regard to how one can become truly free in the context of a larger 
society, compassion for one another is something we can practice on a daily basis and it need not 
necessarily come at the expense of our individual freedom; to the contrary, practicing 
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 compassion for others can, in many ways, make us more free. It might strike some as ironic that 
a sentiment like this comes at the end of a study of “Bloody Sam,” but after researching his films 
and the scholarship that surrounds them, it’s an idea I think he believed and one we’d all be wise 
to consider. 
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